Translated material
Eastern Europe: dangers and opportunities
At the same time, the balance of power along the outer perimeter of Eastern Europe is changing. The collapse of the Orange coalition in Ukraine brought to power a government much less open to reform or less committed to rapprochement with the West. This will likely slow down not only Ukraine's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, but also reforms in other republics of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, after a decade of weakness and passivity, Russia has again emerged as an important regional and international actor, especially in the energy field.
Although these changes have important implications for US interests, they have gone largely unnoticed by policymakers in Washington. Over the past several decades, America has spent a lot of energy and resources supporting a free and whole Europe. If Eastern Europe reverts to the old pattern of nationalism and localism and European integration stalls, many of these investments will be wasted.
Reform fatigue
Overall, the last decade has been a period of economic growth and increased prosperity for Eastern Europe. Recently, however, the course of liberal economic reforms has changed direction. Pro-European and pro-market parties have lost support and have been replaced in some countries by coalitions with nationalist and populist slogans.
Poland represents the clearest manifestation of this trend, which began there with the victory of the conservative Law and Justice (LS) party, led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, in parliamentary elections in September 2005. The PS consolidated its electoral success by winning the presidential election a few weeks later. Lech Kaczynski, Jaroslaw's twin brother, unexpectedly defeated Donald Tusk, the candidate of the Civic Platform, which advocates rapprochement with the European Union and market reforms. The Kaczynski brothers are suspicious of market reforms and advocate a strong role for the state in the economy and other areas such as education and the media. In international affairs, the PS seeks to strengthen Poland's "national interests", which has led to conflicts with the EU and with some neighbors, in particular Germany. In domestic politics, the PS’s point of view on a large number of social issues (for example, the rights of sexual minorities) does not coincide with the position of many Western European states and is a source of additional tension.
This rightward drift in Polish politics is underscored by the entry into the ruling coalition of two fringe parties - the populist Self-Defense Party, whose main supporters are farmers, and the Catholic League of Polish Families. Both oppose market reforms and are critical of EU membership.
Forces hostile to economic liberalization also came to power in Slovakia. In the June 2006 parliamentary elections, the Social Democracy party, led by populist Robert Fico, won a decisive victory over the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union, the party of Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda. Despite Dzurinda's impressive record of economic and social reform, Slovak voters have turned against him in favor of Fico and a coalition that includes two right-wing parties hostile to market reforms.
The surprise victory of Rolandas Paksas over incumbent President Valdas Adamkus in the Lithuanian presidential election in December 2002 is another example of the rise of populism in the region. The elections took place just weeks after Lithuania received an invitation to join NATO and the European Union. Given the key role Adamkus played in achieving these long-standing national goals, he was expected to easily prevail. However, Paksas skillfully conducted the election campaign, focusing it on socio-economic issues. (Paksas was later removed from the presidency, but the fact that he won at all is noteworthy.)
At first glance, the victories of nationalists and populists seem paradoxical, given the recent economic growth and prosperity in much of Eastern Europe. However, the region also faces a concomitant rise in inequality and unemployment. It is mainly the largest cities that are prospering, while smaller towns and rural areas have suffered from the reforms. It was here that people voted for nationalists and populists who promised them less reform and more social justice.
Poland's Law and Justice Party, for example, finds support in the agricultural east and the Rust Belt (areas hit hard by post-communist economic reforms), while the more progressive Civic Platform is popular in Warsaw and in the more prosperous north and west of the country. In addition, right-wing parties benefit from the population’s negative reaction to corruption. In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, many officials were involved in scandals, and their rivals actively used these cases during their election campaigns.
In addition, Eastern Europe is undergoing an important process of generational leadership change that could have far-reaching consequences for the political future of the region. This phenomenon was especially noticeable in the Czech Republic, where the resignation of President Vaclav Havel, who embodied the conscience of the Czechoslovak “Velvet Revolution”, sharply affected the situation in the country. Havel's successor, Vaclav Klaus, is a Eurosceptic who lacks Havel's international weight.
In Poland, many influential figures of the Solidarity movement, who led the fight to overthrow communism, also retired or were pushed to the margins of political life. The most prominent of them, Lech Walesa, the leader of the movement and the first President of Poland, retired into majestic seclusion in Gdansk. A similar process is observed in the Baltic countries. The death of Lennart Meri, the great patriarch of Estonian politics and the first post-communist president, left behind a political vacuum. In Lithuania, President Adamkus, who was re-elected after Paksas's impeachment in 2004 and oversaw the country's entry into NATO and the EU, is still respected, but he is 80 years old and the end of his career is looming.
The leaders of Eastern Europe can be compared to the first generation of statesmen who reconstructed Europe after the Second World War, such as Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi, Charles de Gaulle and Jean Monnet. Havel, Walesa and others similarly laid the political foundation for the post-communist course of Eastern Europe.
But now this generation is leaving the political scene. And in its place comes a new crop of leaders for whom the communist era is a distant memory and who increasingly see the United States as a guiding light and source of inspiration. As the memory of the communist era fades, the ardent Atlanticism of the first generation of Eastern European leaders is likely to wane.
New NATO, new challenges
All Eastern European countries saw NATO membership as a defense against a resurgent Russia, considering membership a key security goal. However, the NATO of which these countries have become members is significantly different from what existed during the Cold War era. The Old Alliance was formed to keep the USSR from attacking its member countries; the new one is designed to counter threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, rogue states, and other dangers emanating from beyond European borders.
NATO's transformation poses several important challenges for its new members. In less than ten years they had to carry out two revolutions in the military field. The first was that countries were forced to adapt their outdated, tank-heavy militaries inherited from the Warsaw Pact to NATO standards at a time when their economies were weak and undergoing radical restructuring. No sooner had they begun these very disruptive (and costly) changes than they were faced with the even more difficult task of adapting their armies to an Alliance that increasingly focused on flexible and mobile forces capable of rapid deployment to remote “hot spots” for long periods of time. periods.
The fundamental dilemma facing Eastern European states today is whether to join these efforts to develop high-tech expeditionary forces that can successfully operate alongside other NATO troops in remote regions such as Afghanistan.
The transformation of NATO military formations is also a serious psychological challenge. A number of statesmen in Eastern Europe still see security as the defense of their own territory. In Poland, for example, many PS leaders support the idea of maintaining a large regular army based on compulsory conscription as a defense against a resurgent Russia. But Polish defense reformers say their country needs a small, professional army that can contribute to NATO's new missions.
Integration frustration
The recent addition of eight Eastern European countries to the European Union (two more, Bulgaria and Romania, will join in 2007) has significantly affected the political balance and decision-making process in the Alliance. In particular, enlargement has made it much more difficult for France and Germany - the main drivers of European Union integration in the past - to steer the process of unification and enlargement in a way that turns the EU into a counterweight to American power. Debates within the European Union on the eve of the Iraq War revealed how enlargement had changed the political dynamics within the organization. While France and Germany opposed the outbreak of war, the leaders of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, together with the leaders of Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Great Britain, openly supported the US position. This divergence clearly showed that the views of Paris and Berlin are no longer the views of the entire European Union and that the new member states intend to play an important role in building a new Europe.
On the other hand, the slowdown in reforms in the European Union since the Lisbon summit in spring 2000 (at which members decided to strengthen the EU's research capacity, promote entrepreneurship and support the use of information technology) has complicated the integration of new members. Richer countries are increasingly reluctant to provide large sums of money to help poorer ones.
The Services Directive, adopted by the EU Council of Ministers at the end of May 2006, was another slap in the face for new members. They wanted their workers and service companies to have greater access to markets throughout the European Union. It was assumed that this measure would lead to the creation of a single, borderless market for service providers, who account for more than two-thirds of the EU's GDP. However, the final version of this directive was more moderate in nature: this was the result of the efforts of France and other Western European countries, which feared the influx of cheap labor.
Economic protectionism within the old EU member states has actually only increased over the past year. Calls for economic patriotism led to efforts to create national "heavyweights" designed to protect key strategic industries from foreign competition. Thus, the Spanish government promoted the merger of Spanish energy companies Endesa and Gas Natural in order to prevent the latter from being taken over by German utility giant E.ON. To prevent the Italian energy concern Enel from taking over the Franco-Belgian utility Suez , Paris arranged its merger with the state utility Gaz de France .
A similar trend is developing in Eastern Europe, where the influence of Eurosceptics is growing. In early 2006, the European Union threatened to sue Poland when its government tried to block an attempt by Italian banking group UniCredit to merge a Polish bank it controlled with a newly acquired German one. Weeks later, Poland provoked the ire of Brussels by blocking a value-added tax decision that had been approved by all other 24 member states.
However, nationalist and populist parties in Eastern Europe are unlikely to take radical steps to cut their countries' ties with the European Union. First, their Euroscepticism is not shared by the general population. Secondly, Eastern European countries are the main recipients of EU development assistance.
Identity crisis
Membership of the European Union also highlighted the tension between Eastern Europe's commitment to Atlanticism and its European identity. This is most clearly evident in the defense sector. Mostly, Eastern European countries believe that the US presence in the region is absolutely necessary for their security and do not want to reduce it. At the same time, they do not want to be forced to choose between America and Western Europe, but strive to maintain good relations with each of them. Eastern European countries were therefore uncomfortable in the run-up to the Iraq War, when the Bush administration attempted to draw a line between old and new Europe as a tactic to force them to choose sides. This sense of discomfort has also found expression in the region's simultaneous support for the EU's common defense and security policy, provided that ties with NATO are not weakened as a result.
This tension was felt to the greatest extent in Poland due to Warsaw’s particularly close ties with Washington. Some EU officials have warned Poland that it should temper its pro-American enthusiasm now that it is a member of the European Union. Warsaw's decision to purchase American F-16s instead of fighters produced by European countries has extremely irritated European officials. They believed that Poland should purchase goods on the continent.
However, it would be wrong to assume that EU newcomers will automatically follow the US line in everything. On many foreign policy issues, most related to Iraq, the views of the population of Eastern European countries are not particularly different from the views of residents of other European countries. This attitude limits the extent to which even populist or nationalist governments can deviate from the mainstream of European politics. Moreover, Eastern European countries have strong economic reasons for maintaining close ties with old Europe, especially Germany, which for most of them is a major trading partner and leading investor.
Even in Poland, the most pro-American state in Eastern Europe, public support for the European Union is growing noticeably, primarily among young people. This phenomenon is partly a consequence of Poland's expanding integration with Europe. But it also reflects disappointment in current US policy, which concerns mainly Iraq. Many also feel that the Bush administration is taking Polish support too much for granted and is unwilling to take into account Poland's important interests, especially the desire of its citizens to enter the United States without a visa. If these sentiments intensify, they could weaken Warsaw's traditionally strong pro-American orientation.
New ties
The changing political climate in Eastern Europe also affects patterns of interaction within the region. Over the past decade, Eastern European states have shown a high degree of regional solidarity. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia created the Vsegrad group to promote economic and political cooperation and to coordinate politics before the first round of NATO and the European Union. Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, Croatia and Estonia united in 2000 into the Vilnius group, or B-10, in order to promote the solidarity and cooperation of countries striving to join NATO.
Although the countries of the New Europe have a number of general characteristics (first of all, the desire to discard the political and economic shackles worn by communism and integrate with Euro -Atlantic institutions), they are a heterogeneous group with very dissimilar historical and cultural traditions and various levels of economic development. Slovenia, for example, has more in common with Hungary and Austria than with Bulgaria or Romania. Poland has closer relations with the United States than with many neighboring countries or even Western Europe. Even among the Baltic states - probably the most homogeneous group of the countries of New Europe - there are important differences. Lithuania is historically tightly connected with Poland and considers itself part of Central Europe to the same extent as part of the Baltic states. Estonia maintains closer relations with Finland than with most countries of Eastern Europe.
After the goal - joining the EU and NATO - turned out to be achieved, regional cooperation of recent years can give way to existing differences and lead to regrouping. For example, Poland may move in the direction of the "Big Five" by NATO (Great Britain, Germany, Spain, Italy and France). And Hungary - to establish closer cooperation with the countries of Central Europe, such as Austria, Slovenia and Croatia, and with regions such as, for example, Bavaria. Baltic states, in turn, can more closely bring their policy closer to the policy of the Scandinavian countries.
At the same time, new political ties begin to arise. The most significant event in this sense was the far-reaching rapprochement between Poland and Ukraine-a process launched in the early 1990s. Historically, relations between these two states were characterized by very increased tension and mutual distrust. However, over the past one and a half decades, both countries managed to overcome mutual hostility and establish exceptionally heart relations.
However, the recent decay of the “orange” coalition meant the failure of efforts aimed at strengthening the ties of Ukraine with the West. In the new government of national unity, led by Viktor Yanukovych, figures belonging to the era of Leonid Kuchma discredited itself. Although President Viktor Yushchenko adheres to the pro-Western course, including ultimately membership in NATO and the European Union, his power is limited to the constitutional reforms put into effect in January 2006, which expanded the powers of the prime minister.
The Ukrainian turn, in all likelihood, will seriously affect other countries - the former republics of the Soviet Union in the region and create significant difficulties in the implementation of their pro -Western courses. Moscow may experience a temptation to increase pressure on both countries in order to stop their connection with Europe and the USA. In Belarus, President Alexander Lukashenko, the last dictator in Europe, will feel that his hands are untied for unpunished tightening of his authoritarian rule.
The collapse of the "orange" coalition in Ukraine in particular hit Poland. The Polish government had to fight to preserve some of its influence in Kyiv.
Return of Russia
The process of changes on the eastern periphery of Europe is intensified due to the fact that Russia regains the role of an influential regional and international player. Under Boris Yeltsin, the Kremlin pursued a policy of benevolent indifference to most of the countries of the former eastern bloc and, with the exception of the noisy and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to stop the first round of NATO expansion, mainly ignored the region.
Now this period of negligence is over. President Vladimir Putin began to make systematic efforts to restore Russia's influence in Eastern Europe and its periphery. Instead of, like his Soviet predecessors, to rely on military power, Putin seeks to use economic tools (primarily the export of Russian energy) to expand the power and influence of Moscow.
In the Baltic countries, Russia tried to ensure that Latvia’s energy sector has to have an economic influence, making an export oil terminal in Ventspils, one of the few non -freezing ports of the Baltic region. In early 2003, the Russian State Monopoly Company Transneft stopped supplying oil to Ventspils, which inflicted serious economic losses to him. According to Transneft, it reduced supplies, as she directed oil to her own terminal in Primorsk, in the Gulf of Finland. The true goal of this step, however, apparently, was to force Ventspils's leadership to sell Transneft control over the port.
Russia applied similar tactics in Lithuania. In July, Transneft stopped supplying raw oil to the largest oil refinery in Lithuania - the Mazheikyaysky. The gap occurred only a few weeks after the Lithuanian government, the Russian oil company Yukos, as well as the Polish PKN Orlen concern, concluded a deal with each other that would allow the latter to buy an enterprise. Most observers regarded the suspension of supplies as an attempt to change the terms of the transaction in favor of Yukos.
Putin tried to use energy weapons against Yushchenko. The Moscow’s decision made in December 2005 to significantly raise the prices of the gas supplied by Kyiv had some economic grounds (he paid for Russian gas at prices below the market), but it was clearly designed to aggravate Ukrainian economic problems and the weakening of Yushchenko’s position in the pre-government of the parliamentary elections.
The revival of Russia as a strong and confident political and economic player who has an impact on its neighbors coincided with another important trend - the intensification of relations between Russia and Germany, especially in the field of energy. Under the former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, the German strategy was based on the principle of “the main thing - Russia”, when the priority for Berlin was to strengthen ties with Moscow, primarily economic. The most controversial aspect of this growing economic cooperation was an agreement on the construction of a gas pipeline on the bottom of the Baltic Sea, directly connecting Germany and Russia. The document was signed in September 2005, shortly before Schroeder left his post. The deal caused indignation in Poland and the Baltic states, since Russia will allow Russia to stop gas supply to these countries without prejudice to supplying Western Europe.
The hopes of Eastern Europe that Germany’s policy will change under the Chancellor of Angel Merkel did not materialize. Although Merkel did not follow such an openly pro -Russian policy as Schroeder, the changes basically touched tone and style, and not the essence. Merkel still gives priority to the expansion of economic ties with Russia and refused to cancel the construction of the North European gas pipeline.
The activation of Russian-German cooperation is disturbed by many countries of Eastern Europe, who are afraid that this process can lead to the New Rapallo, namely that Russia and Germany will begin to cooperate behind the back of Eastern Europe and the West, just as they did in The period between the First and Second World Wars. However, these fears are exaggerated. Today, although Berlin has important economic interests in Russia, he will hardly defend them to the harm that unites him with the West.
In order to calm the anxiety of Eastern Europe, Germany, it is necessary to balance its strategic interest in economic cooperation with Russia more dynamic OSTPOLITIK (Eastern Policy. - Ed .). At the same time, the focus of attention should be an increase in efforts to improve relations with Poland, which became significantly aggravated after the end of the German Chancellor Helmut Kolya and urgently need restoration.
But these steps to meet you should not be one -sided. Poland must also do its part of the work. So far, the Polish leadership showed little interest in rapprochement with Germany. However, such a policy is short -sighted. Warsaw cannot afford a single strategy, especially during the period when Moscow rattles its energy weapons. Poland needs allies, and above all in Berlin.
American Ostpolitik
Events in Eastern Europe require more attention from Washington. This task is also an urgent nature because the process of integration of the European Union has stalled, and Russia, which is kept afloat, is assigned to act assertively and self -confident. East European countries are concerned about these trends and are waiting for signals that the United States is attentive to their security.
One of the most important steps that Washington could take was to mitigate the hard restrictions on the issuance of visas introduced after the events of September 11, 2001. The softening of these strict measures would eliminate a large irritating factor in relations between Washington and Eastern Europe and significantly contribute to the improvement of the image of America in the region, especially among the young generation.
In addition, Washington should not try to draw demarcation lines within Europe or set up one part of it against the other. Such a policy is counterproductive. It will not only push the key Western European allies, whose support is necessary to answer new security challenges, but will also cause a sense of discomfort among the leaders of the Eastern European countries. They do not want them to be forced to choose between the United States and Europe.
Instead, the United States should support closer integration of Eastern Europe with the European Union. The chairmanship of Germany in the EU in the first half of 2007 will provide a good opportunity to give this process a political impetus. Such actions could give a new impetus to the development of the partnership of Germany and the United States, who seriously affected during the years of the Schroeder reign, and again confirm the adherence of the United States to strengthen stability and security in Europe after a split on the problem of Iraq.
Washington should also encourage Warsaw to play a constructive role in Europe and make more efforts to strengthen ties with neighbors, especially with Berlin. Good relations between Poland and Germany are a necessary condition for stability in Central Europe.
The missile defense will seem to be an important issue in bilateral relations between the United States and Poland. Warsaw showed interest in the possible deployment of a pro system in its territory. However, Washington should not accept the consent of Warsaw as something granted. According to Polish laws, any agreement should be ratified by parliament, and the country's government will have to explain how the rocket shield will be able to strengthen its own security, and not just US security. Washington needs to realize the political nature of the debate in Warsaw and work more efficiently on the provision of actual data proving the benefits of the deployment of the PCs in Polish territory. It is necessary to keep in mind the influence of this step on the safety of the expanded Baltic region, including how it will affect relations with Russia.
Finally, the United States should support the integration of Ukraine into Euro -Atlantic institutions, including NATO. However, given that the orientation and priorities of the Yanukovych government have not yet acquired clear contours, it should be given to Kyiv time to prove himself before offering him a “plan of action on membership”. However, the doors to the European Union should remain open to Ukraine in case it manages to move forward with the energetic and consistent program of political, economic and military reforms.
Together, these steps would help strengthen the support of US relations with Eastern Europe and strengthen the process of European integration. Ultimately, the birth of strong and cohesive Europe is best served by the interests of the United States. A weak and divided continent is not an asset, but a burden for the United States.
Stephen Larrabi holds the post of chairman of the Rand Corporation Corporation on European Security. From 1978 to 1981, he was responsible for relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, being a full -time employee of the National Security Council.
The full article will be published in the journal “Russia in Global Affairs”