Energy speculation

In January 2006, the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict caused a surge in public interest not only to relations between Ukraine and Russia in the energy region, but also to Ukrainian energy and the prospects of its development. In the Russian media, the correct public polemic did not occur, and little to the public clarified. Many were only established in the conviction of the relatively complete dependence of Ukraine on the import of energy resources, primarily from Russia, and the country's vulnerability to the pricing policy of neighbors, especially against the backdrop of Russia's determination to stop the “price subsidization” of the former post -Soviet countries, and primarily Ukraine.

We will try to show how in reality the situation is with Ukrainian dependence on energy imports, how this country could build an effective energy policy that reduces this kind of dependence, and how further relations between Ukraine and Russia can be built in the field of pricing for energy resources.

First of all, it is worth noting that the situation with the supply of Russian energy resources to Ukraine and the Ukrainian energy future has recently overgrown with a mass of myths, which, apparently, will take a long time to overcome for a long time. Let's try to display some of them for starters.

The harmful of these myths is the myth of the systematic subsidization of the Ukrainian economy by Russia through the supply of energy resources at low prices. In fact, the situation in this area is not at all simple. The gap between the prices of gas supplies to Ukraine and the cost of European sales of Russian export gas, of course, has become very significant in recent years. However, you should not forget that a surge in gas supplies to Western Europe began in 2003, when oil prices, to which the contract value of the European Gazprom gas supply, reached the heights unprecedented, and then $ 60 per barrel. Prior to this, it should be noted that the level of European prices for gas imports was very moderate. Suffice it to say that, according to BP 8T1IZ1IE1 KEYEECEYCEC \ Wagi Ephegdu, the average price of imported gas in Europe was only $ 102 in 1992-2003 for 1,000 cubic meters. If we take into account the cost of transporting gas from the Russian-Ukrainian to, say, the German border (the component of approximately 30 dollars for 1,000 cubic meters), this means that the average price of Russian gas supplied to Ukraine would be $ 72 if, for example, to look at the average European prices of gas imports in 1992-1999, then they are less: 85 dollars. Accordingly, a certain objective price of Russian gas for Ukraine in this case would be $ 55. It is worth recalling that in the 1990s-early 2000s, Russia supplied gas to Ukraine for $ 50 for 1,000 cubic meters, with payment of additional gas consumption in excess of contract volumes of $ 80, approximately the same conditions were laid down in the well-known Russian-Cranei gas agreement signed in August 2004 shortly before the presidential election in Ukraine.

As you can see, if gas subsidies took place, then they were not so significant as to talk about the long existence of Ukraine “for the Russian account”. Some disproportions in prices were explained by a completely different system of organizing markets and pricing. Gazprom supplies gas to Western Europe based on long -term contracts, where prices are tied to market prices for an entire basket of energy products, primarily for oil, and are constantly changing, including falling. For example, in 1999, the average gas supply prices to Germany were $ 65 for 1,000 cubic meters, and Ukraine was supposed to pay almost more Germans for Russian gas. If world oil prices in the near future fall to $ 30-40 per barrel, the price of gas in Europe will decrease to about $ 160-180 per 1,000 cubic meters. In this course of events, gas prices for Ukraine (in accordance with the agreement concluded, for 2007 they amount to $ 130 per 1,000 cubic meters, and in the future it will increase) may be higher than European ones.

But in the post -Soviet space, the picture is fundamentally different: there is no gas market here, gas monopolies controlled by the state are engaged in its supplies, and prices are determined by intergovernmental agreements. It is clear that such a non -guide price mechanism, and while it exists - and the governments of the post -Soviet countries are not decided to demonopolize and privatize national gas companies - prices will never reflect objective market realities. It is characteristic that such problems do not know, for example, the oil sector, where privatization and liberalization took place both in Russia and Ukraine.

The rhetoric about the “price subsidization” of the former Soviet republics is able to only spoil the relations of Russia with the neighbors, just as popular in 1990-1991 in Russia the slogan “Enough to feed these fraternal republics” significantly spurred centrifugal processes in the USSR, which ended in the collapse of the Union. Although such subsidies periodically arise in the gas sphere, it is due to nothing more than the absence of a transparent gas market in the post -Soviet space that can determine the objective level of price, and the inflexibility of pricing mechanisms within the framework of bilateral intergovernmental agreements.

Another thing is that in the 1990s, Ukraine did not pay well for the supply of Russian gas, accumulating a debt of about one and a half billion dollars. Subsequently, the debt was restructured [1] , and its repayment with money remains only a dream. The previous non -payments can really be considered indirect subsidies from the Russian side, but the price has nothing to do with it.

The next myth is that Ukraine is completely dependent on the import of Russian gas. In fact, this is not entirely true. Gas occupies a significant share in the structure of energy consumption in Ukraine (according to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 41%), but not as high as in Russia, where its share in the balance sheet of primary energy resources is approximately 54%. In the Ukrainian economy, coal (22% of the primary energy balance) and atomic energy (approximately 15%, nuclear power plants in Ukraine produce more than 40% of electricity). At the same time, approximately a third of the gas consumed (over 20 billion cubic meters) is extracting Ukraine itself. Thus, the dependence on imported gas is only less than a third of the country's energy balance. At the same time, since the 1990s, Ukrainians preferred to buy the main volumes of gas from Turkmenistan, obviously anticipating difficulties in communicating with a capricious northern partner. Since 2006, when the supplies of the Central Asian and Russian gas to Ukraine were monopolized by the Rosukranergo trader, partially controlled by Gazprom, the dependence of Ukraine on Russian gas suppliers became more tangible.

However, Russian politicians requiring tightening pressure on Ukraine must also take into account who consumes gas in Ukraine. According to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 51% of gas in the country consume seven regions of the eastern part of the country, where the vast majority of the Russian -speaking population live - Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Lugansk, Poltava, Kharkov, Zaporizhzhya regions, as well as Crimea (only the first four regions consume 40% gas in the country). It is these areas that are most economically and socially close to Russia, vote in elections for politicians who promise rapprochement with Russia. The main dependence on gas imports from Russia also falls on these regions.

In general, the best solution for both Russia and Ukraine, whose general headache is a negative Soviet heritage in the form of extremely energy -intensive economies - extremely ineffective in terms of consumption of energy resources both in industry and in communal services - would be the liquidation of the monopolies of the state Gazprom and Naftogaz and the creation of a free competitive market in the gas sector, where prices are prices, where prices are prices. would be determined on the basis of supply and demand. It is possible that they would be high, but this mechanism would exclude the opportunity to use the "energy weapon" for political purposes, would eliminate all ground for mutual distrust and speculation. Much less politicized, for example, are relations in the oil sector, where the role of a free market is significantly higher - although Ukraine imports more than 50% of oil consumed from Russia. The energy intensity of the Ukrainian economy remains the main headache of the authorities. As in Russia, the consumption of energy resources for the dollar of GDP in the parity of purchasing power in Ukraine is two to three times higher than not only developed Western countries, but also developing economies (China, India). Moreover, this is due to the fact that in the post -Soviet years (as in Russia), the energy -intensive industry, which is the main consumer of energy resources (more than 90% of fuel consumption and 54% of electricity consumption), was not carried out. Specific energy costs for the physical release of products in Ukrainian metallurgy, chemistry and petrochemistry, other energy-intensive industries are two to three times higher than not only in developed, but also in developing countries. Actually, it could not be otherwise-the authorities that pursued a policy of supporting the population and industry with low domestic prices for energy resources, inherited from Soviet culture of pricing policy, thus missed the possibility of creating incentives for a sharp increase in energy efficiency of the economy, which was achieved, for example, in the countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries as a result of strict price reforms in energy markets.

Meanwhile, in a decrease in the energy intensity of the economy lies significant potential to reduce the dependence of the country on energy imports. However, the solution to this problem is associated with increasing domestic gas prices and electricity for Ukrainian consumers. Since at the beginning of 2007 the internal political struggle in Ukraine entered the rivalry phase of two frankly populist political clans - Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko - it is difficult to expect sharp steps to increase prices, although some price increase provoked by increasing prices for Russian gas will still happen.

Another important problem in Russian-Ukrainian energy relations is the transit of energy resources. The idea of ​​the one -sided energy dependence of Ukraine from Russia is completely wrong. In fact, the Russian economy is much more dependent on the reliability of energy transit through Ukraine to Europe than Ukrainians - on our energy resources. Ukraine was, there is and will remain the main export corridor for the supply of Russian natural gas to Europe for a long time. Today, over 70% of Russian gas, which is exported, is pumped through Ukraine, and even if Russia builds and takes to full capacity the planned and discussed new gas pipelines bypassing Ukraine - ICHOPS 8Igeash and the second turn of the “blue stream” - the share of Ukrainian transit will still exceed 50%. Today, approximately 130 billion cubic meters of Russian gas to Europe are transported through Ukraine, while the maximum possible capacity of the ICHOPS 8Igeash gas pipeline along the bottom of the Baltic Sea will be 55 billion cubic meters per year. Yes, and gas in Ichops 8Igeash will go to completely other markets, where our gas is practically not supplied today-to northwestern Europe, Northern Germany, Denmark, Benilyux, and Great Britain. The Ukrainian corridor leads us to our main markets - to Eastern, Central and Southern Europe, and our gas simply will not be able to get there along the Baltic gas pipeline.

In other words, in the strategic perspective, Ukraine cannot be circumvented. This means that it is necessary to recognize its key transit country, critical from the point of view of ensuring the reliability of our energy exports to Europe, and based on this to build relations with Ukraine not as a “younger brother”, completely depending on the mercy of the “elder”, but as an equal partner - on the basis of mutual respect, trust and the rule of residence of disputes in court, and not through the overlap of gas valve. Of course, it would be good if Russia ratified the contract for the energy charter and the transit protocol that could become such a long -term legal basis for relations in the energy sphere between the two countries that have no other future, except for the European (Ukraine, unlike Russia, ratified the contract for the energy chart of transit and expressed the readiness to sign the transit, the signing of which was torn down in December 2003 due to the refusal of Russia to sign a document). The energy charter is the only international legal document that protects the rights of energy manufacturers in their transit through third countries; WTO agreements, for example, do not regulate these issues. Thanks to the Charter, Russia and Ukraine would gain access to the universal mechanism of transit disputes. However, a five -year gas transit and gas supply agreement, concluded with Viktor Yanukovych in August 2004, created quite good prerequisites for the formation of such a legal framework in the long run. Former Deputy Chairman of Gazprom’s board, Alexander Ryazanov at a briefing in Moscow on June 7, 2005, did not accidentally call the agreement “Extremely profitable for Russia”: despite the fact that the price of gas supplies to Ukraine was only 50 dollars for 1,000 cubic meters, Russia received one of the lowest transit rates in Europe - $ 1.09 for transportation $ 1,000 Gas cubic meters per 100 km. But six months after that, a team from the Kremlin arrived to consider those conditions “non -market”.

Another common myth of Russian-Ukrainian energy relations is the theme of “theft” of transit Russian gas. Real facts look different. After the conclusion of the 2002 intergovernmental agreement, when a cross was placed on the history of the 1990s with an unauthorized selection of Russian gas from Ukrainian gas pipelines, the new documents provide that the Ukrainian side has the right to select additional gas from transit gas pipelines, but is obliged to pay it at an increased price-which is fair, and it pays carefully for this overkill. The allegations of Russian gas from Ukrainian gas storage facilities from Ukrainian gas storage in the spring of 2005 - in June of that year by representatives of both countries, were not signed by the act that gas was in place and everything was in order were not confirmed. With political speculations on the topic of “gas theft”, thus, it is high time to end.

In general, Russia and Ukraine, whose authorities are constantly forced to defend the interests of the State Monopolies, would be much more useful to move towards the open market. This would allow the elimination of the ground for non -reality and not confirmed by the facts of speculation regarding “subsidies”, “dependence”, and even more so “thefts” that contribute to unnecessary politicization of economic relations. The faster this happens, the more chances to increase the efficiency of our economies, and to increase the stability and predictability of our relations in the future. And not only in the energy sector.

[1] On October Fourth, 2001, the prime ministers of the Russian Federation and Ukraine Mikhail Kasyanov and Anatoly Kina signed an intergovernmental agreement in Kiev “On additional measures to ensure the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine”, which provides for the restructuring of Ukrainian debt for 12 years on the terms of the restructuring of the debt to the Parisian club of creditors, i.e. with a three-year beneficial period, according to The restructuring rate is 1% + Libor, and this debt is formalized as corporate: not the state will be responsible for its payment, but by the Naftogaz National Joint Stock Company. The amount of Ukraine’s debt for Russian gas amounted to more than $ 4,401 million. The debt repayment was partially carried out by the supply of military equipment, partially - bonds of Naftogaz of Ukraine NAC.