Not everything is so simple with timi Ukrainians ...

To print Oksana Mikheev, re -heating the playful statement of Pierre Daninos [1] about the French, we can say that Ukraine is divided into 46 million 929 and a half thousand Ukrainians. Ukrainian scientific literature is replete with evidence of the originality and uniqueness of each region, the uniqueness of its historical fate and mentality. Political discourse, filled with contrasts, replicates fears of possible clashes and as if inevitable decay of Ukraine into separate parts. But all this, fortunately, remains only by political rhetoric, while the country, despite all the crises and shocks, retains its integrity and even in cases of deep electoral scholars avoids armed clashes.

What holds the citizens of Ukraine so dissimilar to each other in a single state-political space, why is the victory of any one political force is impossible and the path of compromises is the most effective? Perhaps these questions can best answer the society itself.

From this point of view, the results of the sociological survey “Lviv -Donetsk: a sociological analysis of group identities and hierarchy social loyalities” [2] , conducted during the period of maximum political intensity in Ukraine - before and during the 2004 presidential election, at the time when the political situation in the country powerfully catalyzed the process of political identification. Many problems, social attitudes, possible scenarios of future development.

One of the main results of this study was that the respondents of Donetsk have regional identity, while the residents of Lviv were the first place by the national identity. The geography of the survey was not determined by chance - in modern Ukrainian politics, the words about “two Ukraine” (east and western), about deep differences in their historical fate, language, mentality, level of economic development, etc. often sound.

It is unlikely that, however, Donetsk is unique in the named attitude - to a certain extent, regional Autarchy is also characteristic of other regions of Ukraine [3] .

Rather, the Donetsk region is one of the types of territorial-demographic constructs that exist in modern Ukraine, and in this capacity contributes to the complex political whole that various political forces are so successfully used to realize their own ambitions. Be that as it may, this region turned out to be “iconic” in a series of events of recent years and therefore attracts special attention.

The 2004 political campaign was largely built on binary oppositions: Eastern Ukraine was contrasted with West as two poles that split society; Attention was focused on the confrontation between Russian-and-speaking citizens, a sharp feature was held between the western and eastern foreign policy orientation, between protest and loyal, liberal and “authoritarian”, right and left electorate, etc. It turned out to be especially interesting how political rhetoric was refracted in the consciousness of the ordinary resident of the region, to which political myths, stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and stereotypes and tables Labels (“Donetsk”, “Bandera”, etc.) affect the political behavior of people, affect their choice.

One of the problems experiencing permanent exacerbations in Ukraine is the language problem. Language is a significant factor in building identity, especially in Ukraine, where positioning on the principle of “we - they” is complicated by the difference in communication languages. It can be stated that today in Ukraine it is not proposed acceptable for all solutions to a language problem, which is why it becomes a convenient tool for influence on a potential electorate.

And the point here is not only in linguistic empiricism: the language is an integral part of different scenarios of national-political development. It is difficult to disagree with the famous Ukrainian historian J. Gritsak, according to which the acuteness of the situation is caused by the fact that Ukrainian -speaking intellectuals in most cases act as supporters of linguistic, and not political Ukrainization, which is unacceptable both for Donbass in particular and Russian -speaking citizens of the East and South of Ukraine as a whole [4] . On the other hand, the Ukrainian-language West is wary of the possible introduction of official “bilingualism” due to its specific interpretation by residents of the eastern regions, where bilingualism in most cases is understood not as the need to know both state languages, but as an opportunity to continue to speak only on their own.

Mutual fears in this regard are significantly exacerbated by political rhetoric. According to election mythology, Western Ukraine advocates the creation of a homogeneous Ukrainian -speaking environment, and the East offers a rather specific scenario for preserving multiculturalism, but based on the Russian language.

The polyeticality of Eastern Ukraine, and above all, Donbass, has deep historical roots. The development of industry in this region required attracting labor. This caused both spontaneous and planned movement to the region of workers from the territory of the entire Russian Empire, and over time - the entire Soviet territory. The mixing of different nationalities in the “Great Stooping School”, Ver and faiths made it impossible here to build identical identity on an ethnic basis. At the same time, the ideological construct that created a certain unity on the basis of proletarian affiliation, internationalism, the Russian language (as the language of international communication in the Donbass) and areaism (atheism) turned out to be quite convenient. Thanks to this mixing, a tolerant attitude to the neighbor, tolerance in relation to other people's ideas, models of behavior, and personal choice of everyone, was fixed, and healthy pragmatism was formed. This identification model provided for the upbringing of pride in a person for his land, his small homeland, a sense of self -significance for the whole country, respect for a person of labor - Metallurg, Shakhtar, etc., heroization of workdays. This region, whose name serves a geological term, conditionally denoting the boundaries of a coal basin (and existing only in the minds of people, since it is not fixed by any legal documents), continues to perceive itself as a holistic unified education, endowed with a special fate, distinguishable against the background of replacing political contexts.

However, despite the dominance of regional identity, most Donetsk residents do not lose the feeling of belonging to the country as a whole, while the difference between the concepts of “Ukrainian” and “citizen of Ukraine” remains relevant for them. Being in a single political space, and this region is gradually Ukrainized (though much more slowly than the Ukrainian -language elite would like). The population with understanding refers to the demand of the Ukrainian language to know, but does not experience special motivation for its study, since in the public sphere of the region it is not particularly in demand. The number of schoolchildren undergoing training in Ukrainian has increased markedly: from 3% in 1991 to 32.9% in 2006 (while the proportion of students in the state language in the elementary grades is higher; if in high school this indicator is now 23.8%, then among first-graders-48.2% [5] ). However, this quantitative growth does not bring noticeable qualitative changes: among the Ukrainian language, students are only in the lessons, after school they immediately fall into the Russian -speaking environment.

The self -identification of the Donetsk residents, as well as their political positions, is significantly affected by another language factor. This is a specific pronunciation of the Russian -speaking inhabitants of Ukraine, which makes them “not their own” both for Russians who immediately recognize the “Little Russian emphasis” and for the Ukrainian -speaking inhabitants of Western Ukraine, who consider the language of the “scraps” at best “surgic”. All this creates the conditions for their awareness of themselves by a separate group, to build regional identity. And since the language sign largely defines the border between “we” and “they”, the preservation of the language is understood as the preservation of ourselves. The fact that the Russian language should be the second state in Ukraine, “completely agree” 75.3%of respondents, and “rather agree” 14.9%, which together is 90.2%. This makes the choice of the residents of Eastern Ukraine the candidacy of V. Yanukovych, in the election program of which a paragraph of bilingualism was laid.

Often they talk about the persistent orientation of the population of Western Ukraine to Europe, and Eastern Ukraine - to Russia, explaining this by a special historical fate of these regions. The emphasis of this orientation and its use in the pre -election programs of candidates for the post of president or deputy of the Verkhovna Rada significantly affects the choice of people. However, in relation to Donetsk, in any case, this scheme looks too simplified and not quite adequate.

The respondents in Donetsk asked: "What exactly in the election campaign had a decisive influence on your choice?" Since the answer to this question was supposed to be open, this gave a person a more convenient opportunity to indicate what was subjectively the most significant for him. Of the 323 respondents who voted for V. Yanukovych (and they make up 95.6% of those who answered this question), 228 commented on their choice. In total, 318 explanations were made, among which in only five (1.3%) cases, the choice of the candidacy of V. Yanukovych is explained by potentially possible cooperation, friendship and orientation to Russia, and only in one case (0.3%)-a possible union with Russia. Only two replicas as a motivation for the election of this candidate affected the introduction of the Russian language as the second state. In general, out of 323 respondents, only seven (2.2%), when explaining their own choice, spoke of Russia, relations with it and the status of the Russian language. Of these, three called themselves Ukrainians, two - Russians and two demonstrated a double identity - “Ukrainian - Soviet man”, “Russian - Soviet man”.

Focus group discussions held in April 2005 in Donetsk also demonstrated that in conditions when a person is invited to list the problems that are most concerned about the inhabitants of the region, the topic of relations with Russia is differently affecting different age groups. Only representatives of the senior age contingent spoke about the need for an alliance with Russia, while the middle generation demonstrated healthy pragmatism, indicating that Ukraine should maintain relations with the West and Russia. The youth audience did not call this problem at all in its list.

However, all this does not mean that the population of Eastern Ukraine abandoned the traditional orientation towards Russia and the post -Soviet space, since 60% of respondents surveyed “entirely support” entering a single economic space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, 31.6% “rather support what they reject”, 6.7% - “rather reject” and only 1.3% - “completely Reject. " The vast majority of respondents (87.2%) believe that the security of Ukraine is due to the desirable connection with Russia and the CIS countries.

As you can see, the general nature of answers to questions regarding attitude to Russia and the Russian language varies significantly depending on the form in which they are set: in open or closed. This visible contrast, in all likelihood, can be explained by the fact that from regional positions, contacts with Russia are perceived as something positive and in this capacity not subject to reflection: if the respondent in an explicit form is proposed to express his attitude to this problem, he does this, if not proposed, leaves it “behind brackets”.

The inhabitants of Eastern Ukraine consider such a foreign policy orientation to be certainly granted, but at the same time, the “snakes” do not perceive themselves as part of the Russian and post-Soviet state-political space: 74.2% of respondents believe that their region has a common fate with all over Ukraine, for 73% of the integrity of Ukraine than the needs of individual regions. To some extent, such a situation indicates the marginal state of the inhabitants of the region, who simultaneously feel and an integral part of the Ukrainian political space and at the same time do not lose the feelings of “common fate” with Russia.

Thus, the inhabitants of Eastern Ukraine consider Russia and the CIS countries to be geostrategic allies, however, the territory of Eastern Ukraine itself is conceived in two ways: and as part of the Ukrainian state space, which has a common historical fate with all over Ukraine and represents itself in the international arena through state power policy, and as a special territory with its fate and political position. In this regard, I would like to give a well -aimed observation of J. Gritsak that “its ambivalence was and remains the specifics of post -communist Ukraine. If today a referendum was held on Ukraine’s entry into the “East Slavic Union” of Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians or the entry into the European Union, then each of these referenda - judging by the data of sociological research, would have a positive result ” [6] .

Further, despite the persistent revolutionary traditions in the eastern region of Ukraine, the modern Donbass demonstrates a low level of participation in protest actions. The main forms of protest behavior are the signing of petitions, appeals, participation in rallies, demonstrations, strikes, seizure of buildings, etc. It is believed that protest activity increases under conditions of dissatisfaction with the quality of life, the impossibility of realizing their own interests. However, it should be noted that even with significant social dissatisfaction, the level of protest behavior will not be high if people do not believe in the effectiveness and effectiveness of their protest [7] . During the 2004 presidential campaign of 2004, 84.4% of respondents never posted posters, did not distribute leaflets; 86.7% - never signed appeals and petitions; 91% - did not apply leaflets in support of their election candidate; 90.2% - did not join their efforts with the organization or initiative group; 64.1% - did not take part in mass rallies and demonstrations; 93.2% - did not take part in strikes. This allows us to argue that the region’s protest potential turned out to be quite low and fears about it were one of the mythology of the election campaign. And the formula put forward by the Party of Regions: “While you are rallying there in the square, we are working here” was rather an attempt to veil this low protest potential, to substantiate the unworthyness of the region to actively protect their choice. The low activity of protest behavior to a certain extent is determined by the type of political culture, which developed throughout the Soviet period, when protest actions were decorative, and the real protest was not only ineffective, but also dangerous. This led to the redirection of protest activity to conventional forms of political behavior: voting “against all” or for a candidate chosen on the principle of “if not the same”.

This region is also characterized by a tendency to an authoritarian type of management with which public consciousness connects stability, the ordering of social relations. The population of Eastern Ukraine was more in the sphere of influence of Soviet political culture, the characteristic features of which are collectivism, relatively high dependence on the authorities and its political course (and especially on social policy - social benefits, support of low -income, etc.). Long -term dominance in the region of the Soviet authoritarian model and the consolidation of the traditions of subordination of the authorities formed a certain type of political culture among the population. That is why “understandable”, “simple”, “our”, “of ours, of our workers”, “outwardly representative”, “capable of restoring order” V. Yanukovych turned out to be closer to the ideas of voters regarding the qualities of a possible leader in comparison with his competitor V. Yushchenko, in the image construct of which emphasized his political liberalism.

As for the electoral split along the Right - Left line, the presidential election was not an exception in this regard, although not one of the candidates directly positioned himself with the first or second. Characteristic for Ukraine is the gravity of the Western regions to right -wing forces, and the eastern to the left. According to the statistics of elections, "... c. Янукович был наиболее популярным на территориях, где ранее максимальные показатели получали левые радикалы, а В. Ющенко — на территориях, на которых традиционно голосуют за консервативных правых» [8] .

С социально-психологической точки зрения, политический выбор человека формируется его отношением к трем элементам политического процесса: кандидатам, политическим курсам и связям между определенными политическими силами и социальными группами.

Если рассмотреть политические предпочтения жителей донецкого региона, в большинстве своем поддержавших кандидатуру В. Януковича, то из всех реплик-мотиваций его избрания (228 человек ответили на вопрос и в 318 репликах прокомментировали свой выбор) большая часть затрагивала прежде всего личность кандидата (39,4%). В поле внимания респондентов попали его черты характера и личностные качества (характеризовался как честный, лояльный, умный, сильный, молодой, прогрессивный, сдержанный, человек дела, здоровый и т. д.), его реальные дела, связанные с ним ожидания («с ним будет хорошо», «я доверяю ему», «я надеюсь на него», «он защитит нас» и т. д.), деловые качества («прирожденный хозяин», «настоящий supervisor"). Весомую группу в этой категории составляют реплики протестного характера (поддержка В. Януковича объясняется тем, что «он не В. Ющенко и не входит в его окружение»).

Следующая группа реплик свидетельствует о том, что выбор дончан имел социотропно-ретроспективний характер [9] , опосредованно связанный с кандидатурой В. Януковича. Социотропность проявилась в том, что значительная часть респондентов отметила стабилизацию экономики страны, улучшение материального положения общества в целом и отдельных категорий населения, а не акцентировала внимание на личном материальном положении (как при эгоцентрической модели). Ретроспективный характер проявился в склонности респондентов апеллировать к предыдущей деятельности В. Януковича в качестве премьера, уже имеющимся результатам его деятельности, тогда как о предполагаемой работе властей в будущем (как при перспективном голосовании) замечаний высказывалось меньше. В целом реплики этого типа составляют 29,5% от всех имеющихся.

Политическая программа и будущий политический курс кандидата заинтересовали лишь 12 респондентов, 9 человек сделали свой выбор под влиянием политической кампании В. Януковича. Реплики этого типа составляют лишь 6,9% от всего количества комментариев по поводу избрания «своего» кандидата. Вообще говоря, это свидетельствует об ослаблении партийной идентификации, о повышении роли краткосрочных факторов (таких как имидж кандидата) предвыборного процесса. Это уже не новое явление в политике. По мнению российской исследовательницы С. Н. Пшизовой, оно вызвано процессами маркетизации, коммерциализации и профессионализации политической деятельности. По ее утверждению, проникновение рыночных механизмов в политическую сферу кардинально изменило характер отношений между избирателями, членами партий, их руководящей верхушкой и отдельными политическими лидерами. Прежде существование массовых политических партий обеспечивалось регулярной уплатой членских взносов. В наше время это становится невозможным, так как рост числа политических партий влечет за собой сокращение числа их реальных членов, кроме того, значительно дорожает рынок политических услуг. В этих условиях рядовые члены имеют все меньше возможностей влиять на политический курс партии, вместе с тем стремительно растет роль «бизнесменов» от политики, которые способны найти источники финансирования своей политической деятельности. Создавая свой имидж с помощью современных технологических средств, максимально используя возможности СМИ, такие политики получают доступ к широкой аудитории избирателей, активно влияют на общественное сознание и властный курс и тем самым становятся все более привлекательным объектом инвестиций [10] . Этот механизм сработал и на президентских выборах в Украине, когда основной упор был сделан на имидж кандидатов, а не партий или коалиций, которые они представляли.

И, наконец, группа реплик, которая характеризует В. Януковича как члена группы, «своего», в отличие от «чужого» кандидата. При этом 12,9% реплик характеризуют В. Януковича как «своего» по принадлежности к своему региону, городу. Еще 4% дают ему эту характеристику по принадлежности к соответствующей социальной группе: «он из рабочих», «из пенсионеров», «из народа» и т. д.

Остальные 7,3% реплик описывают личные впечатления («человека сильно облили грязью» и т. п.), убеждения, случаи получения конкретной помощи от имени кандидата и т. д.

Если рассматривать Украину в целом, то президентская кампания 2004 года продемонстрировала соединение элементов национально-государственной и региональной идентичности. Действенность последней усиливается тем, что в стране еще далеко не завершен процесс формирования идентичности национально-государственной, а также наличием в Украине глубоких электоральных и социальных расколов, которые политики в своих целях используют и углубляют во время предвыборных кампаний. Между тем существование в Украине региональной автаркии усложняет процесс поиска общенационального лидера, который бы отвечал ожиданиям всего населения. Данные проблемы остались актуальными в Украине и отчасти углубились вследствие политической кампании 2006 года. Все вышеизложенное не имеет целью продемонстрировать «особость», «уникальность» или «неповторимость» Донбасса. Мы лишь хотели сказать, что в политически и социально разнородной Украине недопустимы утверждения о «зомбированности» тех, кто голосует не так, как ожидалось. Все мы разные, и каждый из нас имеет право на уважение и на собственный выбор. И еще: главное, что связывает нас воедино, — толерантное отношение к людям (как в 2004, так и в 2006 годах образ «другого», т. е. представителя другой электоральной группы, другого региона, в целом размещался на позитивной стороне шкалы), ощущение единой судьбы и стремление к взаимопониманию. Так, в июле 2006 года 73% населения Украины не считали различия между Восточной и Западной Украиной существенными или имеющими цивилизационный характер, к тому же 62,5% населения Украины считает, что существующий конфликт исходит не от общества, не от рядовых граждан Украины, а связан с противостоянием бизнес-элит или противоборством России и США за влияние в Украине [11] .

Да, мы разные, и избирательный процесс 2004—2006 годов помог нам осознать многое в наших внутренних отношениях, признать и отчасти принять эту разницу, а также, надеюсь, понять, что в Украине возможен только путь компромиссов, поскольку в чистом виде каждый из политических сценариев, предлагаемых сторонами, представляющими ту или иную часть Украины, обречен на провал.

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[1] Данинос П. Записки майора Томпсона. М., 1970. С. 38.

[2] Опрос проводился Институтом исторических исследований, кафедрой истории и теории социологии Львовского национального университета имени Ивана Франко при содействии Института социальных исследований Мичиганского университета (США) и Донецкого отделения Социологической ассоциации Украины в ноябре-декабре 2006 года.

[3] Лупацш В. Модел рештеграцц украшського сусшльства (Центр сощальних дослвджень «Соф1я») [ http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua ].

[4] Грицак Я. Про вщповвдальнгсть та безвщповвдальнгсть украшських штелектуаМв // Доповщь на мгжнароднш конференций пам'яти бжи Гедройця «Европа — минуле i майбутне. В1зц та рев1зц». Кив, 24—26 листопада 2006 р. (В печати.)

[5] Бтецький В. С. Мовно-культурне поле Схвдно! Украши. Донецьк: Украгнський культуролопчний центр, Донецьке вщдглення НТШ, 2006. C. 24; Сайт головного управлшня статистики в Донецькш области / Школа и школьники [ http://donetskstat.gov.ua ].

[6] Грицак Я. Про вщповвдальнгсть...

[7] Бтецышй В. С. Мовно-культурне поле...

[8] Черкашин К. В. Електоральна поведшка населения незалежно! Украши в репональних зр1зах: Дис. cand. полшганих наук / Тавршський нацюнальний университет 1м. В. I. Вернадського, 2005. C. 14.

[9] Политический процесс: основные аспекты и способы анализа: Сб. учебн. материалов / Под ред. Э. Ю. Мелешкиной. М., 2001. C. 177-178.

[10] Пшизова С. Н. «Традиционные» демократические институты и российская практика финансирования политического рынка // Куда идет Россия?.. Формальные институты и реальное практики / Под общ. ред Т. И. Заславской. М.: МВШСЭН, 2002. C. 36; Она же. Финансирование политического рынка: теоретические аспекты политических проблем // Полис. 2002. № 2. C. 76.

[11] Грицак Я. Про вщповщальнгсть...

Дуализм идентичностей на Украине Одна Клио, две истории