Viktor Khristenko promised independent producers the domestic gas market
Minister of Industry and Energy Viktor Khristenko again told reporters that in 10-12 years independent producers will become the main suppliers of gas to the domestic market. As Interfax reports, according to the official, gas companies that are not part of the Gazprom group will take dominant positions in Russia by 2015-2020. In the forecast balance of gas in Russia until 2015, which Gazprom presented to the government for a meeting with Vladimir Putin in the fall , dominance is not visible, but the existing proportions of supply to the domestic market will change significantly. In 2006, the share of independents was about 25% of Russian consumption, and in 2015 it is planned to reach 47%.
For now, this is a semi-official situation, since the general plan for the development of the gas industry until 2030, which Gazprom has been agonizing over for several years, is still not ready. In addition, we should not forget that the share of independent producers takes into account gas that formally independent traders buy from enterprises under the control of Gazprom. A good example is Purgaz, 51% of the shares of which belong to the gas concern, and the rest to Itera. The company's products are sold to shareholders at a price close to cost, in proportion to their shares. The same situation is expected at the fields of Sibneftegaz, whose controlling stake was bought by Gazprombank, promising to sell half of the gas produced from the Beregovoye field to its junior partner, Itera.
We should not forget the fact that the sector of independent gas producers in Russia is very ephemeral. Firstly, their business is almost completely dependent on the monopoly, which can easily force them to sell gas to themselves, the right trader or consumer. It may cut off supplies under already concluded contracts. Secondly, in recent years there has been a downward trend in the number of independent producers. De facto, Itera lost this status (turned into a trader), de jure, Northgaz and Sibneftegaz, in which the Gazprom group received controlling stakes. The hour is approaching when Yukos's Arcticgas, the Yuzhno-Tambeyskoye field and the Astrakhan gas condensate field will come under the wing of the monopolist. State-owned Rosneft is hard to call an independent gas producer, LUKOIL sells almost all its gas to Gazprom at the entrance to the gas transportation system, and TNK-BP may soon gain a monopolist as a majority shareholder. That leaves NOVATEK, in which Gazprom has already bought 19.9% of shares, which actually have the status of a blocking stake.
Nevertheless, in terms of numbers, the rise in supplies of “other gas and oil industry enterprises” (as they are named in the balance sheet) over ten years is impressive. Their production should increase from 95 billion to 224 billion cubic meters (130%). The monopolist will increase production by only 11% (65 billion cubic meters), to 619 billion. Receipts of Central Asian raw materials are expected to be only 10 billion cubic meters more than last year. At the same time, a sharp - by 120 billion cubic meters - growth in exports is planned, which is not covered by either Gazprom's increase or gas from Central Asia. It is not surprising that more than 70 billion cubic meters, by which Russia’s needs will increase (from 400 to 476 billion cubic meters), should be provided by independent ones that have become in demand.
There is one more nuance. No one knows how the transition to European pricing, approved in the fall by the government in 2011, will affect gas demand in Russian industry. “Today we cannot boast of high energy efficiency. We have great losses at all stages,” Mr. Khristenko said yesterday. And I personally estimated this inefficiency at 100-150 billion cubic meters of gas. If the minister’s forecast is correct, the economy should spontaneously reduce gas consumption by this amount when prices rise. This means that all plans to increase production can be crossed out by objective macroeconomic processes. Not to mention the fact that in Russia it is not customary to look that far. And the error of government predictions goes beyond all reasonable limits.