Anxiety

Crisis of controllability of the international system

What will the world be like in 2017? It is enough to look back ten years to understand how much can change even in such an insignificant period by historical standards. In 1997, at the height of post-Cold War euphoria, no one predicted upheaval, but the next decade was rife with military conflict and increasing chaos in international relations.

To predict the external conditions for the development of our country in the coming years - this is the goal of the project “The World Around Russia: 2017”, carried out within the framework of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy on the eve of its 15th anniversary. A team of authors from the Higher School of Economics, the Institute for Strategic Assessments and Analysis, and other research institutions analyzed global trends and prospects for change in key regions of the world. We are publishing a shortened version of one of the sections of the forecast, which is devoted to the degradation of the global governance system. The main author of this section is Dmitry SUSLOV, Deputy Director for Research at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy.

A general decline in controllability is the main trend in the development of the international system now and will remain so over the next decade. The international community - states and non-state actors - is unable to reverse the trend of increasing chaos. Most of the main international institutions and rules of behavior are being emasculated or are proving inadequate to the constantly changing conditions. The unpredictability of international development poses a serious challenge, including to the security of the traditional leaders of the international system, including Russia. One of the most destructive factors for the system of global regulation is the tendency towards the internal weakening of states - the main elements of international relations. Currently, this trend is manifested on two levels:

• in most countries of Africa and in many states of the wider Middle East, there is a degradation of public administration and a reduction in the ability of its institutions to carry out their basic functions (ensuring security and law and order, guarantees in the field of education and medicine);

• in European countries and the United States there is an implicit crisis in political systems and a decline in the quality of public policy, which has a decisive impact on the ability of the international community to understand the nature of the main threats and propose adequate and effective methods for eliminating them. On the other hand, in a number of countries in East Asia and the Far East, the quality of public administration, on the contrary, is increasing or, at least, maintaining at the current level. This, however, cannot compensate for or reverse the general trend towards degradation of regulation in the international system.

Degradation of public administration in developing countries

Currently, in the region of Africa and the wider Middle East (EME), there are several dozen countries whose state institutions are not able to effectively manage their own territory, population and resources. These states are characterized by massive corruption, the inefficiency of the bureaucratic apparatus, the inability of the army and police to perform the functions of protecting state borders and law and order, the collapse of law enforcement agencies (up to the point of leaving the control of the central authorities and turning into gangsters), a dysfunctional judicial system, the incapacity of the medical infrastructure, a growing gap with the needs of countries and societies in the era of globalization, including the needs in the field of education. Non-state factors are taking the place of state institutions as providers of public goods. They may well be (and often are) transnational terrorist networks, as a result of which the territory becomes a breeding ground for international terrorism. Most countries with ineffective government have no chance of approaching Western levels of prosperity and economic development in the foreseeable future. Many are degrading in absolute terms, which leads to impoverishment of the population. The proliferation of mass media leads to a potentially destabilizing political “awakening” of the population of the countries of the RBV, as well as Africa, part of the backward countries of Asia and Latin America. The masses, who had not previously shown political activity, recognize themselves as a society and become the engine of the political process. Authoritarian systems are not ready for this. As a result, the popularity of the only alternative to weakening corrupt regimes—radical Islamists—is growing in the RBV space. A complex of factors such as the degradation of state institutions, poverty, lack of opportunity to influence politics, political “awakening” and access to information gives rise to mass protest sentiments, radicalism and, as a consequence, anti-Western terrorism. The political elites of deteriorating countries seek to compensate for their weakness by asymmetrical methods. Sometimes - by acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is called upon to play a dual role: containing the West and creating the appearance of power in the eyes of its own population. However, it cannot compensate for poverty and lack of prospects for improvement. If one regime or another falls and radical Islamists come to power, weapons of mass destruction may end up in the hands of international terrorist networks. In this case, a terrorist attack using it becomes a matter of time. Today, this threat is primarily associated with Pakistan. Successfully combating these challenges and threats requires improving the quality of governance in developing countries and strengthening their public institutions.

Trends in the development of public administration in developing countries by 2017

The most likely scenario appears to be one in which the governance crisis in Africa and the wider Middle East worsens by 2017. It is unlikely that in the next decade developed countries will accumulate enough knowledge and especially political will to encourage the population of developing countries to create effective public institutions. The US policy of “expanding democracy” threatens to deprive weak countries of the last elements of governability. Taking into account the current political mood in many countries of the RBV and Central Asia, holding elections there can bring to power not supporters of democracy, but radical Islamists. In addition, successful democratization is impossible without the prior creation of effective government institutions (army, law enforcement agencies, ministries). In order to seriously address the problem of state weakness, it would be necessary to abandon the recognition of the formal sovereignty of deteriorating and “failed” states. However, it is unlikely that this will happen in the next decade. Meanwhile, the reconstruction (or creation from scratch) of effective state institutions is possible only through the introduction of direct external control. This realization may only come towards the end of the next decade. Finally, by 2017 the United States and the European Union will not be ready to radically revise the global rules of economic interaction to create more favorable conditions for the development of weak countries. Meanwhile, a more equitable pricing policy, a rejection of indirect restrictions on imports from these countries and aggressive exports that displace local production are necessary conditions for overcoming economic backwardness.

Declining efficiency of public administration in developed countries

The crisis of public administration in developed countries is more of an ideological nature. It manifests itself in the narrowing of the ideological spectrum and the crisis of party systems. This, in turn, leads to a shortage of ideas in the field of domestic and foreign policy and a growing inability to find adequate responses to emerging challenges and threats. In leading European countries and the United States, the trend towards unifying the platforms and ideologies of the main political parties is gaining momentum. There is less and less ideological and conceptual competition, the programs of rival forces are moving closer together, which leads to all governments, regardless of party affiliation, pursuing a certain average course. Since the political structure of the most influential states in Europe and North America is based on a virtually two-party structure, this leads to an ideological monopoly with formal pluralism. The remaining differences concern small and tactical subjects and patterns of behavior, but not strategic directions of policy. The first reason for this crisis is related to the monopoly position that Western democracy acquired in world ideology after the collapse of communism. The illusion of the universality of the Western political model that arose in the 1990s and the associated impression of the “end of history” (the achievement of a perfect type of political system by Western Europe and the United States) led to the ossification of the platforms of the main parties. The second reason is that Westerners have achieved a high level of well-being and created developed social systems and consumption patterns. This makes maintaining the status quo by any means necessary a fundamental imperative of political life. Adherence to the status quo and hostility to any change sets a clear framework for the possible political and economic course. This imposes serious restrictions on the domestic and foreign policy of the United States and especially the countries of the European Union. The possibility of using innovative solutions and moves designed for the long term, the implementation of strategic objectives and program settings, is practically excluded. The domestic and foreign policies of Western countries are becoming predominantly reactive, based on maintaining the status quo and pursuing tactical interests. An example is the current situation in the European Union. In the face of competition from China, India, the United States and Japan, a demographic crisis and a slowdown in the EU itself, the social model of the continental states of Western Europe seems increasingly less competitive. But these countries are unable to even come close to long overdue and necessary reforms. The crisis state of political systems has already led to the economic lag of the European Union in the global economy, as well as to a serious crisis in the European Union as a whole. A similar situation is developing in the USA. Growing trade and balance of payments deficits are undermining the current economic model in which the American public consumes more than it produces and finances its level of consumption through foreign borrowing. The gradual decline in global financial markets' confidence in the dollar marks the limits of this model. However, none of the leading political forces in America is able to propose and seriously implement reforms that require limiting the level of consumption. On the surface, the global policy of the United States, pursued by the Republican administration of George W. Bush after the events of September 11, 2001, appears to be an exception to this trend. Thanks to the ideological dominance of neoconservatives, Washington, for the first time since the Second World War, attempted a serious transformation of the international system and a radical restructuring of the regions from which the main security threats emanated.

In fact, this policy reflected the American foreign policy mainstream, which consisted in unconditionally consolidating US dominance in the world. At the same time, US hegemony in the international system in 2001-2006 not only did not strengthen, but significantly weakened, and not a single one of the tasks set by the George W. Bush administration was realized. In addition, relations with Western Europe, the main ally, have seriously complicated, the image of America and, as a result, its “soft power” have deteriorated.

Crisis of regulation of the international system

Not only the central elements of the international system - states - are in a state of crisis, but also the system of relations between them. By the second half of the 2000s, most of the rules, mechanisms and processes governing the behavior of participants in the international system were seriously undermined. At the current stage, the power hierarchy in the world is relatively stable, and the United States is significantly ahead of all other states and even possible groups of states in terms of a comprehensive indicator of strength. However, Washington's political influence is declining. The inability of the United States to refuse to implement a number of ideological dogmas threatens a collapse of political influence and limitation of US involvement in world politics. The collapse of the American strategy in Iraq and the Middle East as a whole and the subsequent hasty withdrawal from the region could radically change the attitude of American society towards the country's external involvement. A partial American withdrawal from its commitments in East Asia and Europe cannot be completely ruled out. At the same time, the decline of American influence will not be compensated by the rise of other centers of power. None of the alternative “poles” (EU, China, India, Russia), nor all of them together have the physical capabilities and desire to act as guarantors of regulation of the international system, including primarily in the military sphere, and thereby compensate for the weakening of America . As the influence of the United States declines, the preconditions for a non-polar world rather than a multipolar world arise. A reversal of this trend may occur no earlier than by the end of the forecast decade. In the second half of the 2000s, almost all major multilateral decision-making mechanisms found themselves in a state of crisis. Most international institutions created during the Cold War are unable to cope with finding answers to new threats and security challenges, which, as a rule, are trans-border, dispersed and networked in nature. Existing institutions are not equipped to work to improve governance in developing countries. The prospects for creating, in the short and medium term, organizations specifically focused on state-building in countries that cannot cope with this themselves are extremely small. In the 2000s, there was a tendency to make an increasing number of decisions outside the framework of international institutions, which significantly undermines the legitimacy of these decisions. The weakening of institutions means a decrease in the “constitutionality” in the regulation of international relations, which, in turn, reduces the susceptibility of states to regulatory impulses.

United Nations

The crisis of international institutions is most clearly manifested in the weakening of the main multilateral decision-making mechanism - the United Nations. The UN has become hostage to the split in the international community between the powers of the “golden billion” and weak, politically and economically degrading countries, on the one hand, and the split between the United States and all other states, on the other. The UN Security Council, the main decision-making mechanism on issues of war and peace, remains in the second half of the 2000s a relatively ineffective body that does not reflect the real balance of power in the world after the end of the Cold War. The UN General Assembly (GA), being a universal platform for global dialogue, is unable to contribute to finding answers to the main threats and challenges of the international system. First of all, due to the dominance in the GA of representatives of weak and degrading states, whose political elites realize that real work aimed at improving public administration will deprive them of their current benefits and privileges. A number of cautious steps in the right direction have been taken. For example, the Monterrey Consensus was adopted, which recognized the importance of governance for developing countries and linked the provision of economic assistance to them with steps to improve governance. However, by the mid-2000s, the UN had failed to propose a global agenda for improving governance and nation-building in Asia and Africa.

NATO

In the second half of the 1990s, it seemed that the decline in institutional regulation of the international system due to the weakening of the UN could be compensated by the strengthening of the North Atlantic Alliance. This possibility was written down in cautious formulations in the new strategic concept of the Alliance in 1999 and was then tested in Yugoslavia. However, already in the early 2000s, NATO’s role in the global decision-making system began to decline. The reasons were the strengthening of unilateral trends in American foreign policy, as well as the rejection of the “Oonization” of the Alliance by Russia, China, India, Brazil and even near the “old” NATO members. Strengthening the role of the alliance in the global decision -making system was interested in the United States only to the extent that it was a tool for the implementation of Washington's foreign policy agenda. A blow to the role of NATO was the US refusal to enact the fifth article of the Atlantic Agreement after the events of September 11, 2001. By 2017, NATO is unlikely to become the Central Institute for International Security Regulation. The main reasons are:

• unwillingness of European countries to increase defense expenses and generally participate in peacekeeping operations, especially in long -term missions on state building;

• the unwillingness of European member countries to implicitly realize the foreign policy agenda of the United States, the rejection of Washington’s desire to impose his point of view, and not to consult on equal terms; The competition of NATO and the EU, undermining the legal capacity of both organizations;

• the tendency of the United States is unilaterally acting if it is not possible to achieve support within the alliance; The unwillingness of America to obey any multilateral structures, especially on the use of force and command of military operations;

• Non -participation in NATO Russia and the rate of the alliance on the reception of former allies and union republics of the USSR instead of the integration of the Russian Federation and the Western Security System. Russia today has no incentives to promote the preservation or strengthening of the global positions of the alliance;

• The reluctance of the intensifying countries of Asia to support NATO and the operation conducted by the Alliance. Meanwhile, attempts to turn NATO into a global security union will continue. The success or failure of these attempts will largely depend on the outcome of the operation in Afghanistan.

"Big Eight"

The Russian Federation’s entry into the Group of Eight, and especially the Russian chairmanship, added legitimacy to this forum in developing countries. The recommendations received by him began to be perceived in most states of the world more constructively, which is potentially capable of increasing its effectiveness. The prospects for joining the “eight” of China and India are currently being discussed for its possible transformation into the central mechanism of regulating international political and economic relations, as well as to an institution that can raise the issue of improving government in developing countries. On the other hand, the expansion of the “club” will strengthen the contradictions that have already appeared in its work after the accession of Russia. For this reason, the “eight” may be paralyzed in the same way as the UN Security Council. The absence of a permanent secretariat (and even the prospects for its appearance) in the “eight”, as well as the optionality of decisions made (which is unlikely to change) means that in the next decade the group will remain a forum for consulting the most influential countries on certain problems of world politics and economics. The prospects for its transformation into the Institute for Regulation of burning issues of international relations, especially to their central institution, are small even in the medium term.

Crisis of norms and rules of state conduct

In the middle of the first decade of the XXI century, a contradictory situation has developed with the rules and norms governing the behavior of participants in the international system. Although the total number of norms increases, the rules governing the most significant areas of interaction are destroyed or losing strength. In some cases, for the same sphere, several contradictory rules and norms acts at once. In the mid-2000s, we can confidently talk about the crisis of international public law, mainly in terms of the application of military force. A number of provisions of international law based on the UN Charter do not comply with the conditions of cross -border network threats. In this regard, their partial review can be justified and will contribute to the growth of controllability of the international system. However, the fact that a revision is often made by an expert order is not accepted by a majority (and even a number of most influential) states of the world and is very controversial, has a negative effect. The most significant rules and norms of behavior of states in a crisis state include:

• Rules for making decisions on the application of force. According to international law, such a decision is authorized to make only the UN Security Council. Despite the preservation of this position, de jure, in fact, it is regularly violated (Iraq-1998, Yugoslavia-1999, Iraq-2003). In parallel, the norm is approved that decisions on the use of force can also make regional collective security organizations (NATO, CIS, CSTO). Finally, the UN Monopoly openly disputes the United States, which officially declare readiness and intention to use force unilaterally if it is dictated by America's safety interests.

• Criteria for using force. International law allows the use of force for self -defense, as well as in order to advise external aggression, the inevitability of which is obvious. In the 1990s, the provision on humanitarian intervention was added to the grounds for the force action, but this approach did not enjoy universal support. The events of September 11, 2001 objectively required further expansion of the rules for the use of force, as well as a revision of the concept of an external threat and its inevitability. However, these considerations did not find “constitutional” expression in international law. Instead, the United States was presented with an obvious order, the doctrine of “proactive blows”, which, due to the tricks intentionally laid in it and contradictions, only aggravated the crisis of the rules and norms. An even more destructive blow to the criteria for the use of force was inflicted on the war against Iraq in 2003: the action was taken against a relatively stable state that had no relations with international terrorist networks and did not have at the time of the military operation or its production programs. The same countries that possessed both (DPRK) and at the same time were directly or indirectly related to international terrorism (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan) remain unpunished.

• Lack of universal definition of international terrorism. A vacuum of "constitutional" rules and norms of behavior in relation to international terrorism is observed. The probability of overcoming this vacuum by 2017 is extremely small, since different countries are approaching this phenomenon in the opposite way. The fact that for some is international terrorism, others understand as a national liberation struggle, etc.

• The problem of sovereignty. In the mid-2000s, in international relations there is no general understanding of what is state sovereignty, what are its criteria and how absolutely it is. Obviously, threats associated with the inefficiency and weakness of public administration require a serious revision of the traditional understanding of the sovereignty as an unconditional and absolute attribute of each state that limits external interventions in its internal affairs. On the other hand, there are no clear criteria for limiting state sovereignty, except for the assumption by the state of humanitarian catastrophe. There are no standards governing what degree of state weakness or insolvency allows external intervention, including armed, and which is not.

Prospects for 2017

The probability of legitimate and “constitutional” adaptation of the system of rules and norms to modern conditions until 2017 is extremely small. The approaches of the countries of the “golden billion”, on the one hand, are weak and degrading states - on the other, and, finally, the United States to which direction these rules and norms should develop are fundamentally different. If the recognition of state sovereignty directly depends on the stability and viability of a particular state, then for others it is an integral and initially given category. For the United States, sovereignty is generally often dependent on how pro- or anti-American policy pursues one or another regime.

The prevailing development trend of the modern international system is to reduce its controllability. The number of conflicts, both domestic and interstate in nature, is increasing, while the international community is not able to confront this in any way. The effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, as well as measures aimed at preventing conflicts and armed clashes, is reduced. In general, the probability that in the medium term, the tendency to degradation of international handling will be broken or reversed is insignificant. You cannot completely exclude the script in which the trends in greater controllability will still prevail. However, before this international system, most likely, you will have to survive serious crises, a farc “Cold War”, an aggravation of trade and economic relations. If negative trends prevail to the end of the forecast period, one cannot exclude the sliding of mankind to a series of large-scale military-political crises.