Translated material
"Welcome to reality!"
Summit in Samara: the beginning of a new stage in relations between Russia and the European Union
The results of the Russia-EU summit held in Samara are being criticized on both sides. A decade after the start of cooperation within the framework of the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Moscow and Brussels, problems emerged that gave rise to talk about the beginning of a “cold peace.” However, not all observers, including those in the West, assess the results of the meeting in Samara so negatively. The summit can become a new starting point in relations in which there will be no place for unrealistic hopes and unrealistic expectations of partners from each other. This is what political scientist and expert at the German Society for Foreign Policy Julian PAENKE thinks.-- The recent Russia-EU summit in Samara seems to have disappointed both sides. Many analysts, commenting on its results (or rather, the lack thereof), talk about a strong cooling between Moscow and Brussels. Is this really a systemic breakdown?
- You should look at everything that happens with a fair amount of calm. At any time, European-Russian relations (as well as not only them) go through certain cycles. In this sense, it can be argued that 2007 became a landmark year - just remember the sensational Munich speech of President Putin, the energy debates at the spring summit of EU heads of state and government in Brussels or the recent summit in Samara. If we look back, we will see that in previous years relations between Russia and the EU carried a certain charge of euphoria. Since the beginning of this decade, rather pragmatic relations have been mixed, in my opinion, with a dose of political romanticism. This, for example, concerns the desire to create four joint “spaces” declared at the St. Petersburg summit in 2003 - in the areas of economics, internal security, international relations and in the humanitarian field. However, in recent years relations have cooled somewhat, and at the meeting in Samara its participants, which is very unusual for events of this level, did not even adopt any joint document. This undoubtedly indicates that the parties have overcome a certain stage in their relations.
-- So the new trend is leading Russia and the European Union to a “cold world”?
- Not everything is as bad as it might seem at first glance. What we witnessed in Samara, it seems to me, may even benefit Russia and Europe. Now both partners could be greeted with the slogan: “Welcome to reality!”
I am sure that until now relations between Russia and the EU have been associated with greatly inflated expectations from each other. At times they were devoid of everyday realism. But the current approaches are just as devoid of realism, when comments in the European media speak more and more clearly about a catastrophe, a “cold war”, and a sharp drop in “temperature” in relations between Russia and the West. This is in no way true. The truth is that Russia and the EU saw each other in a significantly distorted, I would say, too rosy light and therefore sought relations that could not be ensured to the desired extent on either side.
- However, both sides have quite similar approaches to the most important global problems. Is this an exception?
- This is a rather superficial approach to assessing partners. In fact, current Russian foreign policy is most clearly characterized by pragmatism, devoid of any ideology. This fundamentally distinguishes today's Russia from the state of Soviet times. Russia brings to the world not the previously ideologically charged anti-model of the global order, but a pragmatic capitalist policy built on its state interests. And Europe needs to accept this approach. The European Union would do the right thing if it stopped assessing Russia as a “purely European” country - it needs to be perceived in the same way as all other countries of a similar scale - say, India or China. Of course, and no one argues with this, Russia is significantly more important for Europe, and this factor should be decisive in shaping EU policy. The current problems in relations between both sides, which were especially highlighted in Samara, are not systemic in nature. These specific problems are the meat dispute with Poland, the relocation of the monument in Tallinn, differences on the Kosovo issue, the deployment of missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, etc. - partly caused by the integration rivalry between the EU and Russia that has emerged in recent years.
— Do you mean rivalry in the former USSR?
-- For Russia and the EU today it is completely unclear in what direction the countries located between their borders will develop. There is no final clarity about what kind of foreign and domestic policies these countries will build in the foreseeable future. And ultimately, we are witnessing a Russian-European competitive political struggle for the sympathy of these countries. These are primarily Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, but in a certain sense also the republics of the South Caucasus, to which Moscow traditionally defines the role of the sphere of its foreign policy interests. In this situation, the EU has concerns about the possibility of a security vacuum forming on its eastern border. Against this background, both sides are fighting for favor from the ruling elites in these states.
- Many people believe that the methods of Russian diplomacy in this context are somewhat clumsy.
- I agree with this point of view. This is not the most diplomatic approach when Russia tries to twist the arms of former Soviet states through various embargoes and bans. This seems like an exaggerated reaction to me. After all, everything in these countries initially contributes to closer integration with Russia - the majority of the population there speaks or at least understands Russian, people have sympathy for Russian culture. This is undeniable. I have the impression that Russia, whether it wants it or not, is pushing these countries away as a result of its policies. Of course, these countries and integration rivalry should not be considered as a subject of “division.” There is nothing of this - there is a process of search for their own identity by the republics of the former USSR. And whatever the outcome of this process, it must be respected by both Russia and the West, including, of course, the United States.
- How important is the historical factor in this case? Does your past together help or hinder building relationships?
— In the theory of international relations, I consider myself to be a supporter of constructivism. This means that modern politics is largely built and implemented on the perception of the past. An important role is played by past processes of formation of social relations. A simple example: the political elites of both the EU and Russia were formed mainly during the Cold War. Therefore, there cannot yet be complete trust in each other; it must only be won in a joint political process. There is always a certain amount of mistrust in the subconscious. The most striking example of recent times is President Putin's Munich speech. Why is he attacking in an extremely sharp tone the project of deploying missile defense systems in Europe, which is completely legitimate? After all, the missiles are aimed at containing the nuclear ambitions of Iran, North Korea, etc. countries It’s very simple: NATO, by definition, in the view of the Russian leadership, is a military organization that threatens the security of Russia.
- But NATO, as they say in such cases, must go its part of the way in order to achieve the trust of Moscow.
- I don’t really understand the position of NATO or the European Union in this regard. After all, if we turn to the foreign policy rhetoric of the early 1990s, we will remember the mutual desire to build a common European home and a common security system. We have witnessed how painfully Russia reacted to NATO's expansion to the east. Why, one might ask, did not the West behave more flexibly in this situation? After all, NATO’s clumsy actions in accepting Eastern European newcomers into its structures awakened “hawks” in Moscow. One result of this has been a tougher Russian foreign policy towards the EU and the West.
— So, what are the differences in the approaches of Russia and the European Union at the new stage of relations, after Samara?
— In general terms, I can formulate it this way: European foreign policy lives in an atmosphere of institutionalism and liberalism, while Russian foreign policy is determined by realism. The EU is built on the interpenetration of member countries, their institutions, and common values. Cooperation plays a major role here, and conflicts are considered undignified and unacceptable in relations with each other. Mutual solidarity is one of the most important principles for building relations within the EU.
In Russia there are different approaches. The Kremlin rejoices at high prices for energy raw materials, a swelling treasury, economic growth and an increase in the living standards of the population. In this situation, it becomes possible to show muscles to neighbors and competitors. Currently, Russia does not really need foreign policy harmony with the EU and the West. The energy dependence of both is quite high, and therefore Russia, without the danger of serious negative consequences for itself, can take opposition to the West, for example, on the issue of Kosovo. This, as they say, costs Russia nothing in the literal sense of the word. But such a policy prevents the EU from eliminating points of contention.
- And high prices for oil and gas, as we know, may not last forever...
- The European Union, it seems to me, would do Russia a good service if it pursued a clearer, more uniform policy that would encourage your country to position itself more adequately in Europe and the world. The desire of European countries to diversify sources of energy purchases forces Russia, as a supplier of oil and gas, to look at other energy markets and look for new import partners. Thus, both the EU and Russia would be able to avoid stagnation in relations with other countries and regions.
— Is the failure of the Samara summit a move in this direction?
— Yes, in this sense, the outcome of the summit in Samara is not so bad. What happened between the EU and Russia was something similar to what happens from time to time between friends when a certain problematic potential accumulates in their relationship. Samara highlighted the positions of each side and exposed contradictions. Now a certain amount of time must pass to comprehend the ways and means of moving forward together.
Julian Paenke taught a course in international relations at Tyumen State University in 2003-2005. At the German Society for Foreign Policy he studies the philosophical aspects of the future of a united Europe.