About seconds down

On July 14, 2007, in the unrecognized Republic of South Ossetia, a 15th anniversary was celebrated from the date of entry of peacekeeping forces into the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. This event was celebrated in Tskhinvali as a national holiday. Naturally, in Tbilisi this event is evaluated differently. About the Russian annexation of the "Tskhinval region" (as well as about the effective implementation of the "Alternative" South Ossetia project) there, at any opportunity. From time to time for the "rebellious republic" Tbilisi also includes the "stopwatch". "The stopwatch is included. Georgia has all the resources to solve this issue. We will show an example to the whole world how to solve such problems. And this will be a good precedent for all countries," the President of Georgia said during the June summit of the GUAM countries in Baku. However, it should be noted that for South Ossetia this is not the first inclusion of a stopwatch. In February 2006, the then Minister of Defense of Georgia already tried to put the rebellious republic "on the counter". “This year, the Georgian has two main tasks: the reunification of the Tskhinval region (the decision of which enters the active phase) and the receipt of the status of the Candidate country for membership in NATO at the end of the year,” Okashvili announced at a meeting with journalists. Answering the question whether his intention remains in force to meet a new year in Tskhinvali (it was announced earlier), the head of the Georgian Ministry of Defense said: "A stopwatch has already been included for me." And although the New Year's Eve was postponed to Tskhinvali, the idea of ​​returning South Ossetia to the “One and Calm-Toe Georgia” still owns the minds of the Georgian elite. And if by the end of 2006 (after the first inclusion of a stopwatch) in the conflict region the conflict of Tbilisi and Tskhinvali was limited to a small foul (while the foul level decreased by the end of the year), then in June 2007 (after the launch of a second second -ender), tension escalation occurs. By the way, at the celebration of the 15th anniversary of the beginning of a peacekeeping operation in Tskhinvali, representatives of Georgian peacekeepers were not present. I would like to remind you that the operation, which began 15 years ago, is not exclusively a Russian enterprise. This is a joint peacekeeping operation, in which the Russian Federation, and Georgia, and the unrecognized South Ossetia, and North Ossetia are represented (as an interested party, since in the early 90s Ossetian refugees from Georgia made up 15% of the entire population of this Russian republic). The only representative of Georgia at the celebration of the 15th anniversary of the input of peacekeeping forces into the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict was the first commander of the Georgian peacekeepers, the leader of the Georgian Communist Party (marginal force in today's Georgia) Panteleimon Giorgadze.

Hence the "high price" of the holiday on July 14 for residents of South Ossetia. “Peacekeeping forces will remain in the conflict zone until the Georgian-Ossetian conflict is completely resolved, whoever tried to prevent this and no matter what decisions the Georgian parliament was taking,” Eduard Kokoita , President of South Ossetia, said at the celebration of the 15th anniversary of the peacekeeping forces into the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.

The Georgian-Ossetian confrontation, "frozen" 15 years ago, was the first interethnic conflict in the post-Soviet Georgia. In its development, this conflict has passed several stages. The first is ideological (1988-1989), during which the warring parties designated the main claims to each other, and also formed the fundamental ethnopolitical mythologists of the future conflict. The second is political (1989-1991), when the Georgian and Ossetian sides waged a legislative ("status") war on each other. The Ossetian side proclaimed a higher status and sovereignty of its national-state education, and Georgian canceled and canceled political and legal initiatives of obstinate opponents. The third is an armed struggle (January 1991- July 1992). The fourth (1992-2004) - attempts to resolve the consequences of armed confrontation and determine the format of relations between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali. The fifth (began in May -June 2004) -unfolding a new ethnopolitical crisis, "defrosting" the conflict.

The South Ossetian Autonomous Okrug - the historical predecessor of unrecognized state education of the Republic of South Ossetia - was formed on April 20, 1922. The territory of this national state education was 6.5% of the territory of Georgia (3.84 thousand square meters). The population of the South Ossetian AO, according to the 1989 All -Union Census, was 98.5 thousand people (63.2 thousand Ossetians, 28.5 thousand Georgians, 2.1 thousand Russians, 0.9 thousand people - representatives of Jewish ethnic groups). The number of Ossetians in Georgia in 1989 was 165 thousand people (about 3% of the population of the Transcaucasian Republic). The legal status of South Ossetia in the pre-crisis period was regulated by the Law on the South Ossetian AO (adopted in 1980).

The epidemic of the Bythly Typhus flashed in the South Ossetian AO in 1988 gave impetus to the formation of public informal associations. The most influential was the movement "Adamon Vsihas" ("People's Veche"). At first, it acted with socio-economic and environmental slogans containing criticism of Tbilisi for insufficient attention to the region. Then claims to the republican authorities of Georgia began to move to the plane of interethnic relations. At the end of 1988, the Georgian media initiated a discussion of the problem of the ethnopolitical development of the Georgian SSR as part of a single union state, as well as the relationship of autonomies that are part of Georgia with the Republican Center. In the discussion on the "Ossetian" problem, the Georgian media had an obvious advantage (in quantity, circulation, the presence of electronic media). Therefore, the publication of numerous sharp materials on the problems of Ossetian-Georgian relations began to be perceived by representatives of South Ossetia and the Ossetian community of Georgia as the propaganda of Georgian ethnopolitical dominance. Meanwhile, in the Soviet period in South Ossetia there were no frequent outbreaks of ethnic confrontation, as in Abkhazia, where in the 60-80s, with a frequency of ten years, the situation was aggravated, falling into the focus of the attention of the Georgian Central Committee of the Communist Party. In the mass memory of the Ossetians, of course, the memories of the "power policy" of the Menshevik Georgia of the 1918-1921 model were preserved, but they did not determine the ethnopolitical climate. On the contrary, Ossetians were considered a much greater extent inscribed in the Georgian society. Firstly, unlike the Abkhazians, they did not live compactly. Most of the Ossetians did not live in South Ossetia, but in the internal regions of Georgia (including Tbilisi). Secondly, in the same South Ossetia during the period of "stagnation" there were much more Ossetian schools than in the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the RSFSR (in Vladikavkaz, then Ordzhonikidze, there was one Ossetian school for children with slow development).

However, the exalted Georgian nationalist intelligentsia did everything during the period of “perestroika” to provoke Ossetinophobia not only in South Ossetia, but also against those Ossetians who were in no way connected with Tskhinvali and considered Georgian their native language. The leitmotif of the publications of Georgian authors was the thesis about the "non-veral" nature and artificiality of the national-state education of southern Ossetians. Ossetians were considered as a "new" population on Georgian land, and the territory of the South Ossetian AO - as "ethnic property of Georgians." In the discussion of 1988, to designate the territory of South Ossetia, Georgian historians and publicists began to use the words "Samachablo" (the possession of the Georgian princes of Macchabel) or "Shida Cartley" ("Inner Cartley"), emphasizing the unreasonableness of the claims of Ossetians to their own national-state education.

On November 10, 1989, a session of people's deputies of the South Ossetian AO decided to transform the region into an autonomous republic as part of Georgia. This action was extremely negatively perceived in Georgia. Unilaterally, South Ossetia increased its status. However, at that time there was no talk of separation from Georgia. The response to it was the organization of the many thousands of Georgian march to the capital of the South Ossetian Autonomous Okrug on November 23, 1989. It was during this “protest march” that the first victims appeared. After the November incident, the leadership of South Ossetia began to navigate in his actions on the Union Center, seeing an ally against Georgian National Separatists. In June 1990, the Supreme Council of Georgia recognized all legal acts and agreements concluded after 1921 illegal. According to the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in 1921, the South Ossetian autonomy in the form of a region or republic was not provided. In August 1990, a ban on the participation of regional socio-political forces was introduced in the Georgian Parliament elections, which closed the road to participate in the General Georgian policy of the Ossetian movement "Adamon Vsihas". Thus, Georgian leaders largely provoked Ossetian separatism. They excluded the leaders of South Ossetia from the republican political process, reducing them to the position of the marginals. On August 10, 1990, a session of the Council of People's Deputies of South Ossetia adopted a declaration of sovereignty (67 votes - for, 25 - against and 7 abstained). On September 20, 1990, the South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic was proclaimed. On December 9, 1990, elections were scheduled for the Parliament of South Ossetia. Their organization and conduct were recognized by Georgia illegal. On December 11, 1990, the Supreme Council of Georgia decided to cancel the South Ossetian autonomy. Almost simultaneously, the authorities of the SSR union announced the emergency regime in the South Ossetian autonomy, and the Georgian leadership began the blockade of South Ossetia. "The Ossetian people are garbage, which must be laid through the Rock tunnel. We will go along Ossetia, and let the Ossetians submit and become Georgians, or, if they love Russians, leave Georgia to Russia," said the at that time of Georgian ethno -nationalists and the first President of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

In January 1991, the rebellious autonomy included detachments of the Georgian police, which actually became the beginning of the armed Georgian-Ossetian conflict. In a referendum on March 17, 1991, the vast majority of Ossetians spoke out in favor of preserving the Union of the SSR. At the same time, the Ossetian side actually boycotted the Georgian referendum on independence on March 31, 1991. On May 14, 1991, the general meeting of deputies of all levels of South Ossetia made an appeal to the Supreme Council of the USSR with a motion to recognize the autonomy as an independent participant in the signing of the Union Treaty. The collapse of the SSR union changed the political priorities of the leaders of South Ossetia. Now their main partners have become Russia and North Ossetia - national -state education in the Russian Federation. The rhetoric of the South Ossetian movement has also changed. The communist and internationalist components gave way to the slogans of ethnic unity, the right of nations to self -determination. On January 19, 1992, a referendum was organized for the exit of South Ossetia from Georgia and a association with Russia. The Georgians living in South Ossetia did not take part in the plebiscite. More than 90% of the participants voted for the department of South Ossetia and the association with Russia.

A new escalation of tension during the Georgian-Ossetian conflict occurred in May 1992, when a bus with refugees-Ossetians was shot in the area of ​​the Georgian village of Kehvi. The Ossetian side accused Georgians of this action. As a result of this action, North Ossetia was involved in the conflict, which overlap the gas pipeline leading to Georgia. On May 29, 1992, the South Ossetia Council adopted an act of proclaiming the independence of the Republic of South Ossetia. The only sources of law in South Ossetia were recognized by the legislative acts of this unrecognized state.

On June 24, 1992, with the active participation of Russia, a Dagomass agreement was signed on the principles of resolving the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. As a result of the armed confrontation, 100 villages were burned, about 1 thousand people were killed. The total number of refugees and forced immigrants from South Ossetia and the internal regions of Georgia amounted to 43.4 thousand people. However, despite the loss of Georgian sovereignty over Southern Ossetia, in the territory of the former AO, unlike Abkhazia, there was no mass expulsion of the Georgians. Georgians loyal to the leadership of South Ossetia live in Tskhinvali and in settlements with a population mixed in ethnic composition. Most Georgian villages became enclaves subordinate to Tbilisi. The main result of the signing of the Dagomass agreements was the creation of a mixed control commission (SCC) and mixed forces to maintain peace (with the participation of the Russian, Georgian and Ossetian battalions).

The key problem in resolving the situation around South Ossetia is the problem of the status of the former South Ossetian AO. After 1992, the process of institutionalization of South Ossetia began as an independent (unrecognized international community) state education. In 1993, the Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia was adopted. In 1996, the presidency was introduced. In 1996, 2001 and 2006, presidential elections were held. In the second and third presidential elections in South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoev (Kokoita), the current leader of an unrecognized state, won. According to the Basic Law of the Republic, South Ossetia was proclaimed an "independent, sovereign, democratic state." The only state language was recognized by the Ossetian, the official language - Russian and the minority language - Georgian (for places of compact residence of Georgians). The Ossetian side has more than once spoke in the construction of contractual relations with Georgia and for the need for the official repentance of the Georgian authorities for the events of 1989-1992.

The Georgian state, in fact, itself does not strive for the legal consolidation of South Ossetia as part of a single Georgia. In Georgian legislation, the concept of "South Ossetia" is absent. Instead, the phrase "Tskhinvalsky region" is used. In 2007, the "Provisional Administration" was introduced. Until now, the act of the Gamsakhurdia period on the elimination of national-state education of the Ossetians has not been canceled. The concept of the first Georgian president - "there is no Ossetian autonomy, there are Ossetians living in Georgia" - actually exists today.

Certain progresses in the negotiation process to eliminate the consequences of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict were made in the mid-90s. In May 1996, the Memorandum on measures to ensure security and strengthen mutual confidence between the parties in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict was signed. In February 1997 - "the order of voluntary return of refugees and forced immigrants to the places of former residence in South Ossetia and in the internal regions of Georgia." A special committee was created to return refugees. In 2000, the Russian-Georgian intergovernmental agreement was signed on the interaction in the restoration of the economy in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone and the return of refugees. However, the problem of the crisis of mutual trust was not positively resolved. During the forum to resolve the Georgian-Ossetian conflict under the auspices of the OSCE in The Hague (autumn 2003), the results of a sociological study of public opinion of South Ossetia in 2002 were voiced. The survey was conducted by employees of the Vladikavkaz Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences using specialists of the School of State of Public Administration named after J. Kennedy at Harvard University, which ensured ethnic non -angidism. According to this survey, only 7% of respondents spoke out for certain formal legal relations with Georgia (federation, confederation, autonomy), while in 1997 the number of supporters of state coexistence with Georgia was 21%. Among respondents of the age of 20-29 years, there was not a single (!) Defender of the establishment of a particular form of Georgian sovereignty.

In 2003-2004, the situation around South Ossetia worsened again. The “Revolution of Roses” in Georgia (October-November 2003), stunning the victory (97% of the vote) in the presidential election of M. Saakashvili (January 2004), took place, as in the early 90s, on the basis of mobilization of the ethno-nationalist resource. In January 2004, the leadership of South Ossetia and the Ossetian population of an unrecognized state refused to participate in the elections of the President of Georgia. Meanwhile, the Georgian side stated that the presidential election took place in the most part of the "Tskhinval region".

In late May - early June 2004, a new crisis in Georgian -Ossetian relations was indicated. It was this time that became a watershed in the history of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. The new ethnopolitical crisis arose due to the desire of the new Georgian leadership to conduct an audit of the 1992 Dagomsky agreements. 31 мая 2004 года без согласования своих действий со Смешанной контрольной комиссией (СКК) на территорию Южной Осетии были введены силы спецназа МВД Грузии (300 человек) под предлогом борьбы с контрабандой. Эти действия были расценены сторонами - членами СКК как нарушение Дагомысских соглашений 1992 года. С этого момента и до сегодняшнего дня атаки на Дагомыс предпринимаются регулярно. Это и решения парламента Грузии о прекращении миротворческой операции в конфликтном регионе, и создание "альтернативной Южной Осетии" и попытки ее международной легитимации, и многочисленные ротации грузинских миротворцев (для обучения как можно большего количества военных "на местности").

20 июля 2004 года президент Грузии публично заявил, что не исключает возможности денонсации Дагомысских соглашений: "Если в рамках соглашений на территории Цхинвальского региона нельзя поднимать грузинский флаг, я готов выйти из этих соглашений". Таким образом Саакашвили обозначил три стратегические цели Грузии, которые она последовательно реализует вплоть до сегодняшнего дня:

• интернационализировать грузино-осетинский конфликт, подключить к его урегулированию США, страны Европы;
• переформатировать конфликт из грузино-осетинского в грузино-российский и представить его как проявление российского неоимпериализма;
• отказаться от эксклюзивной роли России как гаранта мира в регионе.

Однако пока ни одна из этих целей не реализована полностью. Сегодня мы можем говорить лишь о психологической победе грузинского лидера. Он фактически убедил "мировое общественное мнение", что этнополитические конфликты на территории Грузии спровоцированы и поддерживаются Россией и не имеют внутренних предпосылок. Сегодня в Вашингтоне и в Брюсселе хотят "смотреть в будущее" и, напротив, считают излишним обращаться к истории конфликта. Лозунг, предложенный в свое время для Балкан Ричардом Холбруком ("no History"), активно используется и при оценке "замороженных конфликтов" на постсоветском пространстве. Между тем сегодня, отмечая 15 лет со дня начала одной из наиболее успешных миротворческих операций в СНГ (а за эти годы миротворцы удержали ситуацию от новой войны), необходимо помнить о тех предпосылках, которые спровоцировали кровавое противоборство начала 90-х годов.

Что же касается миротворцев, то Тбилиси следует помнить, что это те самые проклинаемые "голубые каски" не позволили осетинским радикалам "зачистить" в начале 90-х годов грузинские села Кехви и Тамарашени. Именно эти миротворцы в течение всего периода с момента "заморозки" конфликта и до 2004 года позволяли Тбилиси и Цхинвали сближаться друг с другом (здесь уместно было бы вспомнить и транспортное сообщение, и рынок в Эргнети, и совместное проживание, в отличие от большей части Абхазии, грузин и осетин). И сегодня при всех своих недостатках миротворцы в Южной Осетии (среди которых, кстати, есть и грузины) блокируют возможность "окончательной разморозки" конфликта. А значит, "день миротворца" в Южной Осетии будет сохранять здесь статус национального праздника.