Assault or negotiations

The tragedy of Beslan and the Peruvian experience

Three years ago, before our eyes, a bloody drama unfolded with armed terrorists seizing more than 1,100 hostages at school No. 1 in the North Ossetian city of Beslan. Two years earlier, an essentially similar terrorist attack occurred in the capital’s Theater Center on Dubrovka. Hostage-taking, unfortunately, has become a common phenomenon of modern reality.

In such cases, humanity knows only two possible courses of action - assault or negotiations. Moreover, the actions of the authorities during such terrorist attacks are not at all determined by the nature of the political regime in the country. Roughly speaking, the authorities do not have to share democratic ideals in order to try to get by without using force or to minimize casualties during an assault.

Here's a classic example.

Lima, capital of Peru. December 17, 1996. Christmas Eve. Catholics live in an atmosphere of peace and goodness. At the residence of the Japanese Ambassador, a reception began on the occasion of the national holiday - the birthday of the Emperor. Over 800 people gathered in the halls. Among the guests are high-ranking officials, foreign diplomats, and an economic delegation from Japan. According to unofficial data, the arrival of Head of State Alberto Fujimori was expected.

At a moment of general relaxation, a group of heavily armed thugs from the revolutionary movement “Tupac Amaru” neutralized the guards, carried out a lightning raid and took hostages. The militants' demands boiled down to the unconditional release of their comrades - participants in other terrorist actions, convicted and under investigation. Otherwise, the hostages faced death.

The bandits, realizing that it was impossible to keep everyone in a limited space, immediately released the women. The men were assigned to rooms in the mansion. The house, of course, had representative premises, but it was designed only for members of the ambassador's family and servants. The crowding and cramped conditions were incredible.

In such conditions, an assault was excluded. It would inevitably turn into a bloody mess. It should not have been allowed for another reason. The terrorists, among whom were women, in addition to machine guns with ammunition, grenades and other weapons, constantly wore special belts over their body armor, reminiscent of machine gun belts. Only instead of cartridges there were sticks of dynamite sticking out of them. If hit by a bullet, they would explode like landmines. The hostages had virtually no chance of surviving in the event of an assault.

The Peruvian government, without hesitation, decided to begin negotiations. It was supported by politicians, the media, the G8 states, and the international community. At first, under the authority of the president, the negotiations were led by the Minister of Labor. He was then replaced by representatives of the Red Cross and the Primate of Lima, Archbishop Juan Luis Cipriani, who enjoyed enormous authority. He met not only with militants, but also with prisoners, performing religious rites to those who wished.

During the contacts, it was possible to achieve a lot: to establish regular meals for all residents of the residence, the delivery of necessary medications, a change of linen and clothes, and letters from relatives. Gradually, they began to release sick people, foreign diplomats and people who were of no interest to the raiders. So the number of hostages was reduced to 72.

In the process of protracted, sticky negotiations, lists and photographs of prisoners, procedures for filing individual appeals, methods, routes, means of transportation and delivery of pardoned persons in the future were clarified. A lot of other, including technical, details were discussed.

All this lulled the terrorists’ vigilance, creating the impression that a forceful action was ruled out. This was confirmed by the peaceful attitude of the authorities and the open appeals of the prisoners to the head of state with calls to prevent bloodshed. Meanwhile, Alberto Fujimori made a quick visit to Havana to discuss with Fidel Castro, who was ideologically close to the group that took the hostages, the possibility of accepting terrorists in Cuba or at least getting more compliance from them.

The country lived with bated breath in anxious anticipation. Hundreds of film, television, and photographic documentarians, who had come from all over the world, were on duty around the clock on the nearby streets and rooftops of nearby houses. The national press, television, and radio covered in detail all the vicissitudes of the epic, which acquired the character of a drama. And subsequently, no one from the authorities reproached them for “aiding terrorists.”

In parallel, under the personal leadership of the head of state, with the strictest secrecy and with the consent of the Japanese government, a plan was being developed for the forceful release of the hostages. Outside the city, in a deserted, carefully camouflaged and guarded place, a life-size model of the building was erected. On it, a special forces group methodically practiced capture options. At the same time, an underground tunnel was built across the street directly under the residence territory. The sounds of work were drowned out by high-power loudspeakers. Through them, appeals were broadcast around the clock to terrorists calling for the release of those being held, and hard rock music was specially played.

Months of stress, lack of normal sleep, noise and psychological treatment took their toll. The terrorists' fighting spirit had faded; they were in an extremely exhausted and inhibited state.

On April 22, 1997, having made sure of complete readiness, the president gave the order to begin the operation. The lightning assault lasted a matter of seconds. Special forces immediately jumped out from different directions. Before they could use their weapons, all 14 terrorists were killed. The attackers did not do without casualties: two were killed, some were injured. One of the hostages, an elderly member of the Supreme Court, suffered a heart attack. It was not possible to save him. Several people escaped with minor injuries, including then-Foreign Minister Francisco Tudela. No one disappeared or went missing.

Thus ended the 126-day epic. Its epilogue was an expressive picture with the participation of the president. Under the enthusiastic exclamations and greetings of tens of thousands of townspeople, he rode on the bus step in a convoy that was taking extremely tired, now former hostages to a military hospital.

Of course, we are not talking about copying other people's experience. Each terrorist attack of this type has a set of unique circumstances. But it is useful to know it.

If we compare the general outline of the actions of the Russian and Peruvian authorities in connection with the hostage-taking terrorist attacks, fundamental differences are striking. In Peru, the priority was dialogue to liberate people in trouble. The assault was considered as a backup option. In Russia, negotiations with terrorists were conducted only by volunteers. And information from people who visited the Theater Center on Dubrovka was filtered by the intelligence services as source material for the force action.

After the Nord-Ost tragedy, the two-day confusion and helplessness of the authorities gave way to victorious reports and reports on the successes of the special services. All sorts of PR campaigns were used. And after some time, the situation repeated itself in Beslan: the authorities essentially refused to conduct a dialogue with the bandits, and the security forces stormed the school. The result is terrible. Nevertheless, almost all the officials involved in the tragic denouement live and work quietly away from the site of the tragedy. The President promised to look into it and punish those responsible. But no one from the authorities was punished - not even ordinary police officers who let the terrorists through with weapons, not to mention the heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB.

A parliamentary investigation into the tragedy at Dubrovka was banned, and the parliamentary commission on Beslan acted purely formally and did not dare to contradict the official version of the Prosecutor General’s Office, which removed from under attack all representatives of the state who allowed more than 300 people to die in the Beslan school.

There is and cannot be an excuse for militants taking people hostage. But this does not mean that the authorities are not responsible for preserving the lives of people captured by terrorists.

Emil DABAGYAN, leading researcher at the Institute of Latin America of the Russian Academy of Sciences