Translated material
Shadow of Borodin
The nuclei and bullets lay on all sides. Within one hour I was covered four times, the first time relatively easily two bullets, then a bullet in my left hand, which pulled out the sleeve of my uniform and shirt ... Soon I received the fourth wound; The bullet hit me in the left thigh and threw me off the horse; It was my 22nd wound, I would have to leave the battlefield; And I informed the marshal of this, whose troops mixed with mine.
From the memoirs of Jean Rapp, Adjutant General Napoleon, who commanded 4 and 5 infantry divisions 1 of Marshal Dava Corps during the assault on the Semenov fortifications of OK. 10 a.m. on September 7, 1812.
The main thing is not to go astray for the transfer of banalities. To the famous maxims about the main battle of the campaign of 1812, on the majestic scale of the pan-European mutual murder (there were about 300 thousand men involved on both sides; in Russian, French, Saxon, South German, Italian, Dutch, Spanish uniforms-parallest and not camps, despite the obsolete, despite the unseen The matinee, by the way, is the joy of film director Bondarchuk, who played the battle of 120 thousand participants in the masses and a half a century and a half later - that is, on a 1: 2 scale). About thousands of guns - 640 Russians and 587 enemy.
Actually, in general, the outline of events is quite unambiguous - despite the fact that they argue and argue about the details, while the conclusions and their interpretation are completely able to bring to uniform conflicts. In 1824, the case even reached the duel between the participants in the battle: the former orderly of Napoleon, his publisher of his memoirs by Baron Gaspar Gurgo and the brigade General Philip Pole Segur, who had just published his own memories.
So, here it is, this canvas. In the early morning of September 5, Napoleon ordered to attack the Shevardinsky Redut - the supporting point of the left flank of the Russian army. During a stubborn battle, Redut was taken and this forced Kutuzov to change his position - to deploy the front of his troops as if 45 degrees counterclockwise. They began to build new strongholds - the so -called "Bagrationovs of the Flashi" on the left flank and the "Raevsky battery" on the right. I must say that in two days neither those nor other fortifications have become something serious-despite the fact that it seemed to have enough time. In general, since the choice of the battlefield in that situation was the prerogative of the Russians, Kutuzov instructed this task to General Tolya and his solution, as you know, remained unhappy. However, he did not look for anything else, as if with a wave of his hand - what, they say, the difference ... This is the construction of “through the sleeves” as if confirmed the indecisive of Kutuzov’s indifference to the French observers: either to give a battle, or to retreat further to Moscow ...
The 7th day from the early morning began the main battle and lasted up to 6 in the afternoon. Despite the amazing perseverance and terrifying losses of both sides - only about 25 thousand people killed, about about 25 thousand people, approximately in an equal proportion (which makes the honor to the French, who attacked all day with a smaller art support) - Borodinsky battle hardly became a masterpiece of military art. In fact, the attack of the Shevardinsky Redut is almost the only "creative" tactical decision of Bonaparte. Two days later, in fact, his troops fought, but not himself - fearing that the Russians as usual, suddenly disappeared, without giving such a chained general battle, the French emperor refused to treat Kutuzov’s troops with a deep maneuver and, in return, ordered everyone to go to the frontal attack. This was filled with the whole terrible day - some attacked despite the losses, others stood to death and counterattacked if there were opportunities. Both sides, however, made one attempt on a tactical flank bypass - but also in both cases is not avoided. So, the raid of the cavalry of Uvarov and Platov Kutuzov was so unhappy that these generals were bypassed as awarded presentation for the Borodino business. And about the symmetrical raid of the Polish cavalry of Penatovsky, Napoleon very maliciously wrote even in his famous 18 ballot: "And only the 5th Army Corps fought for the forests with varying success." And this despite the fact that in all other things this false document describes the battle as the complete defeat of the Russian army, achieved by an insignificant price!
In general, on that day, Napoleon was surprisingly passive - this was noticed by many, some attributed it to the aggravated urological problems, but not medical circumstances were the main ones here: the master of the highest aerobatics is truly there is nothing to do with a frontal tank attack. And just the unconditional success of Russian military art is that by imposing such a boring tactics to the enemy, it was possible to deprive him of the most important resource: a tactical genius of a Corsican nugget.
Now a little about the results. By 6 o’clock in the evening, after 12 hours of battle, the situation was something similar to the one that took place by the end of the battle with the Provish-Elau in 1807. Then Napoleon did not know that the Russians would undertake from dawn: whether the battle would continue or begin a retreat. Now it was the same - Kutuzov left the battlefield to his enemy, but he walked away, preserving the battle formations, shooting himself away and even a little counterattack at any opportunity. In the medieval, formal sense, when control of the “bones of the fallen” was considered the most important sign of Victory, Borodino (or, as they are called by the French, “The Battle of the Moscow River”) was Napoleon’s victory, which is in the list of such gold, drawn on the Parisian triumphal arch. It is more reasonable, however, to evaluate the result, starting from the original goals that pursued the parties. As for Bonaparte, his immediate goals before the battle were as follows:
1) bringing the main forces of the Russian army into an inconsistent state
2) the subsequent unhindered capture of Moscow, being in which it was supposed to start negotiations on the world with the king
It is clear that the second goal was still achieved as a result - but it was, in principle, an erroneous goal. In other way, Napoleon made the so -called operating error of the second kind - he set a false goal and, striving for it, wasted all his resources. The first goal of these, in fact, was not achieved at all. The Russian army was not defeated, on the contrary, taking into account the availability of replenishment of reserves, the Borodinsky losses of the French were almost fatal for them. The same indicates the same: the prisoners of the French were taken very little, there were practically no artillery trophies. On the contrary, a certain number of French guns fell into the hands of their enemy. 49 French generals were disabled that day, 10 of them died.
It is more difficult to talk about the goals of the Russian command. The complete defeat of Napoleon on the Borodino field was unlikely to be considered as a real version of the outcome. It seems that one could continue the previous scenario: the retreat, coupled with the planned burning of all food and forage resources. Napoleon’s troops melted from this almost like from Cart. It is possible, however, that the main goal here is indeed, as L.N. Tolstoy believed, lay in the plane of the intangible - "PR", as we would say now. Kutuzov and, more importantly, Alexander I, who stood behind him, was supposed to receive an additional public sanction for his upcoming actions - especially such non -reds as a retreat and abandonment of Moscow. It was necessary to demonstrate to Russian society and determination to fight at once, and the power of the enemy at this stage is insurmountable at this stage. And in this regard, the real outcome of the Battle of Borodino, his purely military balance, had almost no serious significance.