Translated material
Bona fide subject
Dmitry Kozak and stabilization in the North Caucasus
The three-year diplomatic mission of Dmitry Kozak in the Southern Federal District has a chance to make history of the Russian presence in the Caucasus. During this period, another “point of unstable equilibrium” was passed, when, under an unfavorable combination of circumstances, Russia quite realistically risked losing its mountain provinces or, at least, hopelessly missing out on processes that would ultimately lead to territorial losses.Having accepted this troubled region in a state of deep crisis, the third in a row - after Viktor Kazantsev and Vladimir Yakovlev - the presidential plenipotentiary representative hands it over in a more than tolerable form, except for the ongoing criminal and political revelry in Ingushetia . However, Ingushetia, like its neighboring Chechnya, despite all the progress in the peaceful settlement of the Chechen problem, remains a special territory. Here, it is not so much the plenipotentiary representative who is responsible for the situation as President Kadyrov (in Chechnya) and the federal security forces (in Ingushetia). In all other Caucasian republics, Dmitry Kozak very significantly influenced the situation and changed it for the better. The meetings in Rostov, which began as operational meetings of the anti-terrorist headquarters, are now devoted to the issues of reducing subsidies and attracting large investments to the Caucasus. According to the head of North Ossetia, Taimuraz Mamsurov, the Caucasus under Kozak ceased to be a “scarecrow” and became a “conscientious subject.”
Kozak came to the Caucasus in the alarming autumn of 2004 - immediately after the terrorist attack on the North Ossetian city of Beslan, a few weeks after the militant attack on Ingushetia and four months after the assassination of the first post-war president of Chechnya “according to Moscow”, Akhmat Kadyrov. A little later, mass unrest occurred in Karachay-Cherkessia, caused by the murder of seven local residents at the dacha of the son-in-law of the president of the republic and ending with the storming of the presidential residence.
For the first six months, Kozak rushed between Beslan and Cherkessk, both here and there asking people to leave the streets and trust the authorities, promising a fair investigation, choosing the necessary words and even literally kneeling. With his ability to have a frank conversation, he endeared himself to both the desperate “Mothers of Beslan”, who yesterday, by the way, expressed regret about Mr. Kozak’s resignation from the post of plenipotentiary, and the Karachai rebels who broke into the presidential office and demanded the resignation of the absconding Mustafa Batdyev. The plenipotentiary arrived to them late at night, when trucks with riot police and internal troops had already arrived at the building. He negotiated for several hours, then brought the timid president into the room and said: “The perpetrators will be punished, but there will be no resignations of regional heads at the request of the crowd - if we allow this once, we will set the country on fire.” The rebels went home. And then there was a trial in which the president’s son-in-law, who had been the all-powerful master of Karachay-Cherkessia for several years, was sentenced to 14 years in prison.
According to Mr. Mamsurov, Kozak earned the respect of the people of the Caucasus thanks to his “masculine, direct and open leadership style.” Almost immediately it became known that Rostov had stopped taking bribes from regional officials. Refusing to change the heads of regions under pressure from the crowd, the new plenipotentiary nevertheless made several key personnel decisions that changed the face of the North Caucasus, described by Mr. Kozak in his closed report on the state of affairs in the region and the quality of the local elites.
In the 90s, in almost all the Caucasian republics, a political elite emerged, consisting mainly of the late Soviet ethnic nomenklatura, welded together by complex clan and corruption ties, “eating” most of the economy and absorbing federal subsidies like a sponge into their pockets. These elites aroused distrust and hatred of the population, which in the Islamic republics joined the ranks of the sabotage underground. It appeared that they were more of a hindrance in the management of the Caucasus than a tool for such management. Taking advantage of the virtual cancellation of elections for regional heads in the fall of 2004, Dmitry Kozak proposed a number of replacements to Vladimir Putin.
In 2005, the two-time president of North Ossetia, Alexander Dzasokhov, resigned and was replaced by Taimuraz Mamsurov, whose two children were among the hostages in the Beslan school. In the same year, the permanent post-Soviet leader of Kabardino-Balkaria, Valery Kokov, was replaced by Moscow businessman Arsen Kanokov, whom Mr. Kozak later strengthened with Prime Minister Yuri Yarin, a specialist from the embassy’s apparatus. Mr. Kanokov's appointment coincided with the last major militant attack - the raid on Nalchik on October 13-14, 2005. President Kanokov managed to carefully remove from the republican authorities officials who, along with the budget, actually privatized the administration during the terminally ill Kokov, and is trying to ensure that the investigation into the attack on Nalchik proceeds in a way that will not lead to an even greater increase in discontent among religious youth. At the same time, Arsen Kanokov’s management experience made it possible to ensure the growth of the regional economy and reduce the level of subsidies in the region.
Similar progress has been observed in Dagestan, where, under pressure from the plenipotentiary, the same patriarch of the post-Soviet Caucasus, head of the State Council Magomedali Magomedov, resigned. Mukhu Aliyev became the President of Dagestan. The appointment immediately eased the tension between the regional authorities and the largest ethnic group in Dagestan - the Avars, who for several years insisted that their representative should lead the republic. In the elections to the new Dagestan parliament, Mukhu Aliyev demonstrated a brilliant ability to balance the interests of the opposing corrupt ethnopolitical clans that determined the politics of Dagestan throughout the post-Soviet period, while simultaneously playing to reduce their role in favor of legal and transparent political institutions. Dagestan's depressed economy has also shown signs of growth.
The president also changed in Adygea, which the new minister of regional development visited just yesterday, on his first working day in his new position - he congratulated the people of the republic on the conditional date of the 450th anniversary of joining Russia. The entourage of former President Khazret Sovmen, who almost immediately after his election began to displease the federal center, tried to blackmail Moscow with the start of mass ethnic unrest among the Circassians if the president was replaced. The plenipotentiary waited for the constitutional expiration of Mr. Sovmen's powers and proposed to the head of state the candidacy of the rector of the local university, Aslan Tkhakushinov - although part of the local public nevertheless included Sovmen in the list of candidates.
The only replacement that occurred more despite than thanks to the efforts of Mr. Kozak was the early replacement of Chechen President Alu Alkhanov with Ramzan Kadyrov, which happened last spring. Mr. Kozak is clearly not close to the specific understanding of Russian legality that the charismatic president of Chechnya demonstrates: there have been serious successes in reconstruction in the republic, but the presence and influence of federal structures, including law enforcement and control structures, have actually been minimized. Mr. Kozak and Mr. Kadyrov nevertheless show mutual politeness: the former has more than once praised the latter for his ability to learn, the latter the former for being “well versed in economics, politics and, most importantly, interethnic relations.” . Mr. Kadyrov, who, by the way, is considered an adviser to the plenipotentiary representative of the Southern Federal District on security issues, yesterday called Mr. Kozak’s appointment to the government “a strong and justified move” - this remark could sound not only praise, but also relief.
Relief could probably also be felt by the President of Ingushetia, Murat Zyazikov, who publicly clashed with Dmitry Kozak over the introduction of external financial management in the poorest republics. However, the new position, apparently, will allow Mr. Kozak to return to this idea on a different level. But Mr. Zyazikov lost a politician who was unequivocally against the resignation of regional heads under the “forceful” pressure of residents who took to the streets. The situation in Ingushetia shows more and more clearly that this is exactly the kind of pressure being put on its leader.
Yesterday, at a holiday in Maykop, Dmitry Kozak called the situation in the Caucasus stable - this is a comprehensive report from a successful crisis manager. Of course, the general positive shift in the mountain republics is not the exclusive merit of the now former plenipotentiary: the general economic situation played a role, thanks to which at least some money came to the Caucasus in addition to budget subsidies, as well as the actual “exclusion” of the warring Chechnya from the chain of the pan-Caucasian anti-Russian underground . The successes have yet to be consolidated, and with careless management, the situation may again change for the worse. But Dmitry Kozak actually completed the task set before him. Some analysts linked the crisis outbreaks in the Caucasus in the first months of his embassy with the attempts of Mr. Kozak’s local and Moscow ill-wishers to prove his organizational failure. If there were such attempts, they failed.
Having left for the Ministry of Regional Development, Dmitry Kozak seems to be repeating the political fate of his predecessor in the rank of Plenipotentiary Representative, Vladimir Yakovlev, for whom the transfer from Rostov to this ministry was the next stage of political exile. However, Minister Kozak comes to the Ministry of Regional Development with significantly expanded functions, which can make him one of the key ones in the executive branch system. Dmitry Kozak will no longer have to experiment with creating a “government of the South,” as journalists called the commission he created for the development of the district’s constituent entities: having taken a seat in the federal government, he will be able to develop not only the southern, but also all other constituent entities.
Having started his work in his new position with a trip to Maykop, Mr. Kozak made it clear that now he would not leave the Caucasus without attention. The former plenipotentiary representative, according to him, has already discussed the issue of his successor in Rostov with the head of state. Everyone else immediately began discussing the question of whether Dmitry Kozak would be among Vladimir Putin's potential successors. Some political scientists, in particular the director of the Institute of Political Studies, Sergei Markov, already answer this question positively.