Translated material
Rapota is not a wolf
Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Southern Federal District appointed
After two weeks of agonizing wait, the Southern Federal District received a new presidential envoy on Saturday. It unexpectedly became the former Secretary General of the Euro-Asian Economic Community, Grigory Rapota. This appointment formally refuted the version put forward by a number of experts about the beginning of a complete curtailment of the institution of plenipotentiaries in connection with the transfer of most of their functions to the Ministry of Regional Development, now headed by Mr. Rapota’s predecessor, Dmitry Kozak.But in fact, this assumption turned out to be not so unfair: despite his rich track record, Grigory Rapota is unlikely to be able to compare with Dmitry Kozak in his new position. Most likely, he will remain a “technical” plenipotentiary representative, and the emergence of a “technical plenipotentiary representative” in the south, where the district authorities have always had a special status compared to other, less explosive districts, means a further decrease in the importance of the institution of plenipotentiary representatives. However, the appointment of Mr. Rapota may also mean the continuation of Vladimir Putin’s efforts to find personnel reserves that are not seriously involved in any of the Kremlin groups.
The new plenipotentiary can be described as a security official, but, perhaps, not exactly the kind whose appearance was predicted in Rostov. 63-year-old Grigory Rapota was born in Moscow into a military family, studied at the Bauman Moscow Higher Technical School and the USSR KGB Institute, and then worked in intelligence for 30 years, most recently in charge of relations with the intelligence services of other countries. The Chekist past does not mean, however, that he belongs to the cohort of security officials who came to power together with Vladimir Putin in 1999-2000 and in subsequent years. Mr. Rapota already in 1998 managed to serve as Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council, then for almost two years he headed the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rosvooruzhenie, and in 1999-2000 he worked as Deputy Minister of Trade of the Russian Federation (the minister was Mikhail Fradkov), and then (from 2000 to 2001) - First Deputy Minister of Industry, Science and Technology (then Alexander Dondukov). After replacing Mr. Dondukov with Ilya Klebanov, reserve lieutenant general Grigory Rapota was appointed secretary general of the Eurasian Economic Community, where he worked quietly and unnoticed for the past six years.
On October 6, at the CIS summit in Dushanbe, Vladimir Putin praised Mr. Rapota for his successes as secretary general and the “businesslike, friendly atmosphere” he created. According to the head of state, “Grigory Rapota worked well, efficiently, and largely thanks to his efforts, we achieved positive results in the work of the Eurasian Economic Community.” The President believes that in the post-Soviet space there has appeared “a desire to cooperate, negotiate and be together,” that this desire is “pushing integration processes,” and “this is largely the result of Rapota’s activities.”
On the one hand, at the CIS summit, which in theory should be a farewell for Vladimir Putin, a less rosy assessment of the state of affairs in the post-Soviet space could hardly have come from his lips. On the other hand, the serious conflicts that Russia had developed with its Commonwealth partners by the end of Vladimir Putin’s second term are developing rather contrary to the Eurasian Economic Community project, so the assessment of Mr. Rapota’s merits could be quite sincere. However, it seems that the personnel moves of the now former Secretary General are dictated not so much by his track record and the conscious choice of management, but by the search for a decent job for a veteran of the civil service. Grigory Rapota came to the Eurasian Economic Community in connection with the personnel reorganization of the Ministry of Industry and Science, and left it due to the fact that the founding presidents decided to transfer this post to the representative of Kazakhstan, the former ambassador to Russia Tair Mansurov.
This is not the first precedent for such a replacement of the post of plenipotentiary in the Southern Federal District. In March 2004, ex-governor of St. Petersburg Vladimir Yakovlev, who was dismissed from the federal government, was appointed to this position, for whom for a long time they could not find an honorary vacancy equivalent to retirement. But the summer of 2004 turned out to be too hot in the Caucasus, and it became obvious that the ex-Minister of Housing and Communal Services could not cope. In September 2004, he finally settled in the Ministry of Regional Development, from where he finally retired on September 24 of this year.
Strictly speaking, neither the first Caucasian plenipotentiary, army general Viktor Kazantsev, nor the second, completely civilian Vladimir Yakovlev, managed to cope with the task the way Dmitry Kozak coped with it. Dmitry Kozak somehow immediately broke the belief that had taken root in the minds of North Caucasian leaders that any issue could be resolved for cash brought to Rostov. Not being, in general, a public politician, Dmitry Kozak was able to find a common language with the Caucasian elites, which he managed to restructure in three years. And, more importantly, with the population, who, having become acquainted with him, for the first time in many years felt signs of trust in government power. The former plenipotentiary put out numerous conflicts “in fire mode” and carried out long and painstaking work to attract investors to the region, which for years had frightened all of Russia with wars and kidnappings. At the same time, he very pragmatically defended the interests of the federal center, without quarreling with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatists, but always realizing that the country’s territory is limited by its state border.
When he left office, Dmitry Kozak said he had “no sense of accomplishment,” in the sense that much of the work still remains to be done, and said he had discussed the candidacy of his successor with the president. It is difficult to say whether it was Mr. Rapota. In any case, Dmitry Kozak assessed his appointment as “very good.” In the south, as far as is known, the name of Grigory Rapota was not mentioned among the likely appointees until Saturday. It was assumed here that the post of plenipotentiary representative could be occupied by a more or less radical security official, capable of firmly defending federal interests, including in such specific regions as Kadyrov’s Chechnya, and possibly in the separatist provinces of the South Caucasus, de jure belonging to Georgia. But completely different names were discussed - both from the list of heads of southern law enforcement agencies and from among the employees of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Local governors, who managed to build business relations with Kozak, know Mr. Rapota poorly - apparently, just like him - the realities of the North Caucasus. Many North Caucasian presidents, who have already publicly approved the personnel decision, are, if not disappointed, then frozen in anticipation: as President of Kabardino-Balkaria Arsen Kanokov put it shortly before the appointment of a new plenipotentiary, “the effectiveness of the institution of plenipotentiaries is determined by people.” It is still unknown how effective the former general secretary will be in the specific conditions of the Caucasus. It is possible, of course, that the fourth Caucasian plenipotentiary, reserve lieutenant general Grigory Rapota, will unexpectedly eclipse all his predecessors. But most likely, Dmitry Kozak will still have to govern the constituent entities of the south, only not from Rostov, but from Moscow.