Changing priorities

Russia today is dealing with a different Europe

Today's Russia-European Union summit will take place in Portugal immediately after the informal summit of the European Union , which was held in Lisbon on October 19. And this is deeply symbolic, because in Lisbon the draft EU Reform Treaty was approved, which must still be approved in each of the 27 EU member states. But it is already clear that this document will determine the contours of the Europe with which Russia will have to deal in the coming years. A Europe focused not so much on internal development and deepening integration, but on strictly defending its interests in the international arena.

A distinctive feature of the new political and legal framework of the United Europe is a sharp strengthening of the role of national states and a manifold increase in protectionist opportunities in the economy. This means turning the previously independent Brussels - the supranational bodies of the European Union - into a cudgel with the help of which EU countries will strengthen their positions in the world economy and politics. Moreover, in Europe there are increasingly clear calls to protect European businesses from being absorbed by Chinese, Russian or Arab investment funds.

These trends are clearly manifested in the energy sector. This area will be the most important at today's negotiations in the Portuguese city of Mafra. The essence of the parties' positions so far is that both Russia and the EU view energy as the main element of ensuring their own security and competitiveness on the world stage. This does not at all contribute to the growth of trust between the parties and the finding of common solutions for the future.

On September 19, Brussels unveiled proposals to reform the European market and divide energy monopolists into enterprises for the production, transportation and marketing of oil and gas. It is proposed to introduce the same rules in relation to foreign suppliers to the European market. The latter worried Russia, since it could undermine the position of the same Gazprom in Europe.

However, serious observers in EU countries consider these initiatives from Brussels to be unviable. And they suggest considering them as an application for a longer and more serious conversation. This does not exclude the use of these projects as a tool of influence on Moscow. Perhaps the EU considers even a hypothetical threat to separate the pipeline capacity currently under construction from Gazprom sufficient to make Russia more accommodating.

The Europeans will probably also once again demand that Russia cancel the compensation fees charged for the use of Trans-Siberian air routes by European airlines. Europeans want to save money on flights through Russia. And again, as in the case of energy, Russia’s transit capabilities become a factor of national security. Only now it’s Russian. Which explains the difficulties in finding a mutually beneficial solution.

Both examples demonstrate that the main difficulties in the dialogue between Russia and the European Union (due to which today's summit risks becoming nothing more than a polite exchange of reproaches) are not related to issues of human rights, national minorities or democratic procedures. Their origins affect the most important national security issues for Russia and every EU country.

Timofey BORDACHEV, Director of the Center for European Studies, State University - Higher School of Economics