Civil conflict

This week will begin with the “Returned Names” event in memory of the victims of political repression. Members of the Memorial Society and those who want to join them, taking turns, will read at the Solovetsky Stone the names of those killed by state terror in the USSR. The action is timed to coincide with the seventieth anniversary of the Great Terror and the Day of Political Prisoners, celebrated since the mid-1970s on October 30 (since 1991, Russia has officially celebrated it as the Day of Victims of Political Repression).

“Memorial,” which since its creation has been collecting, verifying and clarifying information about everyone who has been subjected to repression in our country, several days ago completed work on the electronic publication “Victims of Political Terror” (carried out jointly with the Commissioner for Human Rights and with the support of a number of others structures), which includes information on 2.6 million victims. Work to replenish the lists is constantly ongoing: compared to the previous edition (2004), 1.26 million victims were identified.

By not allowing us to forget about our own history, Memorial prevents attempts to falsify it yet again in the spirit of the effective manager Stalin or the exclusivity of individual crimes against the backdrop of the general enthusiasm and well-being of the Soviet people, and helps to understand the historical context of the difficult relationships of today's Russia with other post-Soviet and post-socialist countries.

The action on October 29 will continue with a rally of various human rights organizations on October 30, the participants of which will honor the memory of the victims of political repression in our country from November 1917 to the present day, and will express solidarity with modern Russian political prisoners and “prisoners of conscience.”

Various state and near-state structures also planned their events dedicated to the Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political Repression. This cannot but be welcomed from the point of view of preserving the memory of these repressions. At the same time, the attempt of these structures to isolate themselves, to prevent those who are engaged in preserving the memory of repressions from entering them, to “intercept” this memory - either in order to better reformat it, or in order to limit the concept of political repressions within the Soviet period.

This week the “spontaneous” campaign in the lackey style will continue: “Don’t leave us, master!” We already know about a forum of supporters of Vladimir Putin scheduled for Friday in Rzhev, and a forum of supporters of the president scheduled for Saturday in Vladikavkaz. But this matter, of course, is not limited to this.

A fairly friendly negative reaction from the creative intelligentsia to an attempt to speak out on their behalf for a change in the constitutional system without being asked could lead to the fact that, following the original “letter of four,” another statement in the same vein will be concocted.

Analysts are having heated discussions about what is the meaning of the ongoing campaign - either the conditional “party of the third term” is still hoping for something, or we have a specific way of mobilizing voters for the president, and therefore, in this case, for the “United Russia,” or an attempt by many officials and functionaries to curry favor just in case: “In the neighboring region they love the president. Are we worse?

It is most likely that different actors here have different motives, but they have agreed on a campaign that will discredit Vladimir Putin much more than Kasyanov, Kasparov and Limonov could have done if they were broadcast live in prime time on all federal channels. For people whose memory has not completely faded, the stylistic convergence with the classic “scoop” becomes too strong. For those who have previously seen solid supporters of the president on the screen, this is a personal experience of sending support to a rally according to the order, that is, undermining the idea of ​​​​the reality of this support. For those who until recently could be called “the last dictators”, this is a good reason to mock Russia and its president, moreover, to successfully “build back up” by allowing a certain number of opposition rallies and demonstrations for contrast.

Tensions around various Russian detention centers are likely to continue this week. Especially in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region. Almost always in such cases there is some share of responsibility on both sides. One way or another, these situations signal a lack of public control over the penitentiary system. Control, which would make it possible to mitigate tension where there are no fundamental reasons for it, to create new solutions where these reasons are embedded in the legislation or regulatory framework for the existence of these institutions and, finally, to have some fundamentally third party, information from which would help to better understand in what is happening.

Turkish-Iraqi relations will continue to attract significant international attention. Despite the sometimes radical rhetoric of the Turkish leadership, the country’s leadership did not go beyond local operations in the Iraqi border area and cross-border shelling. Attempts will continue to resolve the situation so that the activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party from Iraqi territory will cease, saving the face of the authorities of Turkey, Iraq, the Autonomous Government of Kurdistan and the United States. It is characteristic that the leaders of Syria and Iran came out in support of Turkey’s operation in Iraq. And the point is not only that these countries have their own Kurdish population, but also the desire to achieve maximum divergence between Turkey and the United States. At the same time, Turkish-Iraqi negotiations continue. Moreover, no one has canceled the ministerial meeting of Iraq's neighboring countries on security issues scheduled for early November in Istanbul. It is difficult to imagine that it will take place simultaneously with direct clashes between the Turkish army and armed units of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Japan's emergency anti-terrorism legislation, which allowed it to provide logistical support to coalition troops in Afghanistan, expires on Thursday. How exactly the new cabinet will solve this problem in a situation where the liberal democrats and their allies do not have a majority in the upper house of parliament is not entirely clear. Most likely, some kind of compromise will be reached. This will be all the easier since now early elections to the lower house may cease to be the only requirement of the opposition Democratic Party - it no longer has grounds for absolute confidence in its victory.

Following the publication of the official election results in Ukraine on Saturday, we can expect an intensification of coalition negotiations. So far, representatives of BYuT, the majority of the leadership of the NU-NS and the president of the country are making it clear that without any doubt the coalition will have a “democratic” format, that is, BYuT + NU-NS, with the possible involvement of the Lytvyn Bloc. However, a number of fundamental problems arise, for example, the question of an imperative mandate for deputies of the Verkhovna Rada. A noticeable part of the NU-NS opposes him. And if he doesn’t exist, it is absolutely possible that Tymoshenko, the candidate for prime minister, will not be able to collect the required number of votes. The non-obvious election initiatives of the ex-“Orange” will also be called into question. Some compromise solutions in the form of a package vote are possible, but their preparation will require the coordination of many interests. In any case, the impression of a strong, stable coalition ready to work has not yet emerged. And there is probably nothing wrong with this, since so far the coalition cabinet formula looks like the least effective way for the country, when the economic bloc may go to the BYuT members who are not very well versed in this, generally gravitating towards paternalistic-populist methods of governance, and the “humanitarian” sphere – to the NU-NS, which has good managers, economists, etc., but where in the “humanitarian” part the national-radical aspects are more emphasized (even in comparison with BYuT).

A fairly massive rally of the united opposition is expected in the center of Tbilisi on Friday. Having neutralized the ex-Minister of Defense through televised confessions of crimes and slander against the President, the current government has not at all neutralized the consequences of the seemingly situational unification of various opposition forces. And the more openly bandit methods (beatings, etc.) are used against them, the more difficult it will be to maintain the reputation of an enlightened, democratic government. Badri Patarkatsishvili’s declared decision to provide financial assistance to the opposition may further complicate the situation for Saakashvili and his circle. Of course, you can try to take away the “oligarch’s” property and launch an anti-oligarchic campaign, but what is allowed for Putin, who is largely focused on internal legitimacy, is not allowed for Saakashvili, who is striving for strong international legitimacy. In addition, in a crisis situation, televised repentance can be forgotten, as it once happened with the first president of Georgia, no less radical than Okruashvili, Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

But in Georgia, unless something extraordinary happens, elections are still a long way off. And in Russia, the period of election campaigning in electronic and print media will begin on Saturday (will last until December 1). For once, viewers will be able to see a variety of opposition in relatively normal numbers. Of course, there is no reason to think that this will make “United Russia” appear less on screens; the percentages will simply change. An interesting question is whether the “right foot” party will dare to debate publicly with anyone. In any case, with anyone other than the most convenient sparring partners for themselves - the communists.

Both parties seem to think that it is beneficial for them to make the Duma bipartisan. But if the communists are right here, it is obvious that existing as the only parliamentary opposition, or better yet, the only political opposition in general, would not only extend the life of the party, but would also bring it a lot of other bonuses. “United Russia”, as a means for legislative consolidation of the decisions taken, of course, needs a maximum of seats in parliament. She certainly won’t be able to get everything - according to the law, there must be at least two parties in the State Duma. Ideally, it would be limited to this. And arguing with communists is a pleasure. Here you can be for everything progressive and for everything social (because no one else in such a situation has the opportunity to realize social promises).

Another question is that this situation will not bring anything good to United Russia as a potential political force. Its political image will be as vague as that of the CPSU before its collapse. The inability to appeal to opposition pressure from different positions sharply narrows the possibility of maneuver. With any attempt to introduce some kind of politics, the centrifugal forces in the party will intensify. In addition, the de-actualization of the experience of blocking compromises with someone, coordinating interests externally inevitably leads to the degradation of even existing political skills. Therefore, taking into account the strategic horizon, it would be much better for the “party in power” to get no more than 45% in the five or six-party Duma.

We can expect that international observers will receive an invitation to our elections in the very near future. According to the current electoral legislation , only the President, the chambers of the Federal Assembly, the Government and the Central Election Commission have the right to do this. The Commissioner was deprived of this right, and no one offered this right to parties and public organizations. Therefore, there is no one to compensate for the slowness or destroy the “cunning plan” of those who slowed down the arrival of observers. Usually, the absence of observers is beneficial only to those whom they can interfere with in some way. An attempt to justify dislike for foreign observers by disproportionate attention to elections in the post-socialist space turns out to be very fragile: the level of trust in the electoral process in these countries turns out to be the lowest. And the deprivation of the possibility of observation for domestic public organizations inevitably increases the role of independent observation from the outside.

Following the rally against racism that took place on October 28 in St. Petersburg, on November 4 in several cities of Russia there will be rallies of those against whom the St. Petersburg rally was directed - domestic Nazis. These actions have already been allowed in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Protests by Russian politicians against the glorification or revival of Nazism in other countries will look somewhat strange against the backdrop of a march whose participants are specifically asked to refrain from their usual fascist greeting, euphemistically called “Roman” by our fascists.

Two years ago, on the eve of the first “celebration” of National Unity Day, we wrote: “The shortcomings of the holiday do not end with the vagueness and historical illiteracy of linking the celebrations to November 4th. Even if inaccurately dated, it is in the very idea - of gaining national unity in opposition to someone external - will inevitably provoke outbursts of chauvinism and xenophobia", "Current... flirting with “sovereignty” and an attempt to unite against “hostile” external forces and their domestic supporters if If they are fraught with anything, it is only an increase in the general level of xenophobia and a new civil war.” So far, the forecast, unfortunately, is coming true.