Boris Dolgin: Electoral crises

Three weeks remaining before the elections to the State Duma, they make you look at each nearest time period from this angle.

The election campaign itself continues: videos, television devices (without “united Russia”), posters (sometimes removed), printed materials (often confiscated), meetings with voters (sometimes canceled) and much more.

It does not do without complaints about opponents (administrative resource, extremism, the use of common symbols in advertising of one party ...), state bodies of suspicious hackers, etc. .. Press many (in each case, you need to understand the central order or local initiative), but the union of right -wing forces came into absolute champions - here is the confiscation of millions of circulations, and the collapse of the party site and the collapse With voters, and a refusal to show an advertising video ... The second place seems to retain “Fair Russia”. But at the remaining time, some changes can occur.

In the next few days, the final scale of sabotage of the activities of international observers will most likely become clear. Following the braking of their invitation, an unprecedented limitation of the quantity and a special regulation of behavior developed by the CEC, a new obstacle was revealed - visa. Three weeks before the elections, this issue remains not resolved. Probably, he will either be decided in the coming days or provoke refusals of observation. It seems that consultants who make up the “color revolutions” on the programs of counteracting “color revolutions” again managed to “prick” their services.

On Thursday, the “All -Russian Public Forum” is scheduled, at which representatives of different subjects of the Federation should decide to create an all -Russian movement in support of Vladimir Putin. Typically, movements are created in support of falling, weak, offended, oppressed. Popular movements in support of perestroika were created, as it were, in contrast to the “omnipotence” of its “hidden enemies” - the party and Soviet bureaucracy, the movements of President Yeltsin tried to organize in 1993, when it seemed to the creators that the Supreme Council was about to suspend the president from power. In a situation where not only the main party in power, but also a significant part of the “opposition” parties seeks to lean against the president, the efforts to create a quasi -mass movement in his support look somewhat exotic.

At the same time, there is an uncertainty about whether we are dealing with residual attempts to pave the “third term”, an action to redesign the elections to the State Duma from inter -party to the plebiscite, the cumulative effect of the synchronization of regional cholegunism or the truly experiment to create some very “sovereign structure of the authorities, which involves the status of a“ leader ”without portfel “Moral”, either “nation”, not some other. It is precisely yet clear that it is not the "Libyan revolution" (like Gaddafi).

On Friday, the last “regular” meeting of the State Duma of the fourth convocation will be held (another meeting usually takes place after the elections, and some extraordinary fees cannot be excluded). This composition of the lower house was remembered by observers as the most dim and non -self -state in the entire post -Soviet history. But against the background of the next Duma, legally deprived of single-mandate and party blocks and administratively squeezed out in two- or three-party, and the current composition will be able to seem like an example of unpredictability and diversity.

The coming week will be a fundamental for two unexpectedly synchronized crises - in Georgia and Pakistan. In both ways, the regime of a state of emergency lasts, in both elections are oriented at the beginning of January (in Georgia - presidential, January 5, parliamentary, until January 9), both are partially dependent on the USA and other international structures, they give certain signals about the need to restore democratic freedoms, in both the opposition is very heterogeneous, and in both the cancellation of the state of meters can occur in the most. In the near future (in Georgia there is a formal limiter - a two -week period - and an informal promise of the president - not to wait for its end, in Pakistan - an informal promise of the president). Then the differences begin.

Perevez Musharraf found himself in the Tsugzvang situation - having received signals that the Supreme Court, led by a long -standing enemy, does not recognize the results of the past presidential elections, which means that the elections will have to be held in the probably less friendly composition of electors (central and local parliamentarians), and for the union with the emigration of Benazir Bhutto, he would need to be necessary In advance, still leave the post of commander in chief of the ground forces. But in this case, Musharraf would have no trump cards, except for the unhanged loyalty of the successor at the military post. Almost the only way out was the introduction of an emergency regime and the creation of a situation forcing political bargaining. But already in itself, the emergency regime again put the contractual Bhutto in a situation with one way out-she inevitably had to try to lead the protest, hence the no less forced house arrest and the forced termination of this arrest under pressure from abroad.

In turn, the United States and other Western countries understand the danger of combining the political instability of the regime and the possession of nuclear weapons, but cannot also not oppose the folding of democratic freedoms.

The problem is thus to get out of the emergency regime as accurately as possible, agree on a certain compromise (Musharraf is recognized as president, leaves the military post, the opposition is fully participating in the elections, the Islamists are knocked out of the places that they have already captured in the course of the Time of Troubles). The question here, however, is the legal design of this compromise. The old composition of the Supreme Court can become an incomprehensible obstacle. And it will be difficult to form a new one in the conditions of confrontation with a noticeable part of the law corporation. In addition, if the influence of Musharraf in the army and special services continues to decline, the military can become a factor in destabilization from the stability factor.

There were no hopeless situations in Georgia, but the dissatisfaction with both mass and the elites grew: a certain improvement in the business climate was compensated by the removal of new corruption channels, the results of some economic transformations and cannot appear too soon, the damage to the Georgian economy from Russia's rupture of a significant part of the connections was still tangible, the real ways of solving the problem of broken autonomy did not It was outlined (despite the fact that the topic itself was actively held in the media field), a fairly defined process of pumping up the regime was observed - squeezing out the figures insufficiently built into it (regardless of the direction of non -constructivity). At the same time, the more restrained policy of Russia did not allow the leadership of Georgia to ensure constant mobilization under the slogans of the “besieged fortress”. The formal impetus for the unification of the opposition was the arrest of the ex-Minister of Defense Irakli district. Then the escalation of the confrontation, which could be resolved peacefully - in the form of a compromise, went. For example, the fulfillment of the requirements for quotas for various political forces in the election committee, a change in the procedure for elections in majority districts, but to preserve the idea of ​​Saakashvili on combining the presidential and parliament elections. But the Georgian authorities seemed to feel strong enough (and the opposition was weak) so as not to bother with mutual concessions.

By the time the opposition began to accelerate the opposition and the subsequent announcement of the emergency regime, the next wave of demonstrations weakened (the power was clearly waiting for this moment), but there was an understanding that this would not end.

It is possible that Saakashvili will cancel the emergency this week. In the end, he seemed to be the main one - he had half over the game of many large figures of the opposition (leaving abroad, being underground, an institution of cases, public accusations of working on Russia, etc.), introduced himself as a great democrat who did not hold on to his chair - went to the polls. The latter is by no means a concession in the opposition. The president’s early elections were proposed only by ... the president himself: many of our media are confused in his ideas - he was not even going to increase the presidential term of up to 5 years. The five -year term of the president was recorded in the current Constitution. He proposed to increase the terms of the parliament to 5 years in order to combine the presidential elections and parliamentary, but for now it was decided to slightly reduce its term and increase the work of the current parliament. The opposition said: the President’s goal to draw the ruling party to the still high ranking of the president that has lost popularity and that is why she demanded to hold all elections in the constitutional terms. As a result, Saakashvili is going to simply legitimize what is happening through the same presidential elections that will be combined with a plebiscite about the terms of parliamentary.

Saakashvili also took into account the fact that one person wins in the presidential election - i.e. It will be him or not him - there is no need to share power. And since the probability that the whole opposition will be able to converge in one candidate is not too great. These elections are much more convenient than parliamentary.

But that's not all. Saakashvili and his entourage are probably well aware that for the period for election campaign they chose - first the emergency mode, then less than a month and a half of normal time, and at the end - New Year and Christmas holidays. The situation is obviously profitable for already promoted figures and disadvantageous for unfinished ones. The expected Saakashvili departure expected on November 22 will not resign the situation. Burjanadze is a substantially more reasonable politician, but she will also work for a general victory - along with the executive branch, which no one will change.

All this is also exacerbated by the upcoming difficulties in restoring the work of the Imady channel, the most popular and independent of the authorities.

A rather independent position of the quite authoritative head of the Georgian Orthodox Church, as well as pressure from the West, is a factor, which is dangerous for the authorities, contrary to the expectations of many of our observers, who did not begin to support Saakashvili in every manifestation, and contrary to the current interpretations, which is not at all eager to simply change bets, but requiring a country that claims to meet “Euro -Atlantic values” democratic procedures. As a result, the design so well -built Saakashvili may not be too strong. True, its resolution will not mean at all the victory of liberal democracy in this country, nor the emergence of a new ally of Russia in the South Caucasus. In the best case, the power system will become more complicated, and Russian -Georgian relations will become more predicted.

Domestic analysts can extract their benefits from what is happening in Georgia and Pakistan (those who have not yet degenerated into technologists): a very interesting configuration of interests and values ​​in both cases allows you to better see how these mechanisms work and interact in the US policy and Europe. In addition, it is possible that one of the Western and domestic observers will save the situation in Georgia from excessive illusions that today's events in Russia are determined by the GB'shny background of the president and part of the environment, in Belarus-collective farm Backgraund Lukashenko, etc. Before us is clearly manifestations of much deeper laws.

On Friday, the leader of the civilian platform, Donald Tusk, will present the Seima composition of his future coalition with the "peasants" of the office. The question remains a certain intrigue whether Radoslav Sikorsky Foreign Minister will occupy. The brother of Kaczynsky remains too much against this. The hope that Sikorsky will be able to fall out of politics with a scandalous dismissal from the post of Minister of Defense, accompanied by accusations of trying to benefit from the deployment of anti -thoroughs and unwillingness to clean up officers who had trained in the USSR or “folk” Poland, was too strong to allow him to return so easily. However, the brothers were confused by too many initial allies so that quite many new appointments were not painful for them.

In the case of Poland, as in the case of Georgia, it is important not to make a mistake in expectations. The difference between the two offices will be noticeable-that the policy will be less hysterical, less national-conservative, more rational, more liberal, European. New leaders will not declare that American anti -Cannacons will protect Poland from Russia. The new office will be ready to calmly talk on different topics. But at the same time, he will never be “pro -Russian”, “anti -American”, etc. Negotiations on missiles will continue - partly from a new sheet. Negotiations on Polish meat - too. Most likely, Poland’s exceptional position under the EU agreement with Russia will no longer be, but this does not mean that the issue will be resolved immediately.

Not too pleasant strikes are expected by the largest continental countries of the EU - France and Germany - all cases are attempts to confront the modernization of the “social state” - how it developed during the period of not only a military, but also a socio -political confrontation with a socialist camp. Now the directions of competition have changed (albeit not always consciously), the methods of competition, as well as the institutional environment that ensures this competition, cannot change with them. All these changes pass through the well -established way of life, the unpreparedness to the situation of reducing guarantees of old well -being and the non -obviousness of the achievement of the new.

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