Translated material
Burden of Elections
Abkhazia and South Ossetia will vote for the Russian parliament
A member of the Russian Central Election Commission, Vasily Volkov, told Vremya Novostei yesterday that ahead of the State Duma elections scheduled for December 2, Russia intends to open polling stations in the unrecognized republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia , which are de jure part of Georgia. About 80% of the residents of both enclaves are Russian citizens , so in the upcoming elections they should vote on an equal basis with other Russian citizens living abroad.Mr. Volkov roughly estimated the number of Russian citizens living in Georgia at 140 thousand people, although he did not rule out that in fact there could be more (in elections abroad, voters can be included in the lists right before voting). The official number of voters in Abkhazia who participated in the last presidential and parliamentary elections of the republic itself fluctuates around 120 thousand people. In South Ossetia, this figure is about 50 thousand. A number of demographic experts consider these figures to be somewhat inflated. Moreover, not all residents of the unrecognized republics, without exception, received Russian passports. But it is obvious that electoral statistics for local use look more magnificent than the data of the Russian Central Election Commission - especially since Mr. Volkov also counted those Russians who live in Georgia, but outside the unrecognized republics.
Obviously, no one will make any claims against these latter if they come to the Russian embassy in Tbilisi on December 2 and put their ballots in the ballot box there - this is what our fellow citizens do in all countries of the world. But it can hardly be assumed that Russians from Abkhazia and South Ossetia will also come to vote at the embassy, separated from them by protected de facto borders. It is for them that, apparently, polling stations “at their place of residence” will be opened, which will inevitably cause a protest from the Georgian side, which is inclined to believe that Russia does not have the right to hold such events in territories de jure belonging to Georgia.
“We are monitoring the situation with the formation of precinct election commissions in Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia,” Mr. Volkov said diplomatically. -- According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, in just two or three days, obviously, a final decision will be made on the number of areas to be formed. We believe there should be no fewer of them than in the 2003 State Duma elections - maybe even a little more.” According to a representative of the Central Election Commission, during the Russian elections of 2003-2004, five voting stations were established on the territory of Abkhazia, three in South Ossetia and one in Tbilisi, at the Russian embassy. Vasily Volkov recalled that according to the law, voting stations can be formed no later than five days before the election date, that is, there are still more than two weeks left. “With good will, we literally need two days to do everything, especially since we already have experience,” he noted.
Goodwill, however, is in doubt. “All this is not easy to solve. These issues are being discussed with the Georgian leadership, and therefore the Russian Foreign Ministry sent a corresponding note to the Georgian Foreign Ministry. No answer has been received yet - it is clear that the situation there is now difficult,” Mr. Volkov told Vremya Novostey. “But we still hope that a positive answer will be received soon: no matter what internal problems this or that country is solving, everyone understands perfectly well that the constitutional rights of our citizens living abroad are sacred.” However, in Tbilisi they tend to call the next vote, like the votes of 2003-2004 and the Russian passportization of the unrecognized republics itself, “creeping annexation.”
Residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia indeed, for the most part, received Russian passports in the early 2000s. Tbilisi commented on the situation in the spirit that Georgia could just as easily distribute its passports in Chechnya, during the period when it was de facto separated from Russia. The Russian authorities emphasized the “humanitarian component”: since the USSR passport lost its meaning, the residents of the enclaves simply had no valid documents with which they could cross their unrecognized borders. Within these borders, as is easy to understand, a very tense situation with jobs has developed.
The next Russian elections in Abkhazia and South Ossetia will clearly not add warmth to the strained relations between Russia and Georgia. Russia is naturally inclined to ensure the “sacred” voting rights of people who have completely voluntarily accepted Russian citizenship. And from Tbilisi’s point of view, the next legal elections, in which Abkhazia and South Ossetia should theoretically take part, are early presidential elections in Georgia, scheduled for January 5, 2008.
The situation in South Ossetia, where there are quite large areas inhabited by ethnic Georgians who recognize the jurisdiction of Tbilisi, in principle makes it possible to organize such presidential elections. To demonstrate with their help that the “Tskhinvali region” is an integral part of Georgia. On November 12, 2006, Georgia already held an “alternative vote” there: while the Ossetian part of South Ossetia voted in the next referendum on independence and re-elected President Eduard Kokoity for a second term, Georgian villages elected the “president according to Tbilisi” - ex-separatist defense minister Dmitry Sanakoev and demanded the start of negotiations on the status of the republic within Georgia.
The presence of Georgian enclaves, controlled by the Georgian police, even now calls into question the viability of the unrecognized government in Tskhinvali. And the presence of police in the peacekeeping operation zone constantly leads to conflicts with the peacekeeping corps, which is invariably commanded by a Russian general. On the other hand, the activation of the project of an alternative, pro-Georgian administration, elected a year ago, firstly, only embitters the authorities of Tskhinvali, and secondly, it looks problematic in the conditions of the current political crisis in Tbilisi itself.
Tskhinvali authorities fear that the introduction of a state of emergency in Georgia could become a cover for a military operation in South Ossetia or, even if the state of emergency is lifted, the war to restore territorial integrity will allow Tbilisi to divert the attention of the opposition. Tbilisi, however, has already announced that military operations are not planned in either South Ossetia or Abkhazia - apparently, Georgian politicians are aware that the resumption of hostilities will bury the last hopes for the return of the territories.
Provided internal stability was maintained in Georgia, the prospect of restoring its sovereignty in South Ossetia seemed, if not close, then generally realistic - given the sad state of the South Ossetian economy and the steady departure of the Ossetian population to Russian North Ossetia. However, the current Georgian crisis has made this prospect more doubtful.
And the situation in the Russian North Caucasus, on which the situation in the unrecognized republics largely depends, has noticeably changed for the better in the last three to four years. The project to build a gas pipeline from Russia to South Ossetia, which will save Tskhinvali from the need to import gas from Georgia, has taken real shape. According to some reports, Russian companies have begun to invest in the zinc deposit in Kvaisa. Thus, South Ossetia, despite its position cut off from Russia behind the Greater Caucasus Range, is gradually ceasing to be an economically unattractive and extremely costly project for Russia.
Abkhazia has not been such for a long time, even though Russia officially still supports the regime of de facto blockade of Abkhazia, introduced by a decision of the Council of CIS Heads of State in 1996 on the initiative of Georgia. Abkhazia has its own economy, which has obvious growth points and attracts more and more serious private investment from Russia every year. Unlike South Ossetia, there are no enclaves controlled by Tbilisi in Abkhazia - with the exception of the Kodori Gorge. The political regime of Sukhumi has undergone a noticeable evolution since the election of a new president in 2004-2005: it has become noticeably more transparent and efficient. Although Abkhazia strongly emphasizes its desire to become a sovereign state (unlike South Ossetia, which seeks unification with North Ossetia under Russian auspices), it is clear that it is already very closely tied economically to Russia. And in Russia there are many people interested in the development of an unrecognized republic in the subtropics.
Considering that today any negotiations between Sukhumi and Tbilisi have been interrupted, the chance of restoring Georgian sovereignty in Abkhazia so far looks minimal. Especially if we remember that Tbilisi does not at all seek to guarantee the safety of Russian assets in the event of the annexation of Abkhazia and would like to return several tens of thousands of refugees - ethnic Georgians - to this province. This option looks unacceptable for the republic.
The holding of Russian Duma elections in Abkhazia and South Ossetia will further push these provinces away from their actual return to Georgia and can be interpreted as another indirect recognition by Russia of their independence. Meanwhile, in an even more uncompromising situation - in the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh - a rather accurate method of action has been found. Citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh have Armenian passports, but their series and numbers are excluded from the Armenian electoral lists: Karabakh elects only its own deputies and presidents.