Two weeks before the presidential elections in Uzbekistan , scheduled for December 23, President Islam Karimov made a speech that can be considered a programmatic speech. Mr. Karimov, of course, is the leading contender among the four candidates for the post of head of state, which he has held since Soviet times for nearly two decades. This, apparently, gives him the basis, “being the leader of this country,” to “call all young citizens” of Uzbekistan his sons and daughters, “expressing to them his faith and love.” Of course, Islam Abduganievich Karimov, who will celebrate his 70th birthday next January, stipulates that “every child has his own parents and relatives.”
The reason for the speech of the President of Uzbekistan was the 15th anniversary of the adoption of the country's constitution. Islam Karimov explained in detail to his compatriots “the distinctive features and noteworthy aspects of the current elections.” Their “careful and deeply thought-out model is based on international standards and the best practices of democratic states and fully reflects the values and mentality of our people.” Mr. Karimov focused on the need to “ensure the rule of law and freedom of expression” at every stage of the elections and “completely abandon the still common approaches and stereotypes left over from the Soviet period.”
It is difficult to say what “stereotypes” of the Soviet past burden the Uzbek present. Who knows if Mr. Karimov is referring to the dull and unbearably boring appearance of Uzbek newspapers with the obligatory slogan in the upper right (or left) corner of the first page: “Uzbekistan is a state with a great future!”? It is clear that the Uzbek reader pays no more attention to these words, the authorship of which is easily guessed, than the reader of Soviet newspapers pays attention to “Workers of all countries, unite!”... It is surprising that a whole generation has already grown up in Uzbekistan, which is being taught what to hope for falls only on the “great future.” It seems that the country's leadership does not notice that if the next generation has to read these words, it will discover that even according to the laws of strict logic, this “future” will never become the present.
But the main content of Islam Karimov’s latest speech was unequivocal signals to the West, demonstrating Tashkent’s readiness to restore relations with it, which were practically frozen after the bloody suppression of the uprising in Andijan in May 2005. “There are still those who argue that even today some disagreements continue between Uzbekistan, on the one hand, and the United States and European states, on the other,” Karimov said. “It is not difficult to understand that they would like the existence of such disagreements from which they would receive certain benefits.”
Let us remember, however, that the main beneficiary of the cooling of relations between Tashkent and the West was Moscow: it was in its direction that Uzbekistan sharply changed the course of its foreign policy, joining the CSTO and EurAsEC (albeit, not completely prudently). So there is no need to guess who the Uzbek president meant by “those”.
Another passage from the speech is also interesting. Islam Karimov draws attention to the importance of “the assessment of the upcoming elections by the international community.” Such attention contrasts with the “sovereign” approach of the Russian leadership to the fact that in the West “oh, my God, Princess Marya Aleksevna will say...” It is possible that Tashkent, following Astana, is showing the West that it is ready to distance itself from the Kremlin’s harsh tactics.
However, the warming that was not particularly surprising (the Vremya Novostey newspaper predicted it two years ago) between the West, tired of its adherence to principles, and Tashkent, which has not at all cooled down to it, did not prevent the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights from abandoning its assessment of the presidential elections in Uzbekistan. The ODIHR explained this by saying that the elections were “devoid of competition,” most opposition forces were “suppressed,” and there was “not enough critical media.” The ODIHR's decision became known on the same day that Mr. Karimov gave his “thaw” speech.