Rasputitsa

To the question of how the Medvedev-President-Putin-Premier link will work, it is hardly possible to give an unambiguous answer today. Including because the participants in this game themselves do not know it. Lately, Putin has been trying to solve the non-trivial task of preserving and protecting his legacy — monopolization and absolutization of power, concentration of financial, economic, information resources, and redistribution of property in favor of “their own”.

There are two types of tools for protecting power and property: with the help of bayonets and with the help of a clerical paragraph. The first version was personalized by Sergey Ivanov, the second by Dmitry Medvedev. Both candidates are very close to the current president. Ivanov is closer mentally to the heart and soul, Medvedev is rationally closer to the head. Based on the results of a long and difficult analysis, perhaps at the very last moment the choice was made in favor of the head and the paragraph. Why? For the defense of power, bayonets are better suited; for the defense of property, legalist means. But the scope of bayonets is limited to the territory of Russia, jurisprudence is not. Of course, bombs, polonium, and hacker attacks can also be used abroad. But it turns out noisy, dirty and not very productive. Defense through the courts (including those against Yukos shareholders) looks more successful.

The second task is to ensure personal freedom of movement around the world. For citizens who prefer the bayonet method of securing power and property, it is rather limited (see the examples of Castro, Kim Jong Il, Gaddafi, Lukashenko). The presence of Balthazar judges in the world, showing an increased interest in former dictators, can theoretically be circumvented with the help of strategic aircraft and Borey-class submarines. But it must be admitted that they do not provide the desired comfort. In contrast to the opportunities arising from the status of the head of government or at least a member of parliament.

The third consideration is the political situation during the parliamentary and presidential elections. The lesson of the “unforgivable” weakness of Leonid Kuchma, who did not dare to use force in Kyiv in November 2004, was taken into account in the Kremlin. If an “orange” revolution were brewing in Russia today, if Georgia tried to resolve the issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by force, then Medvedev might not be Putin's successor.

Finally, the psychological factor also played a role. The fatal chain of events in December 2006 (the death of Augusto Pinochet and Turkmenbashi, the execution of Saddam Hussein, the appointment of the Minister of Health rather than the chairman of the Mejlis as the new president of Turkmenistan) clearly demonstrated the frailty of any guarantees of power in states where institutions are destroyed and power is purely personified. Perhaps it is no coincidence that two months later Sergei Ivanov ceased to be Minister of Defense, and another seven months later Mikhail Fradkov resigned from his post.

The variant currently being played has an intermediate character. The future depends on how much Medvedev is allowed to consolidate power, and how much he can do so.

First, he may not be allowed to become a sovereign ruler. And then the situation with such formal leaders of the state as M. Kalinin, N. Shvernik, K. Voroshilov, A. Mikoyan, N. Podgorny, and such de facto rulers of the country as I. Stalin and N. Khrushchev may repeat itself. Who was the Boss then - no one had any doubts. Secondly, he may be allowed to become a ruler, but he may not be able to become one. Then the return of Putin is not ruled out. And finally, if Medvedev is allowed to become the sovereign ruler of the country, then Putin can actually leave.

Only the first round has been played today. Putin, it seems, can be trusted when he says that he has not yet finally decided on the issue of power.