Translated material
Sovereignty Parade
The conflict in Gudermes calls into question the model of the Chechen peace
The events in the Chechen Gudermes have slowed down somewhat, but this has not made the whole situation any less dangerous or simpler. The effectiveness of what was considered an exemplary model of Caucasian politics, when the region is actually handed over to local elites (the so-called “Chechenization of the Chechen conflict”), has clearly been called into question.The responses of the Russian authorities to the conflict between the security forces of Chechnya, controlled by President Ramzan Kadyrov, and the Vostok battalion, commanded by Sulim Yamadayev, are stingy, as are the comments of the official media. The latter are already ready to reduce the real crisis in the heart of the extremely tense region of the North Caucasus to a banal road accident during which people accidentally died.
Such a movement of the soul is justified when the whole country is waiting for the inauguration of a new president. And, apparently, some final words from the outgoing president. Who, we note, began his presidential career with decisive words and deeds aimed at returning separatist Chechnya to Russia. And so, at the end of Putin’s rule in this very Chechnya, the security forces controlled by its head actually laid siege to the location of the Russian army unit.
This is strongly reminiscent of the sad episodes of 1992 or 1996: then the Russian army’s locations in Chechnya were also subject to sieges, assaults, disarmaments and other troubles, which both times - both in 1992 and 1996 - ended in a total withdrawal of troops.
Let's understand the terms. On both sides of the barricades, which in the Gudermes location of “Vostok” and around the house of its commander Sulim Yamadayev, have ceased to be conventional, are mainly those who were considered militants several years ago. Sulim Yamadayev and his brothers were prominent field commanders in separatist Chechnya. Although they themselves are quite zealous Muslims, at some point they did not like the fact that Arab preachers of the Sharia path were taking more and more power in their homeland into their own hands. They did not support Basayev’s raid into Dagestan: they were generally on the brink of war with Basayev. When the Russian army entered Chechnya, they - together with Akhmat Kadyrov - made their choice and went over to the side of the federals.
The Yamadayev detachment first became a special company of the republican commandant's office, then a special battalion of the GRU General Staff, and then a battalion within the 42nd division of the Ministry of Defense, which remains in Chechnya on a permanent basis. The federal command used the experience of the fighters, their knowledge of the terrain and traditions, not without success. The most dangerous places were in the area of responsibility of the Yamadayevites - mountains and forests in Vedeno, Kurchaloy, Nozhai-Yurt, along the border with Dagestan. There they caught the militants, suffering losses and from time to time making up for them with not particularly wide “extras” from among trusted local youth, who, in addition to the guarantee of one of the fighters, were driven, naturally, through army personnel officers.
At this time, other militants - those who were not caught by the Vostok fighters (or anyone else from a whole fan of various federal structures) - also surrendered to the authorities. But they did not do it the way the Yamadayevs did under the emergency conditions of the 1999 army offensive operation. And not in the way it is supposed to be according to the amnesty procedure, which was “launched” several times by Russian parliamentarians - that is, through the police and the court. According to the paradoxical conditions of these amnesties, only those who did not kill in the war, or better yet did not even shoot or come close to illegal armed groups, could surrender through the courts and the police. There were about 500 such people. But Akhmat Kadyrov, and then his son Ramzan, using the broad powers granted to them, accepted “guilty sentences” without the participation of the court and the prosecutor’s office - and by 2004 the number was already in the thousands. For lack of a better use, surrendered bearded men staffed the republican militia, slowly displacing old cadres who remembered the regulations from the times of Soviet Checheno-Ingushetia.
For the time being, it seemed that so be it: the Kadyrovs, like a magnet, pulled militants out of the forest, who one way or another ceased to be a party to the conflict and the engine driving the wave of sabotage war throughout the North Caucasus. Although the very wording “republican power structures controlled by the President of Chechnya” already contained, if you like, a real threat to the constitutional order: power structures in any Russian republic, territory, region or even in a city of federal significance are controlled primarily not by the head of the region, but the relevant federal minister and, through him, the president of the country. There are serious doubts that Federal Minister Rashid Nurgaliev even remotely imagined what kind of people are standing at some posts in Chechnya with certificates of his department. These posts, among other things, appeared - temporarily or permanently - either at the exit from the main federal base in Khankala, or at the location of the FSB operational combat group "Gorets", which in 2006 held this "police" siege for several months, then now in Gudermes, at the location of “Vostok”.
There is a certain logic in the center's consistent support of one single group in Chechnya, and transferring support risks violating the existing system of checks and balances. This group in this case is Ramzan Kadyrov and his supporters. Kadyrov has at his disposal the entire Chechen police (with all the personnel nuances mentioned above), the prosecutor’s office and the courts (where they practically do not hide the fact that any decision depends on the president of the republic), and even, it seems, the FSB Directorate for Chechnya. Not to mention the government, local media and enthusiastic Moscow journalists, who were turned by the charm of the Chechen leader. Taking into account the expert level and the interest of federal channels, it is not difficult for him to create any picture of the events in Gudermes: from a meaningless conflict over a road accident to an attempted armed rebellion, allegedly ripe at the location of a federal battalion. No one will hear the battalion from its location announcing its intention to fully implement the military regulations.
A fundamental point: Kadyrov may remain the favorite, but in the case of pressure on the “East” we are clearly talking about an attempt by a regional leader to interfere in the competence of not just the federal government, but the military command. About 1,000 people in the "East" and about the same number in the "West" battalion (also of the 42nd division, only staffed by Chechens who fought against the separatists and adhere to a different Sufi tradition) - these are the last armed Chechens whose loyalty can be trusted federal command.
It’s not so difficult to “surrender” them - just as the feds “surrendered” their own in the first war, refusing to come to the aid of the defending units, as they “surrendered” the Chechens who fought for Russia in 1996, many of whom are still serving in the “West” . How the special group “Highlander” was “surrendered” ten years later. The President of Chechnya will stop being nervous, he will again begin to smile contentedly against the backdrop of the rebuilt quarters of Grozny and accept well-deserved praise. And in Moscow, representatives of the groups fighting for the Kremlin will again remember from time to time that they have different views, including on the future of Chechnya: whether or not it is worth giving the youngest Russian politician 100% of the shares of this “enterprise” with serious violations of “techniques” security."
Only those, let’s face it, not very numerous people who in this distant and incomprehensible Caucasus are ready to live and die for Russia (Ramzan Kadyrov also has such people) will be finally convinced that this is not worth doing. At a crucial moment, because of some next Moscow inauguration, you will probably find yourself with your back uncovered. And then by winter (in a winter, in two), the militants (no matter with or without “crusts”) will no longer come to the gates of the Vostok battalion base. They will stand, as in 1992 and 1996, along the perimeter of permanent federal bases and say that they interfere with the prosperity of the peaceful Chechen Republic.