Translated material
Caucasian heritage
What the new Russian President has and what will happen in the Caucasus
The inauguration of Dmitry Medvedev took place against the background of a sharp aggravation of the situation in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict . Despite the fact that the Caucasus has not been the main backdrop of the current cycle of changes in the highest authorities in Russia (as it was in 1999-2000, at the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s presidential career), the Caucasian theme is still present in the score of Russian domestic and foreign policy.The Abkhaz aggravation actualized precisely the foreign policy component of Russian Caucasian policy. Analysis of what is happening around Abkhazia (and South Ossetia) in recent days is very difficult due to important external circumstances. The first of them is the change of head of state in Russia. And the second is the upcoming parliamentary elections in Georgia on May 21.
Leaving the presidential post, Vladimir Putin puzzled his successor with orders to increase cooperation with the actual authorities of the unrecognized republics. This cooperation was carried out even before the presidential order, but it was not reflected in any way in regulatory documents. In the last two weeks, even the Russian Foreign Ministry has joined the chorus of Russian politicians and military personnel talking about Georgia’s preparation for a forceful solution to territorial conflicts and the unacceptability of such a solution for Russia, which will protect the rights of its citizens in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The menacing rhetoric is confirmed by a whole series of Georgian drones shot down over Abkhazia (the authorship of these “victories in the air” remains unclear) and an increase in the corps of Russian peacekeepers in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict to 3,000 people - the quota has actually been completely selected.
The Georgian side is extremely wary, as happens when Russia increases its activity in conflict zones, but does not reveal clear program goals. The fact that there are still no such goals is evidenced by the very restrained response of the Russian Foreign Ministry to the proposal expressed in an informal interview with the Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba to introduce a military protectorate of Russia in Abkhazia. The Foreign Ministry stated that Russia would prefer other formats of cooperation.
Taking into account Sergei Shamba’s extensive connections in Moscow, it can be assumed that through the mouths of the Abkhaz minister and Russian officials, two groups of influence within the Kremlin administration are arguing among themselves. One of them is apparently ready to go to any extreme in escalating the situation in the conflict zone, while the other prefers to be cautious. Moreover, it is far from a fact that the “hawks” in this case are concerned about protecting Abkhazia from the Georgian threat, and not about creating maximum discomfort for their opponents in the same Kremlin during the period of formation of a new, post-inauguration scheme of relations. They care little about the fact that every news from Abkhazia reduces the number of Russians going there on vacation, that is, it actually reduces the income base of the subtropical republic so dear to them.
Tbilisi is even less interested than Sukhumi in a real escalation of violence in conflict zones: an attempt at a military solution will not only postpone even the hypothetical possibility of their settlement indefinitely, but will also create the threat of an uncontrolled growth of internal instability. Against the backdrop of a crisis of relations within the Georgian elite before the parliamentary elections, tensions around Abkhazia and South Ossetia add votes to Mikheil Saakashvili’s “For a United Georgia” movement, but it is clear that the very first real victims can have a completely opposite effect. It is likely that passions around Abkhazia will cool down somewhat by the end of May on both the Russian and Georgian sides. Which will likely allow Moscow, Tbilisi and Sukhumi to break out of the swirling funnel of mutual accusations and move on to more equal planning of the situation. However, President Medvedev will now be required to respond quickly and skillfully to the situation. In the “speech from the throne”, he in any case promised that Russia would be “open to the world” and would conduct a “constructive and equal dialogue with other peoples.”
Without stabilizing relations with Georgia, it will be difficult for Russia to maintain its “allied” relations with Armenia, whose strategic problem is the opening of transport communications. The situation in the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh remains extremely tense, which excludes any thawing of Armenian relations with Azerbaijan and its informal “patron” – Turkey in the near future. This means that the transport security of Armenia depends primarily on the state of transit communications connecting it with Russia through Georgia.
Today, two of the three highways from Georgia to Russia are blocked by conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the third - Georgian Military - is still closed due to the repair of the checkpoint.
At the beginning of 2008, Russia took over concession management of the Armenian railways. But so far there is no railway transit through Georgia, since it is far and expensive to drive trains through Baku and Makhachkala, and the Abkhaz section of the railway along the Black Sea coast has been dismantled. Its restoration remains the subject of protracted negotiations between Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine. If Russia manages to take part in the transport “opening” of Armenia, it will largely restore and strengthen its economic and political presence in the South Caucasus. But with every week of delay, this chance becomes smaller.
If tensions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia fail to defuse within the near future, Georgia's movement towards NATO will receive a new significant impetus. Moreover, judging by the sharp reaction of Europe and the United States to the latest Abkhaz events, skepticism about Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration may quickly give way to completely different sentiments. Detente of the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the contrary, will create opportunities for agreements in this regard.
As for relations with Azerbaijan, whose attitude towards Russia following the results of the past eight-year period can be described as polite, but increasingly alienated, here the new Russian administration has a head start of several months. Baku politics is even less public than Moscow’s, therefore, despite all the apparent reliability of Ilham Aliyev’s regime, it is too early to guarantee the outcome of the presidential campaign in Azerbaijan in October of this year. Most likely, the re-election of the current president will occur without any complications, but until the end of his first term, Mr. Aliyev is unlikely to seriously change the system of Baku’s foreign policy guidelines.
But in the event of a further escalation of tension in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the “domino effect” could lead to a resumption of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. And then the activation of two or three more centers of interethnic instability in the South Caucasus, such as Lezginistan or Javakheti. On the one hand, the “collapse” of the South Caucasus could give Russia certain advantages in terms of promoting its project of transporting Caspian and Central Asian raw material reserves in defiance of the development of a potentially dangerous route through Azerbaijan and Georgia. But, on the other hand, instability south of the ridge can easily cause instability in the north: during the eight years of Vladimir Putin’s rule, the situation in the North Caucasus has changed for the better in many ways, but the strength and depth of these changes should not be exaggerated.
The key region of the North Caucasus remains Chechnya, which formally recognizes the sovereignty of Russia and is successfully restoring the war-ravaged economy, but has actually created a very independent regime on its territory. This is no longer a separatist enclave, as at the beginning of Putin’s first term, or a destroyed region, as at the beginning of the second. But the results of the “Chechenization” project, the goal of which was to transfer responsibility for the situation in Chechnya from the federal cent to the shoulders of local elites associated with the former president of Russia through informal mutual obligations, does not suit everyone in Moscow, or even in Chechnya itself.
A manifestation of this ideological conflict was the April crisis in Gudermes, when police units controlled by Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov actually laid siege to the location of the Vostok battalion of the Federal Ministry of Defense, staffed by ethnic Chechens.
Resolution of the conflict is essentially on hold until after the inauguration, and options are limited. The Kremlin can either maintain the current state of affairs, when the Chechen army battalion will remain, albeit unequal in size, but still a counterweight to the republican power structures, and its commander Sulim Yamadayev and his brothers will continue to remain in the political reserve. Or “surrender” the battalion and thus absolute the power of Ramzan Kadyrov. Or, on the contrary, try to reduce it and again make Chechnya more accountable to the feds. Despite all the goodness of the motivation for the last option, there is a risk of turning Chechnya into a semblance of Ingushetia, where the federals seem to be present with all their might, but this does not make it any better.
Another North Caucasian problem remains Ingushetia: apart from Karachay-Cherkessia, it is the only mountainous region that has not had a change of leader over the past three years. Expectations for such a change are connected not least with the inauguration of Dmitry Medvedev: his predecessor, firstly, clearly explained to everyone that he was not inclined to change governors under direct pressure from the public, and secondly, he was associated with Murat Zyazikov with certain obligations, since he himself contributed to his election as President of Ingushetia in 2002 instead of Ruslan Aushev, who resigned early.
The main challenge that the Russian administration will continue to face in the North Caucasus is the growing political Islam. Despite a number of successful personnel changes made by the former presidential envoy to the Southern Federal District Dmitry Kozak, power in the mountainous republics is still strongly associated among the people living there with corrupt officials distributing federal subsidies to their numerous relatives, while the social infrastructure turns into ruins under cheerful reports on the implementation of national projects. The gigantic investment programs that the office of the new plenipotentiary Grigory Rapota is currently preparing should, over time, transform the North Caucasus into peaceful and well-groomed Alps, loved by tourists from all over Russia and from abroad. But young imams, who have received a modern theological education and do not recognize the authority of traditional muftiates, are already offering believers a program for reorganizing the world.
The ethnic separatist movements that Vladimir Putin confronted at the end of their popularity have given way to a creeping “Islamic revolution.” It may spontaneously become more active as soon as the Caucasus senses a downward trend in the economy or a weakening of the political regime in Moscow. Therefore, in the North Caucasus, the new administration is simply obliged to surpass the old one in speed, quality and variability of reactions.