Overcoming crises

Primorsky swamp

During the coming week, clarity should emerge on the prospects for a power crisis in Primorye. Some media outlets not only rushed to announce the imminent resignation of Sergei Darkin, but also stated that a case had been opened against him. Contrary to rumors about flying to China, he ended up in Moscow, where he clearly had conversations at different levels. Whether the leaks are true that they will allow it to be finalized at least until the beginning of next year will become clear pretty soon.

The leadership of the Primorsky Territory and its capital is a long-standing problem. Confrontations there were usually complicated by the fact that none of the forces was at all adequate. On the one hand, there could be a major mafia politician, and on the other, an overtly unhealthy micropolitician. So it should not be surprising either the number of ex-mayors of Vladivostok and their deputies convicted or on trial, nor the fact that the current governor and the penultimate elected mayor, who caused at least bewilderment from the very beginning, ended up in their places, and yet what We worked for a while. Moreover, the governor, adjusted for local conditions, turned out to be much more adequate than one might expect.

The era when the presidential representative in the region, FSB General Kondratov, could not remove the local “father” is long gone. Another thing is unclear: where to get new personnel who are not saturated with the local level of development of the administrative market, and how to set up institutions so that they do not adapt to it too quickly.

Southern Village Council

Diversifying the forms of government activities, the new Prime Minister will begin this week with an inspection of the situation in the Southern Federal District and a meeting on the issue of “Increasing the efficiency of state agricultural policy.” The question is really relevant, although there is no certainty that it will be posed exactly as officially stated: significant money is being invested in agriculture directly and indirectly (through protectionist measures, for which end consumers pay), but the question is about the criteria for assessing the effect of these investment rarely rises. Even Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev at the 26th Congress of the CPSU spoke about a decrease in the return on investment in agriculture, but the solution to this problem is currently in doubt.

The role of protectionist measures in rising food prices is obvious, but under the ever-young slogan of supporting domestic producers, new restrictions are being introduced (one of them is planned for this week). And ahead is a ban on processing frozen products. Instead of controlling the information to the consumer about what raw materials the product he buys is made from, the state prefers to decide for the consumer whether a certain product will be on sale at all.

The agricultural lobby is understandable - it protects those it represents. It’s worse that product processors have a weaker lobby. And what’s even worse is that in a situation of conflict of interests between producers and consumers, the state considers it possible to play along first. Instead of understanding why domestic producers are not efficient enough and stimulating the growth of competitiveness, the state preserves this inefficiency, simultaneously engaging in an anti-social assortment policy - washing out products for the most price-sensitive groups of the population.

Eastern transit

Fortunately, our protectionism does not reach and, it seems, is not going to reach the heights characteristic of our western neighbor. It is in Minsk, at the council of heads of government of the CIS, that Vladimir Putin’s first foreign visit in his new capacity may take place. If he is not replaced by, say, Igor Shuvalov.

This week, following meetings on the fight against corruption and on judicial reform, the first international visits of the new Russian president are expected. On Thursday - Friday he will visit Kazakhstan, and on Friday - Saturday - China. It hardly makes sense to look for some very deep symbolism in the directions of the visits, but they still reflect something: Kazakhstan is the most powerful internal player in Central Asia, for which there is a constant struggle from different sides, and China is one of the most serious players in the modern world.

Recent years have not been entirely successful for Astana - both economically (the consequences of world processes here have been much more painful, and partial squeezing out of foreigners will not end well) and internally politically (the concentration of power in the hands of the president was accompanied by both losses in the circles of meaningful opposition and a qualitative weakening the possibility of relying on the closest circle – it has thinned out greatly). The upcoming chairmanship of the OSCE is significant, but it mainly appeals to past successes and serves as some kind of advance.

The Kazakh leadership, having not decided on any form of complication and transfer of power, looked at the processes in Russia with obvious bewilderment and distrust. Maybe the non-catastrophic nature of what is happening here will convince our neighbors of something.

Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Kazakhstan will begin after the end of another Caspian visit - the President of Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan. After more than a decade of disagreements (the disputed Kapaz-Serdar field, Azerbaijan's outstanding debt, etc.), a certain thaw began last year, and now relations between the two Turkic countries can be restored in full. One of the reasons for rapprochement is the production and transportation of Caspian gas to Europe. To implement these projects, it is necessary to resolve the issue of the legal status of the Caspian Sea or establish another method of transportation. A desirable condition is Kazakhstan’s accession to the project. Probably, all this will become the subject of discussion not only in Baku, but also with Astana.

Chinese intelligence

A visit to China will not get rid of any crises: we don’t have them - already and again.

The Chinese direction of Russian politics and economics is becoming increasingly significant. In resolving some issues, China's voice is beginning to sound a little louder; it is steadily approaching the solution of others, its own. First of all, this is Taiwan, which in this sense is a little unfortunate, and despite the events of this year, Tibet. In the foreseeable future, it will be possible to reach an agreement with the moderate part of the emigrants, and the moment is not far off when, under the control of the CPC Central Committee, the “rebirth” of the Dalai Lama will occur. It will become much more difficult to sympathize with Tibetan radicals without moderates. If we manage to keep Great Han chauvinism in check, the severity of the Tibetan problem will fade away.

Well, if by this time political destabilization does not occur and the currently acute social problems are smoothed out, China will have the opportunity to participate much more actively in foreign affairs. The question will be what goals the then Chinese leadership will consider necessary to set for itself and what will be perceived as limiting the means.

Modern Russia undoubtedly needs stable economic and political relations with China. Many reasons for anti-Chinese fears look stupid, but this does not negate the need in the next decade to avoid the role of a raw material appendage of the Chinese economy, and in the longer term - to be prepared to block with the United States, Japan and a united Korea in opposition to the too strong activation of the foreign policy of its eastern neighbor ( For more details about the problems of China and Russia, see the publication next Tuesday as part of our project “Institutions of Freedom” ).

Spontaneous struggle

In the meantime, it would be useful for experts to conduct a comparative analysis of the experience of dealing with natural disasters in China and Myanmar. Contrary to our generally accepted opinion about the greater effectiveness of authoritarian structures in situations where an emergency reaction is necessary, a somewhat freer China responded clearly more adequately - with a willingness to allow foreign assistance, relying on public initiative. The Burmese junta - trying to hide what was happening as much as possible, to isolate itself from the outside world, hardly agreed to limited assistance, but without delivery to the site, allowing the theft and resale of humanitarian aid, etc. (Note, however, that one of the main defenders of the Burmese military is the Chinese leadership). However, most of the scandals involving the managerial impotence of military dictators are still to come.

A ripe scandal

Unlike Burma, scandals in Israel are primarily local. They are raised not by international officials who cannot reach the leaders of the state in order to save its own citizens, but by their own law enforcement agencies. Legal prosecution of the current prime minister is a good tradition in Israeli politics (the activities of the president, a less significant figure, are investigated less often, and the work of retired politicians is even less common). Ehud Olmert could not break this tradition either. Another interrogation is expected in the coming days, and after some time charges may be brought. If charges were brought, Olmert promised to resign. However, there may be reasons to take back this promise.

Ukrainian puzzle

Otherwise there will be a scandal in Ukraine. It is pointless to guess when it will begin - it is already happening and will only continue - both at today's meeting of the ruling coalition (if it takes place at all), and on Tuesday around the attempt to privatize the Odessa Port Plant, despite the suspension of the privatization process of this enterprise by President Viktor Yushchenko and the presence of two heads of the State Property Fund - according to the president and according to the prime minister. The process of holding early elections for the mayor of the capital of Ukraine (May 25) was also scandalous from the very beginning, where the current mayor - radical populist Leonid Chernovetsky - is opposed by the right hand of the no less radical populist Tymoshenko - Alexander Turchynov. Well, and as the most realistically thinking politician - boxer Vitali Klitschko.

The agreement reached last week by the Tymoshenko faction on pro-presidential amendments to the law on government can be interpreted in different ways. One thing is obvious - a message has been made: we are making compromises, and on Tuesday we will see if they will make concessions to us; If they don’t go ahead and approve our wonderful anti-inflation projects in a timely manner, it’s their own fault – we’ll be forced to leave. There is a real audience for such messages - those who are ready to believe that Tymoshenko’s team can do anything, but there is simply always someone or something in the way.

If the Party of Regions gets into the next cabinet, a new portion of rhetoric against the president will be ready. Therefore, the president is torn between the desire to dismiss the prime minister and the reluctance to deal with the political consequences of this step. The regions are happy to send the plague to both “orange” houses, but are afraid of reducing representation following the results of the next elections, and a significant part of the disappointed voters are not interested in any of the currently noticeable political forces doesn't hope. And only an attempt at inaccurate external influence can force them to mobilize. The same mechanism can once again lead to polarization of Ukrainian sympathies between the United States and European countries.

Aggravation without end

The aggravation of the situation around Georgia has already led to both of these effects. If we were supporters of the conspiracy method, we would definitely assume the existence of a secret conspiracy between Lavrov and Saakashvili: we are angry rebuke to you, and you are a reason for them, etc. Leaks about peace initiatives are immediately refuted, but the danger of using force is talked about with pleasure on both sides.

Despite a lot of internal mistakes, despite the crises within the group of those who made the “Rose Revolution,” Saakashvili’s party will receive much more than it could – after all, it was he who managed to prove that he won the competition in the category “who is no longer loved in Moscow.” A significant voter would like to improve relations with Russia, but not in a situation where the ideas of internationalizing the conflict are declared to be evidence of an unwillingness to resolve the conflict.

Unfortunately, it cannot be ruled out that a preliminary agreement between Tbilisi and Sukhumi was indeed reached (declaration of mutual non-aggression, withdrawal of Georgian forces from Upper Kodori, etc.), but was not approved by our “hawks”. They are trying to achieve something of their own through aggravation. Their Georgian colleagues are about to solve their problems in this way, and besides, Georgia is worried about the danger of a real clash with Russia. Perhaps this is where the readiness for compromise, mentioned by some media outlets, comes from.

But the keys to resolving the crisis really lie in Moscow - no compromise formula will work without the consent of the Russian authorities. And their conditions in this direction most likely will not be realistic. It is from this series of calls for Georgia not only to understand, but also to accept our logic. But that doesn't happen. A compromise is achieved through mutual verification and consideration of logics. This means that there will be no compromise for now.

Explaining the perniciousness and ineffectiveness of a policy where the concepts of security and power can be juggled is much more difficult than in economics, in questions of judicial independence, or even in problems of public participation.