Caucasian lessons

What conclusions should Russia draw?

Russia, in my opinion, made at least eight serious political mistakes in South Ossetia. First, Moscow should have long ago clearly stated how far it is willing to go to protect the interests of its citizens in the disputed territories of the Caucasus. In private negotiations with the Georgian side, with the United States and the EU, it was necessary to speak directly about the fact that Russia, if necessary, uses military force to ensure the safety of its citizens, including on the territory of Georgia. Such military plans and programs had to be documented, some of which could be “accidentally leaked” in order to show the seriousness of their intentions.

Secondly, when tensions began to rise, it was necessary to immediately begin preparations for the implementation of these plans. Army units had to be demonstratively put on combat readiness, officers were recalled from vacation, and additional forces were pulled to the borders. President Medvedev had to make an extremely tough forward statement about Russia's policy in this region. The statements that were made after the deaths of Russian citizens were at least 72 hours late and were not strong enough. Russia should have been proactive, but its policy was again reactive rather than proactive; for several days it was a follower rather than a leading force in the region. Which others immediately took advantage of.

Thirdly, Moscow should have immediately entered into a dialogue with the United States and other NATO countries in order to bring to their attention Russia’s intentions to use all possibilities, including military, to ensure stability in South Ossetia, and, if necessary, in Abkhazia . In the West, Russia's position looked vague, vague and contradictory. Washington understood that Russia did not have major economic interests in South Ossetia, and from a geopolitical point of view, this is also not the most important region. Therefore, Washington assumed that Moscow might make concessions here. The United States even received signals that the Russian leadership might not be against discussing a compromise on South Ossetia in exchange, for example, for certain guarantees in Abkhazia, etc.

Fourth, Moscow should radically reconsider its policy towards Georgia. Today Russia proceeds from the fact that Georgia is its regional adversary and largely represents the interests of the West, primarily the United States. Moscow is acting reactively here too. Meanwhile, everything must be done to turn Georgia, its people and elite into Russian allies. Why on earth has Moscow come to terms with the fact that Georgia has turned into an anti-Russian state and is being used as such by Russia’s enemies from the outside, as well as by hardliners in Russia itself? But, fighting for the pro-Russian orientation of Georgia, we must not make it our satellite, but help strengthen Georgian independence, economy and democracy. This policy should be aimed at Georgia’s geopolitical gain, and not at passive recognition of it as an outpost of anti-Russian forces in the Caucasus, which only makes Russia a hostage to Tbilisi’s policies, as recent weeks have shown.

Fifth, Russia must initiate an international dialogue on the future of the region and urgently reconsider its strategy and tactics regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Continued maintenance of the status quo in frozen conflict zones is not only extremely dangerous for stability in the region, but also undermines Russia’s ability to defend its interests and reduces its international authority and influence. Russia should not allow outside forces - NATO, the EU or the USA - to constantly initiate the search for solutions to the problems of the South Caucasus. It needs to initiate a dialogue on a new political configuration in the South Caucasus with the participation of all interested parties. Moscow's plan should not be aimed at punishing Georgia or the West. It must include the possibility of compromise.

It is necessary to move away from the allegedly ethnic, “genocidal” rather than political content of the conflict being imposed on Moscow (for example, stereotypes about “Georgian refugees”). It is necessary to conduct a discussion about the possible return of all refugees to Abkhazia, including 50 thousand Russians. At the same time, one cannot endlessly ignore Western proposals on the structure of peacekeeping forces, although it is wrong to simplify: either Russian peacekeepers or Western ones. Policy in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including humanitarian and military assistance and reconstruction work, must be transparent and open to public control in order to avoid suspicions of corruption, which is often explained in the West by Russia's interest in these territories. All Russian actions must be carried out by regular troops, that is, no volunteers, mercenaries or illegal armed groups.

Sixth, Russia must recognize the independence of Kosovo and thereby not only untie its hands and eliminate the ambiguity of its position, but also expand the political basis for resolving territorial conflicts in the Caucasus. Kosovo's independence should also be recognized by Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The principle of the territorial integrity of Georgia cannot be abandoned, but an equally important principle is respect for the interests, rights and desires of people living in a specific territory.

Seventh, the entire system of political planning and decision-making in Russia has shown its inefficiency. The notorious Kremlin security forces, fighting for property and lining their pockets, were unable to competently play ahead of the actions of the neighboring country, whose population does not exceed the average region in Russia, to simply calculate the threats and prepare for various scenarios. Nothing unexpected happened in South Ossetia, but Moscow turned out to be strikingly unprepared. Its structures responsible for operational intelligence and situation analysis failed.

Eighth, while seeking to end the conflict, Moscow should not forget about the long-term consequences of any of its actions both in the international arena and within the country. Otherwise, as has already happened, you can win in small things, but lose in big things. This is how I see it today from Washington.

Nikolay ZLOBIN, director of Russian and Asian programs at the US Institute of World Security