Russia today, 17 years after the collapse of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP), is essentially continuing its work: trying to behave like an empire in conditions when it is not an empire. The main consequence of the attempt by the near-Kremlin junta in August 1991 to overthrow the legitimate, albeit at that time extremely weak, President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev was the collapse of the Soviet Union. The consequences of Russia’s war with Georgia are still unpredictable, but in any case, contrary to the sincere point of view of the majority of Russians, and also, I’m afraid, the country’s leadership will not make it stronger.
By delaying the withdrawal of its troops from the territory of Georgia (which also includes Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and our troops are still stationed in Georgia far from even these unrecognized republics), Russia is undermining the already shaky moral foundations of its foreign policy. We can no longer accuse the world of double standards or support of separatism (relying on the Kosovo precedent), because we ourselves directly supported the separatists with force (even in Kosovo the peacekeeping contingent was mixed and did not include regular units of the armies of neighboring or distant states). We can no longer criticize the United States for trying to establish its own order beyond its own geographic borders. At the same time, Russia has neither the skill nor the ability to buy the loyalty of its allies or serve as a political role model, as the United States does. Nobody wants to be like today's Russia. Rather, Russia is copying in Georgia the ugliest foreign policy examples of the George W. Bush administration.
Russia today is not the pole of world politics, as it tries to present itself as, but a country without a clear path of development, which for the first time transformed its imperial complexes, constantly inflated by power, into war. Is it possible not to see that in recent months Moscow has provoked the leadership of Georgia (which in no way removes its guilt for the massacre), increasing its military contingents in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, declaring through the mouth of its generals that “our paratroopers are here (to Abkhazia. - - S.N. ) did not come to swim,” unilaterally withdrawing from CIS economic sanctions against the unrecognized republics on the territory of Georgia, sending a battalion of railway troops to Abkhazia to repair the railway, and not civilian specialists from Russian Railways.
Now the question is not who is to blame and whether this war is not also an attempt by the security forces to plunge the president into a record crisis in Russia’s relations with the West since the collapse of the USSR. Now the question is whether the Russian authorities have the determination to finally begin changing their foreign policy course.
The territorial integrity of Russia itself is in great doubt for the foreseeable future - both in the North Caucasus and in the Far East, with a real threat of creeping Chinese colonization. Russia didn't have any friends anyway. It is even somehow indecent to consider provincial dictators like Lukashenko, Chavez or Ahmadinejad fooling the whole world as such. And after the war with Georgia (which must be ended as quickly as possible), not only Western partners, but also post-Soviet states will not trust us. There is now not a single country on the borders or near Russia that will not be afraid of it. Consequently, all these countries will begin to look for ways to ensure their security from Russia without Russia. (There is already an example: Poland immediately resolved differences and signed a full-fledged agreement with the United States on hosting elements of the American missile defense system ). Moreover, the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine or “historically Russian” lands in Kazakhstan may well be considered by them as a pretext for Russian aggression if it gets a taste for neo-imperial games.
The crisis in relations with the world, provoked by the protracted war with Georgia, is at the same time a real chance to carry out a peaceful transformation of the ineffective regime. If Russia wants to be an influential member of the international community, to lay claim to foreign business assets, if its officials want to continue buying real estate and educating their children in the West (that is, at least for the selfish interests of the power elite itself), it must finally create a democratic political system , return to full-fledged market principles in the economy, stop using law enforcement agencies as a means of settling commercial and political scores between government officials and their opponents.
Russia's current policy has led to confrontation with the world community. It is naive to believe that the fear of Russia from other states makes it stronger. The Soviet Union paid for the status of "Upper Volta with missiles", a country that everyone feared, with its very existence. Russia's price for its irrepressible and foolish imperial ambitions at the new stage of history may turn out to be no less high.
Semyon Novoprudsky
Not an empire • Vremya novostej • RIMA — Russian Independent Media Archive