Whether the oil and gas weapons of Russia will work
Suppose for a second that relations between Russia and the West will reach a large -scale confrontation - with the exception of, of course, a military scenario. How can Russia answer? For all the fantasticity of such a scenario, this is exactly the question that analysts in the West are trying to answer today, developing recommendations for their governments about the degree of stiffness of actions in relation to Russia
There are not so many ways to answer serious sanctions in Russia - in fact, the only one is the notorious overlap of the oil and gas valve. Although such a prospect inspires horror in many minds in the West and excessive self -confidence in Russian politicians, it should not be overestimated to take such a step.
Oil weapons
It is worth immediately dividing oil and gas, since the specifics of the two markets are serious. The role of oil is more important and unique in comparison with the role of gas: in the global energy balance, oil takes about 36% against 24% of gas, while oil cannot be replaced as a source of energy in transport, and gas is mainly replaced by other types of fuel. The dependence of the Western countries (the organization of economic cooperation and development) on oil imports today is 60%, while gas is only 25%. But it is much more difficult to extract from this situation. The politically motivated “overlapping of the oil crane” in the world has already happened-we are talking about the Arab oil embargo of the 1970s. After it, the West took serious measures by creating a system for maintaining warehouses of oil and oil products in an amount sufficient to satisfy their own oil needs within 90 days (commercial structures are enough for more than 50 days, the rest is strategic government reserves). This system today protects the oil market from shocks associated with short -term interruption of supplies. It is no accident that the Arab oil embargo was no longer repeated: the new system deprived the short-term overlap of the oil crane, and the readiness of oil producers for long-term positional wars, taking into account the relative weakness of their economies, raises doubts.
In addition, Russia decides to declare the oil war to the West, its possibilities for the effective wage of such a war would be limited. Net-export of oil and oil products from Russia today is approximately 7 million barrels per day. This is quite a lot - 8.5% of world consumption. The removal of these Russian barrels from the market will lead to a serious panic, world oil prices will certainly fly up. But on the other hand, only commercial oil reserves in Western countries today make up 2.6 billion barrels, which is equal to a one -year volume of oil exports from Russia. If we assume (purely conditionally) that Russian oil will completely stop entering the world market, eating in the West warehouses of oil stocks will replace the missing Russian supplies within 12 months.
... and gas
Technically easier to block the gas valve. But then the consequences of this for Western countries will be much less significant. First of all, the countries of Western Europe do not much depend on them, the supply of Russian gas to each of these countries is not more than 10 billion cubic meters per year, or a unit of interest in the energy balance of these states. The exception is Germany and Italy, where about a third of gas exported to Europe is going on - more than 55 billion cubic meters. But the dependence of, say, Germany on Russian gas is not disastrotical, coal is still dominated by the production of electricity, and in the general German energy balance the share of Russian gas is less than 10% (in Italy-about 11%). Gas supply to the UK has sharply increased - to 15 billion cubic meters last year, but this is only 6.3% of the total energy consumption in this country.
Finland, as well as the countries of central and southeastern Europe: Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Bulgaria, depends on Russian gas. Here, the proportion of our gas in the structure of the balance of primary energy boards ranges from 15% to 35%. Poland depends in the minimum way, since here the energy is built mainly on its own coal. In Europe, there is also a system of gas storages in case of short -term interruptions in supplies. But the termination of the receipt of export revenue and the allocation of Gazprom loans by Western banks will immediately financially bring down the Russian gas monopoly.
Price for Russia
At the same time, one must understand the price that Russia will be forced to pay. We will completely stop receiving oil exports. The oil industry will stop, which will have to be supported from the state budget (in the amount of at least $ 1 billion per week). In 1990-1995, the reduction in oil production by 40% became a real disaster, and for a full -scale oil war with the West it will have to reduce production by 70%, completely stopping exports, and hold this situation for many months.
Moreover, it will be necessary to reduce production and exports, and not redirect export flows, say, to Asian - then Asian countries will simply stop buying oil in the Middle East, which, in turn, will go west, replacing the Russian one.
In the possible “oil embargo” Russia, most likely, will not be supported by Arab countries, primarily Saudi Arabia, which is an important US ally. Today, only free oil producing capacity of Saudi Arabia (wells that can be involved within a month) is approximately 1.2 million barrels per day, or almost a fifth of Russian export of oil and oil products. In the event that it reaches a geopolitical confrontation with Russia, Saudi Arabia will most likely reaches these capacities.
The “point” reduction of Russian supplies to individual countries could be considered more likely - by analogy with how we practiced in recent years in relation to Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic. However, one should not forget that the countries of Eastern Europe have the opportunity to buy oil in another place, just a few dollars per barrel more expensive.
The main volume of oil exported from Russia by sea and delivered to Rotterdam or Mediterranean ports is generally sold not to Western governments or state -owned companies, but by abstract private traders, many of which, by the way, are affiliated with the Russian side (like the same Gunvor Gennady Timchenko) and suffer billionaire losses.
In general, despite the entire formidable of the oil and gas lever, in reality it is difficult to imagine a full -scale oil and gas war of Russia against the West. This war will be too prolonged, the instruments of its maintenance are too complex, Russia's losses are very serious.
