Translated material
Dniester enters into negotiations
Dmitry Medvedev calls Igor Smirnov for a serious conversation
In the coming days, perhaps as early as today, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev will meet in Sochi with the leader of the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic, Igor Smirnov. “We are preparing for a serious conversation,” said Sergei Prikhodko, aide to the Russian head of state last night. Just at this moment, the Transnistrian capital Tiraspol was preparing for the festive fireworks. It thundered not in connection with the upcoming negotiations, of course, but in honor of the 18th anniversary of the existence of the republic. It was established on September 2, 1990 at the junction of the then Soviet Moldova and Ukraine, but since then no one has recognized it.However, unlike the unrecognized republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where the unresolved status problem resulted in the August Caucasian war with Georgia, the likelihood of a repetition of the armed conflict in Transnistria is now minimal, although the Moldovans and Transnistria also fought in 1992. Russia is one of the main mediators in the settlement between Chisinau and Tiraspol and, according to Vremya Novostey, will resolve the problem exclusively through negotiations. Dmitry Medvedev will tell Igor Smirnov, who yesterday hosted a military parade in Tiraspol, about possible solutions.
The celebrations began with the laying of flowers at the Tiraspol memorial to the heroes of the Great Patriotic War, where those killed during the Transnistrian conflict of 1992 were also buried. “The most optimal option for resolving the situation around the settlement on the Dniester is recognition of Transnistria by Moldova,” said Igor Smirnov. He added: “The Russian leadership, having recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, emphasized the priority importance of the will of the people in solving such problems.”
But the Kremlin does not believe that the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is a precedent for similar steps by Moscow regarding Transnistria. It is no coincidence that the day before the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on August 26, President Dmitry Medvedev met with his Moldovan counterpart Vladimir Voronin in Sochi . The Russian leader made it clear that Moscow is ready to make every effort to resolve the Transnistrian conflict within the framework of the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova. “Events in South Ossetia have shown how dangerous the conflict potential contained in some frozen conflicts can be,” Medvedev said then. It is worth noting that Vladimir Voronin abandoned anti-Russian rhetoric and revised his views on NATO.
The main difference between the Transnistrian conflict and similar problems in the Caucasus is that here both sides refrain from using military force. After the end of the war in 1992, Chisinau and Tiraspol managed to maintain peace, albeit fragile. This is largely due to the Russian peacekeeping contingent. And the pressure from Chisinau on Tiraspol is not military in nature, but results in economic and transport measures. Today, the majority of Moldovan and Transnistrian political scientists agree that events in the Caucasus will serve as a catalyst for accelerating negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol.
Russia will still have to make a lot of efforts to bring the parties to the negotiating table. The first steps in this direction were taken in the spring, when, through the mediation of Moscow, Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin came to border Bendery for negotiations with Igor Smirnov. On April 11, a sensational meeting took place between two politicians who had ignored each other for seven years, at which they talked about resuming dialogue between the two banks of the Dniester.
But these contacts are not constant. Now relations between Tiraspol and Chisinau have deteriorated again due to the fact that on August 29 the Moldovan government spoke out against the international recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Chisinau “categorically” rejected “any forceful methods of resolving conflict issues,” but did not consider the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia “a factor in stabilizing the situation”: “As in the case of the recognition of Kosovo, this step only reduces the responsibility of the parties in finding a compromise.”
At the now traditional press conference, held two days before Republic Day, Igor Smirnov put forward a number of conditions to Chisinau: “Two factors would contribute to the settlement - Moldova’s withdrawal from GUAM (GUAM has united Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova since 1997. - - Ed. ) and its accession to the union of Russia and Belarus, as well as the introduction of a second state language in Moldova - Russian." But the leader of Transnistria himself does not believe that his conditions will be accepted: “There is nothing of this and, apparently, it is not expected yet.”
So Igor Smirnov continues to pursue a course towards independence: “This course will continue. In 2006, we had a referendum on independence with subsequent annexation to Russia. The overwhelming majority of our citizens spoke for both the first and the second.”
However, although the residents of Transnistria last August perceived with envy the jubilation of the Abkhazians and Ossetians, no one wants recognition of independence at the price that the Ossetians paid - the price of human lives. So it is possible that negotiations on the status of Transnistria will resume in September with the involvement of international mediators. Chisinau is already calling on Tiraspol to resume negotiations interrupted at the end of February 2006 in the “five plus two” format (Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, plus observers from the United States and the European Union).
Igor Smirnov has so far only cautiously remarked: “The Europeans are under American influence in their policies. All this leaves an imprint on their position.” He is confident that “the main player in the “five plus two” format has been and remains Russia, which is connected both with its diplomatic resources and with the effective peacekeeping mission that Moscow is conducting in the region.”
In Tiraspol and Chisinau, more and more experts are inclined to believe that the parties will return to the “Kozak memorandum” (developed in 2003 with the participation of Dmitry Kozak, then the first deputy head of the Russian presidential administration). In November of the same year, the plan was initialed, but then rejected by the President of Moldova under Western influence. The “Kozak Memorandum” envisaged the federalization of Moldova with the granting of broad autonomy to Transnistria and included a very important point for Tiraspol: Transnistria, with the resumption of Romanization or the expressed desire of Moldova to become part of Romania, no longer receives autonomy, but independence. The role of this point may increase due to the fact that Bucharest-oriented forces may perform well in the parliamentary elections in Moldova (in this country the president is elected by parliament), scheduled for 2009.