Weak link

There is a personnel impasse in Ingushetia

The Ingush opposition postponed rallies until the end of mourning for the owner of the opposition network resource “Ingushetia.ru”, Magomed Evloev, who was killed last Sunday . But in Moscow, a small picket in protest against the murder of Mr. Evloev took place yesterday on Pushkin Square.

In Nazran itself, the rally that ended the oppositionist’s funeral on Monday did not resume after the dispersal early on Tuesday morning . On Wednesday, the father of the murdered man announced that the family would take revenge on the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ingushetia, Musa Medov, and the President of the Republic, Murat Zyazikov.

Few of those gathered were indignant at why the first president of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev, did not come to them, in support of whose return to office the opposition had recently collected 80 thousand signatures . However, the appearance of Mr. Aushev at a rally of hundreds of young people would look strange. Especially considering that although the Evloev resource provided information support for the collection of signatures, the friendly relations between the first president and Mr. Evloev are a thing of the past. If Mr. Aushev considers his return to big politics at least theoretically possible, the rally in Nazran clearly cannot be considered as a successful springboard for a figure of this caliber. The same applies to entrepreneurs of Ingush origin who share money with the opposition, but do not want to appear against its background.

The opposition does not have a leader who would be so integrated into the Russian political establishment that he could be among the likely successors to Murat Zyazikov, even if the Kremlin seriously wanted this. Now the movement is led by Magomed Khazbiev, Maksharip Aushev and two or three other leaders who gained fame in the struggle for the release of their illegally detained relatives or during the collection of signatures for the cancellation of the results of the Duma elections in Ingushetia on December 2 last year and for the return of Ruslan Aushev. Theoretically, there is a “mekhk-khel” - a “country council” of representatives of Ingush teips, elected as an alternative to the republican parliament, but there are no “stars of the first magnitude” there either.

But this personnel shortage is only an apparent advantage of the authorities. If the protests gain momentum, it may turn out that they will have to deal not with civilian leaders, but with Islamists who have weapons and experience in managing the situation. Moreover, almost all civil leaders in Ingushetia are already under one article or another of the Criminal Code, and arresting Magomed Evloev, as it turned out, is much easier than his namesake, Emir Magas.

Meanwhile, the small number of people taking to the streets can hardly be interpreted as an encouraging circumstance. Objective sociology in Ingushetia is understandably difficult, as is authentication of 80 thousand autographs for the change of power. But it seems likely that this idea is supported by about half of the adult population, irritated by constant outbreaks of violence - either against civilians or against police officers. This means that a “butterfly wing” effect that will sweep tens of thousands of people onto the streets is potentially possible. In 2004, in Karachay-Cherkessia, the murder of seven people led to an assault on the government.

Apparently, the situation could be eased by replacing the President of Ingushetia - similar measures in other Caucasian republics gave the authorities at least several months of respite. But the federal center is traditionally afraid to risk its reputation and make any kind of castling under pressure from the street (in the same Karachay-Cherkess Republic, the president was replaced only now, four years after the unrest).

In addition, Ingushetia and the system of power created there, in which the local president does not interfere with the federals fighting the militants at their own discretion, are for the Russian security forces a kind of showcase of a possible alternative to “Chechenization.” In the context of the crisis in neighboring South Ossetia, the storefront is turning into an important tactical platform. At the same time, it is not a fact that the war just around the corner has greatly strengthened Mr. Zyazikov’s personal rating. People in uniform hardly care for him personally. They simply do not want their own Kadyrov to appear in Ingushetia - or the same one, by expanding powers to the fraternal Vainakh region. And this means that any other president (not Kadyrov or Ruslan Aushev, but someone, for example, from former or current Duma deputies from Ingushetia or former heads of its prosecutor’s office) will instantly find themselves in the same position as Murat Zyazikov: the feds will cut down the forest, and the head of the republic will be responsible for the flying wood chips.

Ivan SUKHOV