“We don’t have long to wait, be patient”

The authors of the concept of the textbook "History of Russia 1900-1945" explain their position

Published in our newspaper on August 25, Anatoly Bershtein’s material “Rational Management of Murders”, in which the concept of the textbook “History of Russia 1900-1945”, which is currently being created, is abundantly quoted. , caused a wide public outcry. The discussion about the not yet published book, which is being prepared by Deputy Director of the National Foreign Policy Laboratory Alexander Filippov and Head of the Department of History at Moscow State Pedagogical University Alexander Danilov, has gone beyond the professional community. Judging by the responses received by the editor, the question of what kind of history of Russia will be taught to schoolchildren in the not too distant future worries not only teachers and scientists, and not only in our country.

The violent reaction is, in principle, easily explainable: a textbook on the history of Russia in modern times is too important and a priori not an indisputable subject. However, the editors of the textbook seem inclined to perceive criticism against them solely as accusations - in a letter to the editor, they claim that in the Vremya Novostei material “accusations were brought against them of violating moral standards and violating current legislation.” Today we provide Messrs. Filippov and Danilov have the opportunity to explain their position (the material they sent is published in full and without changes). However, their response to our publication requires new comments.

Readers of Vremya Novostei fully felt not only the approach of the new academic year, but also a real threat to democratic values ​​- A. Bershtein’s article “Rational Management of Murders” was published, dedicated to the concept of the textbook “History of Russia 1900-1945.” . Horror from what we read in the newspaper gripped not only the professional community, but also the parents of students: we received calls from the Russian Academy of Sciences, from many editorial offices and even from political foundations asking us to clarify - is it true? Is it true that we justify the “Great Terror” as a means of achieving political goals, that we mock the memory of repressed people, trample moral standards and offer “deliberately illegal interpretations”? We hasten to reassure our colleagues and fellow citizens - none of this is true.

It seems that A. Bershtein feels almost like a spy who has obtained secret information behind enemy lines. The concept of the textbook “History of Russia 1900-1945.” delivered to them as a captured document from the “last meeting of history teachers” who were “ordered” to accept it for execution and where instructions were given for rewriting history! We must disappoint - this material was published back in June on the website of the Prosveshchenie publishing house. This is a working document from the textbook's author team. The authors' attention is focused on the most painful issues of our history of the twentieth century and those accents in their coverage that would help the teacher to avoid one-sidedness and bias in assessments, allowing him to teach history to its young citizens more balancedly and calmly, without strain and accusations against his own country. This is the main meaning of the material published on the site.

But everyone sees what they want to see. What did Mr. Bershtein see and what was he afraid of? If we speak in his own words, it turns out like this: Stalin is a “successful manager”, and Katyn is “fair historical retribution.” Only an amateur or a biased critic can interpret the published document in this way.

The range of issues that A. Bershtein called debatable is evidence of unprofessionalism or deceit. He is ready to conduct a “separate discussion” with theses, for example, that “Stalin acted in a specific historical situation”, that he was “a supporter of transforming the country into an industrial society”, that in his time the country was “governed from one center”, and that the Soviet Union, according to Stalin, was “threatened by a major war in the near future.” I’m tempted to ask: does all this really give you doubt? Are you lying?

Our opponent also doubts that Russia at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. had the highest economic growth rates; that the turn in the foreign policy of the USSR began under the influence of the Munich agreement between the West and the aggressor; that the Baltic states and Bessarabia were part of the Russian Empire; that as a result of the Finnish campaign the USSR received what it was striving for before it began... Much more is confused (or not understood). The concept says that the contradictions caused by the First World War in 1914-1917 brought the country closer to revolution, and for some reason the author saw that we were proposing the revolution itself to be attributed to 1914-1917. There is a lot that is still misunderstood or not seen. But we are still not talking about that. Three accusations remain key (that’s right), for which a separate comment is needed.

So, first, “there was no organized famine in the countryside in the USSR.” The concept clearly and unambiguously states that the famine of the early 30s. “was not “provoked” by the authorities, especially in relation to certain peoples.” Corresponding explanations are also given. We stand firmly on this position even now. If our opponent, following, for example, the Ukrainian authorities, believes that the famine was organized from the Kremlin, and even with the purpose of genocide of the Ukrainian (or, as others sometimes write, the entire Soviet) people, then this is his personal business - in In our society, everyone can express their opinion. In Ukraine, President Yushchenko is trying to make it a criminal offense to deny the interpretation of a common misfortune for the peoples of the USSR as genocide of Ukrainians. But to demand such an opinion from Russian history textbooks is a shame. Even its most ardent adherents have so far failed to present compelling arguments in favor of the conclusion that the famine was organized from above.

The second thesis is about the justification of the “Great Terror” . Since the author does not seem to fully understand what exactly is being discussed in the document, let us explain. The “great terror” in historical literature does not mean the entire Soviet period, or even the entire 30s, but those 14 months from August 1937 to November 1938, which saw the peak of arrests and executions on political charges. At this time, about 1.6 million people were arrested, including 682 thousand people sentenced to death. It was this period that was distinguished not only by its massiveness, but also by the cruelty of repressions that had no precedents in the history of the USSR. However, all these are known facts. The key question here is why the “Great Terror” dates back to this particular time. We asked teachers to think about their answer to this question. Let's now think about it all together. After the adoption of the USSR Constitution of 1936, and then the constitutions of the union republics, the country was preparing for the first democratic elections. Restrictions on voting rights were lifted for a fairly large part of the country's citizens. This caused not only a rapid surge in the activity of the voters themselves (in Kolomna, at one of the enterprises, for example, for several days only elections for the presidium of the assembly to nominate candidates for deputies were going on), but also serious concern among the authorities (especially local ones) regarding the possible election of opponents of the authorities as deputies. A stream of letters rushed from the localities to the center, in which the authorities and NKVD bodies reported on more and more “enemies” preparing for the elections. Did this worry Stalin? The question is rhetorical. The experience of the “fifth column” in Spain and the inspired “cause of the military” were taken into account. All these hypothetical “enemies” and entire social groups, potentially dangerous to the authorities, were struck. The strike is “preventive”. This is what the authors write about. What in this explanation justifies Stalin and other leaders of that time? Or does our opponent believe that any attempt to explain something is already a justification? We can only be surprised at this line of thought. Judging by the words of A. Bershtein, that “the developers are actually looking for “rational” justifications for the actions of the authorities to exterminate millions of their citizens,” he really considers any explanation a justification, but somehow we are not ready to believe it.

A. Bershtein quotes the concept: “Terror was put at the service of the tasks of industrial development: according to orders from the NKVD, planned arrests of engineers and specialists necessary for solving defense and other problems in the Far East and Siberia were ensured.” In a phrase where any unbiased reader will see only a condemnation of the practice of planned arrests, our opponent sees something else - a justification for this practice. We write that in the fall of 1938, a new stage of mass repression began: in contrast to a “preventive” strike on potential enemies, the arrests of the bulk of people do not end in executions, but in being sent to economic facilities. Should a student know about this? I think so. To whom might this seem like an excuse?

About the scale of repression. A widespread propaganda technique is to compare the number of all categories of repressed people (not only those executed and those who died in custody, but also those arrested, exiled, expelled, deported) with the number of those killed in the Great Patriotic War or in Nazi concentration camps. The goal of propagandists is to substantiate the theses “Russian communists killed more people than German Nazis”, “Stalin is worse than Hitler”, etc. up to “Russia is a threat to the world.” We are against such cheating tactics and say that the number of deaths should be compared with the number of deaths. The only point is that the textbook should remove unverified and scientifically confirmed loss figures, and present those that can actually be proven. The text of the textbook itself lists all categories of repressed persons and says that millions of our fellow citizens were such. It is these figures that schoolchildren should see in the textbook, instead of the traditional and stunning “discoveries” of previous years about the loss of almost 120 million people during the repressions!

Finally, the third - Katyn. The issue is extremely painful for both Poland and Russia. This is also noted in the concept. With all the ferocity of pre-war repressions and the cruelty of war, the mass execution of prisoners of war is a unique event for the USSR. Where did the opponent see the justification for the murder of these unfortunates or the raising of the question of “fair historical retribution” (formulation, by the way, by Mr. Bershtein)? We initially noted that we were trying to present the motivation for the authorities’ actions. On Stalin's part, the execution of captured Poles was a response to the death of tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers in Polish captivity after the 1920 war. There is a document about this in the textbook. Don't students need to know this position? But to agree with her or not is another question. Moreover, we are talking about a textbook for high school, where students are required to develop their own point of view.

What is striking in the article is the passage that “the history that is offered for study is, first of all, the history of power. There is no history of people there. All that remained were the goals and means of the state. And although the word “justification” does not appear, in many ways this is precisely the story of the justification of means.” It seems that this entire article was written for the sake of this phrase. Yes, the history of power in the upcoming textbook, in fact, occupies a place adequate to the role of the state in the life of Russia. But whoever is not blind sees that in the published textbook on the history of Russia 1945-2008. the history of culture, everyday life, and the role of man himself are given such attention as never before. In the history textbook 1900-1945. these stories occupy even more space. These plots and approaches to them are spelled out in the concept. But, alas, it was they who for some reason turned out to be unnoticed by A. Bershtein.

No less striking is the thesis that “the concept of a history textbook comes into direct conflict with current legislation.” The contradiction lies in the fact that the authors emphasize “non-recognition of the fact of totalitarianism in the USSR,” and in the preamble of the “still not repealed” RSFSR law “On the rehabilitation of victims of political repression,” one phrase speaks of “the arbitrariness of a totalitarian state.” We don’t know whether this will be news for A. Bershtein, but some laws of the USSR from pre-war times have not yet been repealed and are still in effect. Should we also take their preambles as guidance? Or will A. Bershtein agree that legislation on issues not related to education should have nothing to do with education? And in general to the content of education, and, in particular, to discussions about totalitarianism?

It's sad, but true - many of our opponents prefer that history textbooks again divide characters into “us” and “strangers”, and in relation to their own past they act not as a dispassionate chronicler, but as a prosecutor. And, according to the old tradition, they try to criticize something that does not yet exist.

Our advice to opponents: do not rush to assessments and conclusions. At least until the text of the textbook is published. There's not long to wait. Be patient.

DANILOV Alexander Anatolyevich , head of the department of history of the Moscow State Pedagogical University, editor of the textbook “History of Russia 1900-1945.”
FILIPOV Alexander Vyacheslavovich , Deputy Director of the National Foreign Policy Laboratory, editor of the textbook “History of Russia 1900-1945.”