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Страницу подготовили Анатолий БЕРШТЕЙН и Дмитрий КАРЦЕВ
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White alternative
Subjunctive mood
The famous American historian Hugh Trevor-Roper in 1980, in an article with the eloquent title “History and Imagination,” decided to rehabilitate the subjunctive mood in history. “History,” he wrote, “is not only what happened; it is what happened in the context of what could happen. Therefore, it must include possible alternatives as an integral element.”
On its historical path, Russia has passed through many, as they now say, “bifurcation points,” that is, forks in the road when the country’s history could have taken a completely different path. One of the most dramatic forks in Russian history is the Civil War.
Knowing about the disastrous results of the confrontation with the Reds for the White movement, historians, as a rule, focus on the reasons for the defeat of the anti-Bolshevik forces. Meanwhile, there is another aspect of history: what would await Russia if the white armies cleared the country of red revolutionaries? Triumph of democracy or grim military dictatorship? Liberal reforms or restoration of autocracy? Reconstruction of the empire or the final collapse of the country? The leaders of the white forces said, and most importantly, did enough to try to answer at least some of these questions.
Without a king in my head
Calling whites “counter-revolutionaries” has become a habit over the decades. Soviet historiography offered its help in finding the necessary clarifications, suggesting the “right” thing: the Whites were reactionaries who dreamed of the return of the damned Romanovs. Little has changed in this sense in recent years, except that the Romanovs began to be called “saints” instead of “damned”, and the conviction in the strict connection of the White movement with the monarchy has not disappeared.
Meanwhile, from this familiar definition there also arose an addiction to the idea that the opponents of the Bolsheviks were enemies of the revolution in general. But this stereotype very inaccurately reflects reality. In fact, most of the leaders of the White movement were far from the idea of restoring the Romanov monarchy. It is known, however, that almost all white rulers turned to Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich for patronage, but this was mainly a symbolic act that was of greater importance for “PR” than for real politics. Believing that among the representatives of the former dynasty there were no charismatic personalities capable of uniting the country, the leaders of the anti-Bolshevik coalition preferred to rely on their own strength. To substantiate his position, Anton Denikin, for example, argued that there was no need to raise monarchist banners and standards, since this would only provoke a struggle for power in the White movement and distract from the main thing - military victory over the Red Army.
Of course, powerful monarchist propaganda was going on inside “White Russia”. “The people are waiting for the tsar and will follow the one who promises to return him,” Denikin’s commander in Ukraine Fyodor Keller publicly stated. The chairman of the last State Duma, Mikhail Rodzianko, echoed him: “In the days of the collapse of the state, firm power is needed, and such power can only be a tsar.”
However, at the highest official level they decided to return to the monarchical idea only at the end of the Civil War, in 1922, when the fate of the country was virtually sealed. On the very outskirts of Russia, in Vladivostok, a Zemsky Sobor was convened, proclaiming the house of the Romanovs “reigning.” The slogan of the last white army was the traditional Russian: “For faith, tsar and fatherland!” But it was already too late: only a few months had passed since Primorye was captured by the Bolsheviks.
Before the coastal events, the main ideological hobby of the whites was the promise to convene a Constituent Assembly.
"Managed Democracy"
“For a great, free, democratic Russia” is one of the main slogans of the white idea. According to it, the future Russia should become a democratic state in the best Western European traditions, adapted to the realities of Russian political life. The shades could be different, but everyone agreed with the basic principles: power comes from the people and is exercised by bodies elected by the people; in Russia all class and estate advantages should be eliminated; to ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, as well as the political status of various nationalities, taking into account their culture and political traditions. “A new free Russia,” said Kolchak, “will be created on the unity of government power with the people.” Denikin echoed him, albeit from emigration: “After the inevitable, but short-term struggle of different political movements, a normal system would be established in Russia, based on the principles of law, freedom and private property.”
This whole structure had one significant feature, due to which the liberal colors somewhat faded. The fact is that the creation of a democratic Russia was postponed indefinitely. Moreover, the white leaders believed that the Constituent Assembly was possible only if it met their ideas of what it should be. “The Constituent Assembly will be convened only if,” one of the White Army commanders declared very frankly, “if guarantees are created that it will not entail the dictatorship of the proletariat.”
Kolchak, in turn, argued that the convening of the Constituent Assembly was possible only after all of Russia had been cleared of the Bolsheviks, but he reserved the right to gather popular representation, promising to disperse any body that gathered arbitrarily. Moreover, when choosing a meeting, he was going to focus exclusively on those whom he himself considered “state healthy elements.” “This is the kind of democrat I am,” Kolchak summed up his program for the future structure of Russia.
Many modern researchers believe that the Civil War in Russia was a war of two revolutions - the February and October. Allegedly, the White movement defended the achievements of the February Revolution: human rights and freedoms, democracy - from the encroachments of the Bolshevik government. In fact, the picture was much more complicated. Not being supporters of the restoration of the monarchy, the white rulers were cool, if not suspicious, towards liberal values. And their ability to compromise with the “conquests of February” was very, very limited. This is especially clearly demonstrated by the attitude of whites to federalism.
Federation banned
When talking about the reasons for the defeat of the whites, usually the first thing that comes to mind is disunity. But the more disagreements there were within the movement, the louder its main, unifying slogan sounded - “For a united and indivisible Russia!” True, there was a problem with this beautiful formula, which appeared several years before the start of the Civil War. The fact is that the “indivisibility” of Russia was destroyed primarily by those who, like the whites, did not accept Bolshevik power: Poland, Finland, Ukraine. And here it was necessary to decide what was more important: ideology or real politics? Should they unite with those whom they considered destroyers of the country, in the name of victory over a common enemy? Or should we not compromise our principles?
We chose the principle: “there should be no accomplices in the division of Russia.” As a result, for example, General Denikin canceled all amnesties granted to the population by local authorities, equated any separatism with high treason, and at the same time - unofficially - banned the use of the word “federation” on his territory. And Admiral Kolchak, in turn, refused the help of Baron Mannerheim in the fight for Petrograd. In exchange for an army of 100,000, he asked to recognize “merely” the independence of Finland, and also to raise the question of self-determination for Karelia. And one of Kolchak’s associates, in response to the Buryat’s request for self-government, imposed a resolution: “I wish I could flog you!”
It is not difficult to imagine the fate of Russian federalism if, in spite of everything, the white cause triumphed. For many years, the dream of a “federation of free peoples” would be over. It can be assumed that the new rulers of the country would be seriously tempted to restore the empire within its “historical” borders. Then it would have been impossible to avoid a war, say, with Poland (it is curious that the Bolsheviks, under the guise of expanding the cause of the world revolution, nevertheless unleashed such a war) and with Finland. Which, undoubtedly, would delay peace in Russia for an indefinite period.
To whom the white government never guaranteed peace at all, it was the Jewish population.
The White Answer to the Jewish Question
In the autumn and winter of 1919-1920, Anton Denikin's troops staged a series of pogroms throughout Ukraine. Although Denikin himself was not an anti-Semite and considered the pogroms senseless and corrupting the army, neither he nor his inner circle did practically anything to prevent them. Both the obvious and the incredible were used to justify the pogroms. Thus, Jews were accused without evidence of shooting them in the back during the retreat of volunteers (such an accusation was made in Fastov, Bila Tserkva, during the so-called “quiet” pogrom in Kyiv in early October 1919 and in other places).
The official information agency (Osvag) and many press organs conducted pogrom propaganda in the territory controlled by Denikin, distributing, for example, false information about “Jewish units” allegedly fighting in the Red Army. The commanders of the Volunteer Army responded with silence to numerous requests from Jewish delegations to stop the pogroms. The only thing that somehow saved the Jews was the public opinion of the allies - England and France. Individual measures to protect Jews from pogroms were carried out only to reassure Western countries. The British representative at Denikin’s headquarters threatened that if the pogroms were not stopped, the Volunteer Army could “lose the sympathy of all of Europe.”
At the beginning of October 1919, thanks to the intervention of representatives of foreign powers and fear of the corrupting influence of the pogroms, the army command began to apply various punishments to the pogromists, including execution (about ten people were executed). Only this could stop the pogrom wave. And on January 23, 1920, when the Volunteer Army had already left almost all the territories where Jews lived, Denikin finally issued an order to combat violence and robbery. Moreover, pogroms were not specifically mentioned in the order.
So the whites were in no hurry and were late with almost any of their political actions - not only on the Jewish question. On many issues, the whites behaved as if they had a lot of free time: they delayed solving the problem of government, were in no hurry to resolve the national issue, but perhaps their main mistake was that they never found the strength to admit what had happened in 1917, property was redistributed. The whites' policy towards the peasantry was half-hearted and inconsistent.
According to Stolypin's recipes
In the spring of 1919, the Kolchak government declared an amnesty to everyone who had seized the land by that time. At the same time, the Omsk leadership left specific decisions regarding the land issue to the local authorities, which in practice meant the absence of any unified policy on the peasant issue, and therefore the desire of the peasants to fight for this policy. Moreover, this policy itself was inconsistent.
Literally a few days after the amnesty, Kolchak issued a special “Certificate of the Supreme Ruler on the Land.” On the one hand, it guaranteed that the harvest of 1919 would go to the peasants, but on the other hand, it categorically forbade them to occupy new lands and referred the final resolution of the land issue to the jurisdiction of the Constituent Assembly. That is, into a distant future incomprehensible to the peasants.
Denikin advanced further than others in agricultural reforms. His government was going to act in the spirit of Stolypin's reforms. The bet was placed on a “strong man”. In the territories controlled by General Denikin, the issue of land ownership was supposed to be resolved within two years. After this time, the land had to be forcibly alienated in favor of the peasants. The old owners were supposed to leave forests, estates, mineral resources, and land plots of 150 to 400 acres. At the same time, all lands leased from landowners were forcibly transferred to the peasants.
Denikin's law was undoubtedly very progressive. More progressive even than Stolypin’s legislation. The problem, however, was that all this was no longer enough for the peasants. Trying to protect as much as possible the old owners of the land - the landowners - Denikin dug his own grave. To carry out Stolypin's reforms, Denikin needed at least “Stolypin carriages” and “Stolypin ties.” And a peaceful rear. Denikin could not boast of this. It was the peasant resistance in the rear that largely prevented him from occupying Moscow in the summer of 1919.
Probably, if the White movement had won, the redistribution of property would have occurred anyway. Otherwise, they would have faced a full-scale peasant war. It was she, by the way, who forced the same Bolsheviks at the end of the Civil War, when the Whites were already virtually defeated, to agree to certain relaxations of their own peasant policy.
In practice, the half-hearted decisions of the white rulers caused general discontent. Among the peasants - because they did not receive the much desired land. The landowners - because they did not wait for real guarantees of the inviolability of their property. Only Baron Peter Wrangel, who relied on the peasantry, decided to cut this Gordian knot.
Baron Wrangel's Other Russia
“The land belongs to the owners who work on it,” Wrangel proclaimed on May 25, 1920. The essence of his agrarian reform was the preservation of the status quo - “the protection of all land use, as it has been established to date, from violations, violence, seizures” and the expansion of peasant farming - “the transfer of state-owned lands suitable for farming to the working owners of the land.” and privately owned." At the same time, on the ground, all specific decisions had to be made by those selected from among the peasants themselves. Wrangel was the first of the non-Bolshevik leaders who decided on such large-scale transformations.
He generally stood out from the general ranks of white rulers. Although it started out a little awkwardly. In his first address to the people, he almost bluntly used the famous expression of Nicholas II “master of the Russian land” in relation to himself, leaving no doubt about his ambitions. “Help me, Russian people, save the Motherland!” - Wrangel called. However, realizing that such frankness caused real confusion, he soon made a reservation that by “master” he meant a popularly elected ruler.
It was said about Wrangel that he carried out “left-wing policies with right hands.” He recognized the achievements of the Russian revolution, among which the main one was the right of peasants to land, but at the same time he actually put an end to even talk about democratic reforms. At the same time, Wrangel believed that the main danger to the White movement came not from the people, as other leaders of the movement, by default, believed, but from their immediate circle - nobles, industrialists, merchants - yesterday's masters of life, not ready to accept change. His “soft dictatorship” was directed primarily against them.
Wrangel's ideologists put forward the “theory of two Russias.” In accordance with it, the liberation of most of old Russia from the Bolsheviks was postponed indefinitely. “White Russia” was supposed to become a “competing project” that would gradually win over the residents of “Red Russia” to its side. Unlike Denikin, who believed that Russia would be saved only after a final military victory, Wrangel proposed a parallel alternative. At the same time, the baron decided to recognize the independence of the regions that had broken away from the former empire - Finland, Poland and some others. He even entered into an agreement with the Ukrainian hetman Pavel Skoropadsky, based on the principle “even with the devil against the Bolsheviks.”
However, all these interesting decisions of Wrangel were again too late. The Finns and Poles were no longer going to interfere in Russian affairs, Skoropadsky had no influence in Ukraine, and the Red Army easily defeated Wrangel’s Crimean army. The last White Guard project failed before it even really began.
Russian fascism?
Today, one can often hear the opinion that the victory of the white ones would mean the offensive in Russia of the military dictatorship of the fascist type. The first to speak about this, oddly enough, the white emigrants themselves spoke. One of the ideologists of Eurasianism Dmitry Svyatopolk-Mirsky In the early 1920s, he called the white movement “black Westernism of the Russian reaction” and directly compared it with Italian fascism. Even more definitely expressed the now popular philosopher and one of the ideologists of the White Ivan Ilyin. In 1933, in his infamous (actually apologetic) article “National Socialism. New Spirit ”He wrote:“ ... in a word-this spirit, the one who has a tender German National Socialism with Italian fascism. However, not only with him, but also with the spirit of the Russian white movement. ”
Indeed, quite a lot in the practice of the White movement related to him with future fascist regimes. First of all, both were based on the dictatorship. The role of the ruler was decisive. This combined flirting with national feelings and an almost undisguised passion for anti -Semitism. In addition, the enormous power in the "White Russia" received exorbitantly bloated by the state of special services.
But in fact, the similarity ends. Almost nowhere - with the exception of, perhaps, the Wrangel Crimea - there was no leader in the leader. There was no need to talk about any leadership in the white movement. It should not be misleading, in particular, the high title of Admiral Kolchak - the Supreme Ruler of Russia. His real powers were significantly limited by the Council of Ministers, without a visa of which no decision was considered adopted. He himself emphasized in every possible way that his power is a “constitutional dictatorship”, “dictatorship in the name of democracy”.
Parties like fascist in Italy or National Socialist in Germany in “White Russia” did not exist. By the way, the absence of any clear structure largely determined the internal instability of white modes-they were deprived of a powerful organizational support that the same Bolsheviks could boast of. Finally, the nationalism of the whites was of a completely different character than that of the European extreme right. They were not ethnic Russian nationalists - they were patriots of the empire, where the Russian people belonged to the dominant, but not overwhelming role. In this sense, the whites were similar to the ideologists of the British empire - with their "burden of a white man."
If you try to enter the white movement in the global context, then, apparently, it is worth talking about its similarity to military dictatorships, established, for example, in 1919 in Hungary after the admiral of Admiral Horte or, later, already in the late 30s, already in the late 30s , in Spain under General Franco. True, being ideologically very conservative, these military dictators nevertheless carried out modernizing reforms in their countries. Without disdaining the political terror against the opposition.
As for the whites in Russia, then, having promised democracy after the victory over the Bolsheviks, they probably would have sought it in the future. Although in real, not alternative history, they could not defeat the first and main barrier on their way - the Reds.