Efficiency as a myth. According to a well -known statement, Stalin "accepted the country with Sohu, but left with an atomic bomb." Therefore, its management methods are much more effective than market mechanisms, supporters of the active presence of the state in the economy believe. What actually stood behind the Stalinist “efficiency” - The New Times found out the largest specialist in political economy of Stalinism, professor at the University of Houston
The administrative-commanding system of economic management still has many supporters. As an argument, the achievements of Stalin's industrialization are given. How effective was this system?
At the initial stage of development of the country's economy, all decisions are quite simple: no steel - build metallurgical plants, there are no combines, trucks, and tractors - to establish their production. And the command system in this historical period coped with this kind of task.
However, after time, when the economy acquired a more developed character, more complex tasks began to arise before Stalin and its associates to choose alternative ways to develop the country and create new technologies, and they had to make decisions on thousands, and not hundreds, as before, names of products. The leaders of the Soviet Union coped with these tasks much worse, despite the use of the so -called “scientific planning method”.
It should be borne in mind that plans in the USSR were accepted on the principle of “from the achieved”: the desired production increase for the next year was attributed to the achieved economy indicators last year. Equipment, which was produced, say, in 1932, with minor changes was made after 50 years. And this system could not be changed.
Another problem was that the plan was very difficult and never clear, and the control numbers were superficial, too abstract. Based on archival documents, it can be argued that Stalin took indicators “from the ceiling” according to many aspects of the functioning of the economy, listening to his intuition or past experience. There was no “scientific planning” in the Soviet Union, as the documents show.
Public rituals
Why then did you need to introduce a five -year plan?
Five -year planes were important public rituals. In fact, they were an instrument of propaganda, with the help of which the country's leadership brought the vision of the desired future to the people. For example, in the 1930s, power used them to explain to people why and for which such sacrifices are required from a Soviet person. It is important to understand that the plan as a set of tasks for production, assortment, quality, cost of goods, etc. I did not have much importance. In the 1930s, the work of enterprises was planned for only two indicators: the volume of production and the assortment. The decision -making system was built by such way to avoid final decisions.
The country's leadership did not have sufficient and reliable information on the basis of which they could make effective decisions. Everything, starting from the very top and ending with the leaders of some workshops, were interested in concealing or distorting data. The economy cannot function successfully in such conditions. Therefore, plans changed so often and were not implemented. This was the weakest feature of the Soviet economic system.
But still, the Soviet Union achieved impressive results ...
What cost? Collectivization killed agriculture. Forced industrialization created huge industrial capital, which was ultimately used incorrectly. For example, in 1933, the number of cattle fell by 60% compared to 1928. And livestock is a drain force, which was then replenished with tractors, that is, resources from the city went back to the village. Moreover, the volume was still failed to restore the necessary agriculture. The high, by Western standards, the level of investment, which was recorded at the beginning of the Stalinist rule, led to the rapid development of the economy, but then a long decline in the economy, which ended in stagnation, came. Before collectivization, your country was the second in the world for the production and export of agricultural products, and after thirty years she was forced to import bread.
The growth rate of GDP of the USSR in the 1930s coincided with the growth rate of a number of European countries, the USA and even Latin America. Is it so?
Indeed, many Western countries and a number of Latin American states grew by about 5% annually, and industrial growth was about 11%. At the same time, in these countries there was no large terror, no collectivization, no guile. The camps were generally unprofitable "enterprises".
Why?
The leadership of the camps spent a living minimum on the prisoners. The convicts were supposed to cover these costs, and they covered the costs of their content, but nothing more. The performance of the prisoner was approximately equal to one tenth from the performance of a free employee, so this system was extremely ineffective. People had no incentives to work better and better. It was no accident that after the death of the leader with this kind of camps it was decided to end.
Do not stand out, do not risk
Is it possible to trust data regarding the USSR in the Stalin period?
Yes. Surprisingly, you had much more statistical information about the functioning of the economy at that time than in the West. Moreover, we double -checked a number of indicators by our models.
In the book “The Political Savings of Stalinism” you claim that there was no consent between planning and manufacturers and the struggle constantly went between them ...
In science, this situation is called the problem of "principal-agent." Stalin wanted enterprises to produce products with minimal costs. He gave instructions and demanded from his subordinates the execution of instructions. Local manufacturers were much better than Stalin and his associates knew the situation and had the opportunity to deceive the dictator, overestimating, for example, the volume of the required resources. So that no one is injured, everyone begins to lie: manufacturers-that they released so many and so many products, addicts confirm this data (so that they do not touch the punishing hand of the leader), and so on the chain to the Politburo. Therefore, when plans were compiled and they were implemented, there was a bargain at all levels of power.
Moreover, the strategy of people of that time was not to stand out and not to take risks. And this never contributes to the search, which means the innovative nature of the development of the economy. There are no innovations - there are no changes, there are no changes - the system is preserved and becomes immune to changes in the world around them.
Paul Gregori is a doctor of economic sciences, the head of the study of the Soviet State and Party Archives at the Guver Institute of War, Peace and Revolutions (University Stanford), President of the Association of Comparative Economic Research. The author of many books and articles devoted to the functioning of the Soviet economy and bureaucracy, including: The Political Economy of Stalinism ("Political Saving of Stalinism"), Restrting the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy ("Transformation of the Soviet economic bureaucracy"). Freely speak Russian and German.
