Manager instead of patriarch

In 10 days, the election of the head of the Russian Orthodox Church will begin in Moscow

An effective crisis manager” should head the Moscow Patriarchate, argues authoritative deacon and professor Andrei Kuraev, who is echoed by church media. The most "effective, athletic and positive" in the Russian Orthodox Church is its current ...

An effective crisis manager” should head the Moscow Patriarchate, argues authoritative deacon and professor Andrei Kuraev, who is echoed by church media. The most “effective, athletic and positive” in the Russian Orthodox Church is its current temporary head, the patriarchal locum tenens, Metropolitan Kirill (Gundyaev). We haven't seen any other candidates on Russian TV for a month and a half. And in the meantime, they are...

In 10 days, the Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church will start in Moscow, which, in addition to bishops and priests, will bring together governors, directors of circuses and banks, tobacco magnates and fashion models elected by delegates from different dioceses. Should we expect a sensation from them?

Candidates by position: active and silent

Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill (Gundyaev) without interruptions for the New Year and Christmas holidays is conducting his extremely electoral campaign. Most Russians who are interested in the church no longer doubt his future patriarchate. This is evidenced by the data of various kinds of Internet ratings on sites specially created for the "popular vote for the patriarch."

In the inner-church environment, Kirill has a very ambiguous reputation. The most neutral epithet given to him by the church people is "Minister of Foreign Affairs." Kirill heads the Department for External Church Relations, a key agency of the Moscow Patriarchate, and is known for his harsh negotiating methods with other local churches. But the metropolitan is more widely known by his title Tobacco, because he gained true fame in the mid-1990s thanks to publications on the multibillion-dollar volumes of cigarettes imported duty-free into Russia as humanitarian aid. (Money from the sale of cigarettes, by decree of B. Yeltsin, went to support the church.) Then there were scandals: vodka, car, crab ... As a result, Metropolitan Kirill won a stable reputation as the richest man in the Russian Orthodox Church and ... distrust of the Kremlin. President Putin, when creating the Public Chamber, defiantly included not Metropolitan Kirill in its membership, but his main opponent, Metropolitan Kliment (Kapalin), who manages the affairs of the patriarchate. So Clement, who occupies the Kaluga diocese, became candidate number two to succeed Alexy II.

They say that the late patriarch for the tough and powerful Cyril was constantly looking for ways to balance him in the top church leadership with a figure comparable in influence. In 1996, in the wake of the tobacco scandal, the patriarch managed to restore the management of the affairs of the Moscow Patriarchate by appointing Metropolitan Sergius (Fomin) as its head. This hierarch turned out to be too complacent and a few years later Sergius was sent to Voronezh. His main partner, Metropolitan Methodius (Nemtsov), the only hierarch whose fortune could in any way compete with Kirillov's, was exiled even further, to Kazakhstan. The tough but silent Metropolitan Clement became the new manager of affairs.

It was the habit of non-publicity, maximum secrecy that served Clement not the best service in the patriarchal election campaign. After Clement, through his brother, Archbishop of Tobolsk Dimitry (Kapalin), tried to organize in several dioceses and even at the Moscow Theological Academy the election of the delegates he needed to the Local Council, an armor-piercing gun was rolled out against the manager of affairs. Compromising evidence on the Kapalin family, mainly on the brother of the Metropolitan, began to appear non-stop on an Internet forum that was very popular among Orthodox users. Among the horrifying accusations against Archbishop Dimitry are detailed stories about the suicide of three Tobolsk seminarians and about the relics of Tobolsk hierarchs being immured in concrete during the restoration of the cathedral.

The very first "revelations" shocked even the administration of Andrey Kuraev's forum, whose rules prohibit public criticism of specific clergymen. The Trinity-Sergius Lavra, which provided its server to host the forum, initially blocked access to it. But, according to Kuraev, the Lavra leadership was put under pressure by one person, whose name the deacon “is even afraid to say,” and now the revelations continue.

Beam of light from Ukraine

However, while the Moscow heavyweights — the “Minister of Foreign Affairs” and the “Prime Minister” (perhaps, it would be most appropriate to call the manager of departments) of the Patriarchate — were grappling, a heavyweight was rising from behind the Russian-Ukrainian border shrouded in natural gas, whose nomination as a candidate for patriarchs confused everything cards to Moscow church politicians. At the very end of December, the Ukrainian episcopate of the Moscow Patriarchate nominated Metropolitan Vladimir (Sabodan) of Kyiv as their candidate for patriarch. He is a heavyweight not only because he heads almost half of all the parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate and, at the same time, serves in a place independent of the Kremlin. Metropolitan Vladimir was a candidate for patriarch at the Local Council of 1990, where he reached the last round, where he lost only 13 votes out of more than 500 votes to the victorious Alexy. This candidacy has a number of advantages over both Cyril and Clement.

Unlike Cyril, Metropolitan Vladimir did not participate in financial transactions. In contrast to Metropolitan Kirill's tough manner of serving and preaching, Vladimir serves softly and speaks softly. There is no significant “compromising evidence” against him, and his demonstrative independence only makes him a more attractive candidate for broad church circles. Unlike Kliment, Vladimir cannot be called a non-public figure. In the conditions of free competition of religious denominations, including various Orthodox churches, in modern democratic Ukraine, Vladimir is forced to constantly appear in the media, and often in a polemic mode.

Here it is worth noting that the Ukrainian episcopate of the Moscow Patriarchate has a "blocking stake" in voting for the patriarch. According to the charter of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2000, the patriarch is actually elected by 2/3 of the votes of the bishops. Formally, of course, all the councilors vote for him, but the results of their voting come into force only after the approval of those same 2/3 of the votes of the bishops. The Ukrainian episcopate has the right to vote at the Moscow Council, but this episcopate was formed without any participation of Moscow - the hierarchs in Ukraine are appointed by their own synod in Kyiv. A situation that is somewhat paradoxical for the Russian Orthodox Church is emerging - the fate of the Moscow Patriarchal Throne is decided by persons whose election and appointment the Moscow Patriarchate has nothing to do with.

This weekend in Kyiv, the Council of the Ukrainian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is being held, at which all the delegates of the Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, elected from the Ukrainian dioceses, are present. They agree on a common tactic of behavior at the Cathedral in Moscow. The following scenario is not ruled out: if the vote reaches a dead end, then the Ukrainian delegation will agree to grant the Ukrainian Church canonical autocephaly (complete independence from Moscow), having received it, leave the Cathedral and elect its own patriarch in Kiev. In this case, the election of the Moscow Patriarch will continue without any participation of the "Ukrainian element" - it is good that Russia's relations with Ukraine are now, to put it mildly, unfriendly. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine that Metropolitan Kirill, as locum tenens of the patriarchal throne, he will preside over the Council, will go to the expense of losing 11,000 parishes for the sake of his own election as head of the rest of the ROC.

There is no place left for craft

Outside the first three most likely candidates for patriarchs are hierarchs less known, but also with ambitions. For example, an employee of the Belarusian Exarchate told the author how Minsk Metropolitan Filaret (Vakhromeev) hints in every possible way to his entourage that he is preparing to move to Moscow. If not for the extremely close ties and dependence on Lukashenka, this candidate could well suit the Kremlin. In Internet voting, the second place behind Metropolitan Kirill is occupied by the little-known in Moscow Archbishop of Tomsk Rostislav (Devyatov). He is presented as a kind of ideal of an ascetic monk who, having become a patriarch, will finally separate the church from politics. If the Kremlin decides that the final choice of the patriarch should be postponed, the senior permanent members of the Synod, Metropolitans Yuvenaly (Poyarkov) of Krutitsy and Vladimir (Kotlyarov) of St. Petersburg, may also come forward as transitional figures. Theoretically, according to the charter, almost 150 bishops can lay claim to the patriarchal throne and put forward their candidacies...

“And where in all this politics and intrigues is there a place for the will of God, for His all-good Providence?” the pious reader will exclaim. It is in the ancient tradition to choose the patriarch by lot from the three candidates who received the largest number of votes at the Council. Thus, in 1917, the holy Patriarch Tikhon was chosen.