"Juan Carlos" and his government

The most, in my opinion, responsible and conceptually accurate formulation of the existential problem of the existential problem of the Council of the National Assembly - an organization, is extremely friendly by the Kremlin propaganda, the liberal public, and the Communist Party as a gathering of marginal radicals.

First, a few words about my understanding of the phenomenon on. This is by no means a meeting of people who claim to declare themselves political power, such as the National Assembly in France in 1789. This is not the unification of political like -minded people, such as, for example, "Democratic Russia" in 1990.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to observe a research model of a structure, which is currently currently for known reasons. This structure is called a freely chosen Russian parliament. Like any model, it is far from reality. Members of the Assembly were selected according to rather conditional procedures. But at the same time, it allows you to study important aspects of this reality. The people gathered in people of very different political beliefs, who first learn to simply talk to each other, and then develop general documents and decisions.

The Assembly has no power other than the opportunity to convince society of the correctness of its assessments and recommendations. And it completely exhausts its function when the country can choose a real parliament in honest democratic elections provided for by the current constitution.

But at first, as rightly emphasized in the "Council of Council of Council to overcome the systemic crisis of Russian statehood", it is necessary to "dismantle the Putin regime while maintaining the foundations of Russian statehood."

I have long said about the Putin regime that I could to the best of my weak forces. Free, free, finally. Much brighter, more talented, deeper, larger, thinner, wiser, mercilessly criticized by Budbergs and Leontyevs , Svanidze and Remchukov , malice and training , insights and rapidly seeing. There are more and more of them every day. And this is the most correct evidence that historically Putinism survives its last days.

Let's better dwell on the second part of the formula on - "while maintaining the foundations of Russian statehood."

The third time over the past century, Russia has been rapidly drawn into a funnel of the decay of the insolvent already at the beginning of the 20th century, and even more so in the XXI century the same political model of a stupid administrative vertical, a lack of freedom. Twice - in 1917 and 1991 - its collapse was accompanied by the collapse of the state - the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.

If both the power and the opposition responsibly understood the general national task facing them - the dismantling of the regime while maintaining statehood - the history of Russia would be completely different. But she was what she was.

Having easily broken the state, we both times painstakingly and stubbornly restored the political regime according to the patterns of the same bankrupt model, albeit under other ideological clothes.

For the first time, this was done with almost religious mass enthusiasm. Communism was the greatest misconception of mankind, and a tragic mission fell to Russia at the cost of tens of millions of ruined lives to this delusion experimentally refuted.

But if the history of the Soviet Union is a Shakespearean tragedy of a global scale, then the history of Putinism is the vulgar and disgusting provincial farce. Putinism was a wretched philosophy of the waste of the Soviet system - the lower ranks of the St. Petersburg first departments and the funny Dresden residency, called up to power by the Yeltsin oligarchs to protect their "social conquests" and stunned from stolen billions.

A jewelry operation to remove a cancer tumor of Putinism is needed, retaining the viability of the state body. In this regard, the statement of the Council on suggests:

*1. Immediate resignation of the Government of the Russian Federation.

1. Dissolution of the illegitimate and unprogavaled Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

2. The formation for the period of 6-12 months of the responsible government for the current leadership of the national economy of Russia and the Committee on Political Reform.

In the specified time, the responsible government will be obliged to lay the Russian exiting base from the crisis, immediately stopping the stooping of state property, primarily budget and extra -budgetary funds, and create a mechanism for targeted social assistance to needing citizens of the country. This government should provide real and equal to all freedom of access to the media, including television and broadcasting.*

As is understood in the practical plan "preserving the foundations of statehood" in the resignation of the government and the dissolution of the Federal Assembly? The answer to this question is not directly formulated in the statement, but it is clearly implied - preserving the institution of presidency as a cementing basis of Russian statehood.

But what is Medvedev more legitimate than an illegitimate federal meeting, and unless he was appointed Putin, they can ask irreconcilable oppositionists. I will answer, and he is really appointed Putin - just as Juan Carlos was appointed Franco.

But, firstly, any power in the end is a kind of conventionality, the readiness of a certain number of people for one or another reasonable for them and for the country as a whole to recognize it with power. And secondly, the scale of the systemic crisis experienced by Russia is such that for each of us, its citizens, including Medvedev, it is important not who he was in his former life, but what he can do today to preserve his country.

GG. Putin, Gryzlov and Mironov and the structures they heads can do nothing. Medvedev, personifying today the institution of presidency, leaving under other names deep roots in Russian historical consciousness, may or not to do a lot.

He can appoint with the consent of the Duma before it was dissolved (I assure you, the vegetables will be for all consonants) responsible government and maintain the functioning of the state mechanism with it during the transition period (before the election of the new Federal Assembly) in order to prevent the country's collapse. Or maybe, due to the duty of fidelity to a narrow clan or for some other considerations of a personal nature, to remain to the end with a hostage of a self-destructive regime.

Once on the Russian throne, like many of his predecessors, quite by accident, Medvedev no longer belongs to himself or the Putin organized group who appointed him. He was appointed as a funny king, but an unexpected course of events gave him a considerable power over the future. If it remains part of a cancer tumor, then the risks for a state organism will increase repeatedly. The transition process with a high degree of probability can break into uncontrollable chaos.

While we see on the TV of the boy Kai, bewitched by the Snow Queen of Power. In an icy tone, he strictly reports to “marginal dessions of margins about democracy” and importantly discusses the architecture of the global financial system and about the new European security structure, on the current projects of which he is now working intensely.

But maybe after a trip to Spain, a boy Kai wants to walk a little not on Uncle Volodya, but on the uncle of Juan Carlos. Or a sense of history will wake up in it. Providence sometimes in difficult minutes for Russian statehood can be graciously towards her.

Application:

The demand for the government’s resignation was nominated not only on, but also by other organizations, meetings of citizens and public figures. Without presentation of the composition of the responsible government, however, all these proposals are abstract. Expecting perfectly how ungrateful this topic is and what fire I call on myself, I nevertheless take a chance to offer a working version of the list of key members of the office. Someone should start the necessary discussion. I did not discuss this list with anyone, not excluding the gentlemen listed below, with some of which I have no honor to be familiar personally.

Prime Minister

Mikhail Kasyanov

Minister of Economic Development
Grigory Yavlinsky

Minister of Industry

Mikhail Delyagin

Minister of Energy
Mikhail Khodorkovsky

Minister of Finance
Cergea Aleksashenko

Minister of Social Security
Evgeny Gontmamer

Minister of Labor
Alexey Zagarin

Minister of Science and Education

Valery Rubakov

Minister of Culture
Vladimir Sorokin

Foreign Minister

Yuri Ushakov

Minister of Defense
Alexander Sharavin

Minister of the Interior

Mikhail Grishankov

Minister of Justice
Sergey Pashin

Director of the FSB
Alexey Kondaurov

Minister for Media Affairs
Alexey Venediktov

All offered figures are quite known in a professional environment and do not need my recommendations. I will touch only the post of prime minister. The only, but the decisive advantage of Mikhail Kasyanov over other no less worthy candidates is that he will need relatively less time to master the levers of management with a huge bureaucratic machine. For a government forced to act largely in the fire brigade mode, this is the most important circumstance.