New split

When the fall of markets, the devaluation of the ruble and bankruptcy of enterprises did not end, but suspended, it is time to think about the future.

It is curious that some lull in the deployment of the crisis became the reason for the discussion between the unexpectedly manifested two groups inside the government and the state apparatus as a whole - between those who believe that the danger has passed, and those who believe that the danger is still ahead. This dispute, like many others, hides behind not only the difference in expert assessments, but also the discrepancy between interests within the Russian elite.

Discussion about the "second wave"

Recently, representatives of the political and financial elite have made conflicting statements about the “current moment”. So, for example, the First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov suggested that “ we are already below or are already close to the lower point. We have the feeling that by the end of the year there may be growth . ” A similar point of view is protected by the First Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank (Central Bank) Alexei Ulyukaev , according to which the “ acute phase (crisis) has been passed. We are in the macroeconomic balance. We may not really like him, but this is already a predictable situation . ” Chef Ulyukaeva, head of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation Sergey Ignatiev , speaking at the congress of the Association of Russian Banks, made even a more optimistic statement: “ I believe that the most acute phase of the economic crisis behind. I think that in the coming months it will resume, albeit slow, but growth of the economy . ” Ignatiev considers the basis for this the stabilization of world oil prices that exceeded the forecast of the Central Bank.

On the other hand, the assistant to the President of the Russian Federation Arkady Dvorkovich , commenting on the statement of the deputy chairman of the Central Bank, said: “ I agree with the assessment of Ulyukaev that the most acute phase of the crisis has been achieved, but this does not mean that the bottom has been achieved, this means that the slowdown will be more smooth .”

According to the forecast of Dvorkovich, the Russian economy will reach this bottom by mid -summer or by the fall, and this will be due to mass non -return of loans to banks. The head of the RSPP (“Trade Union of the Oligarchs”) Alexander Shokhin adheres to a similar point of view. The Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Sergei Ivanov, expressed very sharply in the same spirit: speaking of those people who declare that the bottom of the crisis was achieved, he called them " charlatans ." At the same time, he actually insulted his colleague Igor Shuvalov, but this remained tactfully not noticed.

However, the leader of the pessimists was and remains Minister of Finance of Russia Alexei Kudrin . He regularly acts with statements, the meaning of which boils down to the fact that “the worst is still ahead”: even if positive trends begin to be traced in the economy, Kudrin invariably comments: “ This is a temporary improvement ... In the near future there will be a new correction and a new decrease ... stock markets ... We will have a decrease in GDP growth .” Kudrin also sees the main problem in the peak of bank loans non -payments in late summer - early autumn of this year. At the same time, the Minister of Finance prefers to talk about the “second wave of crisis”, as if ignoring the threatening processes that have been taking place in the real sector since the beginning of March.

In fact, the wave awaiting Kudrin and Dvorkovich will be the third . The second it will be only for the financial market. This could not be paid attention to this - in the end, the terminological difference is not of fundamental importance - if it were not for the surprising indifference to the fate of the real sector of the economy, which is demonstrated by adherents of the monetarist school in the Russian government.

Bipard government

“ In recent months, within the framework of the still general state“ management company ”, two parties have been formed-“ short crisis ”and“ long crisis, ” said economist Nikita Krichevsky . - The first batch includes Igor Shuvalov, Igor Sechin, Sergey Chemezov and Elvira Nabiullina "joining them". The second batch is primarily included by Alexei Kudrin and Arkady Dvorkovich. ”

Krichevsky, like some other experts, believes that the key question in which the discussions are being conducted between the parties of the “short crisis” and “Long Crisis” is the redistribution of Russia's strategic reserves.

It is easy to guess that the “accountant” Kudrin is consistently opposed to any expenses on a penny of savings he accumulated. The funds of stabilization and reserve funds can be placed in American securities, lending to the US economy, you can invest in the IMF bonds (that Russia will probably go to this step, Arkady Dvorkovich said), can be lend to Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Mongolia, and the multi -billion dollar contributions to the EU anti -Crisis Foundation cannot be invested in Russian industry.

There is a certain reason in a similar approach: debts from the IMF or the CIS countries are hope sooner or later to cut off, and in the domestic economy, no matter how much invest, “they will still steal”. Industry is uncompetitive and is unlikely to become competitive in the next few months; Innovative mechanisms are not developed, which means that the money will go away at best to patch old gaps. However, this approach for many years has consistently excluded even the possibility of improving the situation within the country. In addition, as you know, the funds received from the sale of oil and gas and invested by the Ministry of Finance in American securities still fall into the country, only taken under high interest in the form of private or corporate loans by Russian business with American banks.

The second “party” really includes players closely related to industrial circles (sechins, Chesters), as well as consistent supporters of the modernization of the economy in the framework of “Program-2020” (Shuvalov, Nabiullina).

The ideology of this part of the “short crisis” party, which was formed long before the first wave of the crisis, is that the funds accumulated during oil and gas prosperity should be invested in the development of production, innovation, etc. Unfortunately, in a crisis, innovative models lose a significant part of their attractiveness.

The point here is not even that the funds allocated to save industry are necessarily “plundered” - they are more likely to “eat” them, trying to avoid a social explosion.

“ The provision of support to large enterprises with a large number of employees (workers.- K.B .) is a dead end ,” said Andrei Yakovlev, director of the Institute for Analysis of Enterprise and GU-VSHE markets. “ Because they will most likely simply“ eat ”money, saving jobs, but then new money will inevitably need .” It should be borne in mind that the top management of a number of large industrial enterprises that enjoyed the support of the state in calm pre-crisis years pursued an ill-conceived, risky policy, occupying huge amounts from banks for fabulous interest. Now these enterprises are in dire need of state support in order to at least somehow pay off the bills. An example is the sad fate of the Russian Machine Holding, which is part of the Empire of Oleg Deripaska. The conflict between Deripaska and the owner of Alfa-Bank Mikhail Friedman, who issued Bazel a billion dollars, was forced to resolve Dmitry Medvedev himself.

Now few doubts that the main problem of 2009 will be the impossibility of a significant part of the borrowers in the real sector to give the previously taken loans to banks. According to the Institute of Economics of the Transition period, now only 60 percent of entrepreneurs believe that they can pay for debts (bankers are more optimistic: according to the forecast of the head of VTB Andrei Kostin, in general, delay on loans in the Russian banking system will be 10-15 percent, for VTB will not exceed 8 percent).

What to do with "toxic assets"?

The discussion about the future of the Russian banking system, which unfolded in March 2009 between representatives of various groups, including the "parties of the long and short crisis," is of particular relevance. The former head of the Bank of Russia, a member of the Board of Directors of the VTB Capital Sergey Dubinin, a number of RSPP leaders (Alexander Shokhin, First Vice-President of the RSPP Alexander Murychev ) and some other experts and some other experts and some other experts and some other experts acted for creating a unified state structure, which would be engaged in “toxic assets”).

There is an unconfirmed information that the “pool of bad assets” was formed for the creation of such an exchange of views between the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, the First Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank, Alexei Ulyukaev, advocated. It should be noted that almost all supporters of the “pool of bad assets” belong to the “Party of the Short Crisis”.

The exception is Shokhin, who, like Kudrin, expects the “second wave” of the crisis in the fall of this year. However, this is the very exception that only confirms the rule: Shokhin veiledly accuses Kudrin that the “second wave” will be created by the Ministry of Finance artificially . He emphasizes that the money with which the state “pre -capitalizes” banks is too expensive, moreover, it is “ not enough, or the scheme for the pre -capitalization of banks is not entirely effective compared to the creation of a fund or institute”, buying “toxic assets”. It should be noted that the United States went along this path (creating Bad Bank).

Kudrin himself is a consistent opponent of creating a pool to redeem “toxic assets”. On March 25, 2009, speaking at the banking conference in Moscow, Kudrin announced that the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance do not see the need to create a “bad” asset fund and are ready to work separately with each bank. In this sense, the Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation is inclined to the European model, which involves painstaking individual work with each problem bank. However, it must be borne in mind that Russian “toxic assets” are seriously different from the Western ones. If in the USA and the EU, “toxic assets” are mainly understood the securities of problem companies, then in Russia the lion's share of “toxic assets” falls on issued loans, the quality of which is very difficult to evaluate in a short period of time.

“ If Russia followed the path of creating a pool to the purchase of“ toxic assets ”, then I admit that this would lead to a long-term stagnation of the Russian economy (in the world there was an analogy of this-Japan has bought“ toxic assets ”of financial and industrial holdings in the early 90s of the last century, which led to the fifteen years of stagnation of the Japanese economy ,” says Alexander Baranov.

Of course, any analogy is lame. However, it seems very likely that, having spent a lot of money on the purchase of problem loans, the state will not solve the problem of non -payments - after all, its roots go much deeper. The method, which is offered by supporters of the “short crisis” party will help survive medium and small banks, but is unlikely to save the real sector of the economy.

Darkness at the end of the tunnel

“ Believe that hundreds of banks will disappear before the end of the year ,” said Peter Aven, President of Alfa Bank, in an interview with Financial Times. It also predicts the crisis of non -payments in the third quarter of 2009 and calls the reason for this - a high refinancing rate, which the Central Bank supports at 15-19 percent. Banks, according to Aven, are simply forced to lend to borrowers under 25 ( really 27–29. - K.B.) interest, which makes loans expensive.

“ Perhaps the 20-30 largest banks will receive the help of the state ,” Aven said. According to the banker who wished him to remain anonymous, at a closed meeting with representatives of the financial sector, Alexei Kudrin announced a completely apocalyptic forecast: according to the results of 2010-2011, thirty commercial banks may remain in Russia.

The reduction in the number of commercial banks automatically enhances the role of the largest state banks and banks closely related to the state (Sberbank, VTB, VEB).

It would seem that such a scenario should not arrange supporters of the Party of a “long crisis”. But only if we proceed from the assumption that the “party of a long crisis” is a party of financial circles, and the “Party of a short crisis” is a party of industrialists. In fact, probably everything is much more complicated. None of these groups or parties are homogeneous either ideologically or politically.

The party of “Long Crisis” contains liberals close to InSor (Dvorkovich), and convinced monetarists (Kudrin), and statesmen-sibs (Ivanov). In the Party of the “Short Crisis”-all the same liberals (Ulyukaev, Shuvalov) and statesmen-Siloviki (Sechin, Chemezov). Some analysts believe that we are not talking about two, but about three groups (highlighting Shuvalov in a separate group), but this is no longer structural, but hardware differences. With certain reservations, we can say that the split between the liberals present in both parties occurred along the line of the old discussion between the Ministry of Finance and Mart regarding the Strategy 2020.

So, the demarcation line, meanwhile, does not take at all where it is most often found by external observers. Liberals and security forces here unexpectedly find themselves on one side in different parties. And political arguments change all accents in purely economic arguments.