Prohibition on profession

Not long ago I had the opportunity to witness an argument between two of my colleagues (graduates, like me, of one of the prestigious Moscow business schools) regarding the type of management model presented in the publication of V.V. Putin “Why is it difficult to fire a person” on the pages of the magazine “Russian Pioneer” (No. 9, May 2009).

I note that, certified in the editorial annotation as one of the “main top managers of the country,” the author, in a very simple form, set out the universal principles of management during a crisis for the state apparatus and business.

Without questioning the authorship of the published material (snot appeared again, and from previous speeches we know about the national leader’s indifference to various emphasis, which indicates the authenticity of the text), we can highlight some of the prime minister’s preferences, for example, in favor of a typically Asian model of management (usually as Japanese is considered classical).

The meaning of the publication boiled down to the triumph of the central, system-forming principle of the Asian model (the disputants agreed with this conclusion, by the way) - lifelong employment, which qualitatively distinguishes the Japanese type of management from, say, the American one. The latter is rather focused on internal competition and profit maximization.

There is no need to talk about the success of the implementation of the Asian model in Japan in comparison with Russia, but it makes sense to reflect on the logic of the current authoritarian government, on its own tendency towards irremovability, nepotism and fear of personnel changes in principle.

It is known that in Putin’s circle a place is guaranteed for persons who meet a number of subjective criteria (the main one: a member of the community on “classmates” - “graduates of the Leningrad OGPU maternity hospital”), and during the 2000s, the corporate-compatriot principle of personnel formation only became stricter and coarser. The “strong Soviet hillbillies” were replaced by semi-criminal illegal immigrants with an asthenic psychotype. The stocky “hillbilly”, as it should be, migrated to the periphery and down to the middle and lower administrative floors.

Moreover, the desire of the “St. Petersburg security officers” for overwhelming dominance led to the complete political segregation of the generation of the 90s. 30-40-year-old people, who were drawn into the orbit of administrative control at the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century, were almost simultaneously and consistently purged from the bureaucracy with a loss of political rights. Their opposition and general rejection of Putin's reality turned them into pariahs of modern Russia.

Belonging to the opposition opposing the government is perceived by current officials, the business community, and, indeed, the majority of ordinary people as something disgusting, physically repulsive. This is largely the result of many years of propaganda and material enslavement by the ruling regime of the social mass - hired employees dependent on state employers, entrepreneurs from various administrations, tax and law enforcement agencies, the people from their own apathetic moods. The intelligentsia, for the most part, also agreed with the plunger attached to their mouth by the authorities.

Former ministers, deputies, journalists, entrepreneurs, scientists, who in one way or another got the start of their careers precisely with the fall of Soviet power and the beginning of changes in the 90s, are experiencing a certain confusion. This entire politically heterogeneous environment feels, on the one hand, disappointment from the total lack of demand, on the other, rushing about in attempts to somehow change social conditions. For these reasons, participation in the elections to the Moscow City Duma for a number of them was the only way to overcome the “profession ban” that actually exists in Russia on political grounds.

People of a socially active age (it should be said that generational characteristics are not strictly tied to age), at the peak, as they say, of their business career were forcibly squeezed out of the management apparatus. Who will object to the fact that the failure of Russian reforms and the corruption of the current government are not least associated with the replacement of people from the 90s at administrative levers, the regressive cabal of Komsomol members and security officers of the 80s? The baggage of the latter is limited to professional cynicism, ideological ambivalence, total material motivation and a disposition towards criminal manifestations (usually lexical), added in modern times.

Putin’s “lifetime hire” operates extremely selectively (the notorious “Putin doesn’t rent out his own” applies to those closest to him): Sechin (Peter + GB), Medvedev (Peter + Faculty of Law of Leningrad State University), Zubkov (Peter + “Forest Lake”), Chemezov (formerly .brother-in-law + GB + GDR), Miller (Peter + business), Timchenko and Kovalchuk (this is sacred!), etc.

The approaching age of most of the representatives of Putin’s entourage only creates the preconditions for the accelerated incorporation of children, their wives and husbands, new relatives, children’s friends, mistresses, business partners into the apparatus of state power and business management. The “pro-Kremlin youth dressing room” does not guarantee any real prospects for the “Seliger biomass” crowding around the tandem bosses. The social elevator does not involve transporting upward persons who do not meet at least one of the essential criteria. The primary selection, which is carried out by the current government in relation to the loyal youth environment, is necessary for recruitment exclusively to the level of the already mentioned “rednecks”.

In all this there is a completely traditional pattern of an authoritarian system - the unity of goals and internal program of the corporation should not be at risk of foreign influence, which is any “non-genetically” justified presence (other people, a different environment, foreign interests). Putin’s team building does not allow outside participation in the magical ritual - “cutting the dough.” The ruling nobility undoubtedly understands that the “personnel change” nurtured in a certain political way is precisely the most dangerous threat: again due to cynicism, material depravity, demoralization and corruption.

If we imagine a situation in which the current powers that be, if they were out of work, could choose which government they would like to be under (excluding English, Swiss and German), then they would definitely entrust their fate to Lyudmila Alekseeva or Lev Ponomarev, and not V. Yakimenko or Surkov. They soberly realize this.

As for the generation of the 90s, to which I also belong, there will definitely be no return to power or reintegration of its representatives by the current government. This prospect appears to have receded forever. This generation will not have to experience any particular bitterness from the unrealization and incompleteness of what they started. After 3-5 years, their social status and age will forever move from “potential” to “completed”. The politicians of the 90s will finally disperse into uncomfortable but permitted social niches - journalists, writers, mediocre businessmen, human rights activists, some will leave...

A new impulse should now be expected from the still emerging post-Putin generation. Its unclear chronological contours, place in the political system, goals and guidelines, relations with previous generations (the same 90s) do not provide a definite answer about the future of freedom and democracy in Russia. It may well be that they are not guaranteed.

Drawing by RIA Novosti