In society

Half -down systems, or the era of "Voluntarism" - 3

September 21, 2009 Avtandil Tsuladze

The personnel decide everything

I. Stalin

In a well-known article in the magazine Russian Pioneer, Prime Minister V. Putin reasonably remarked: "A crisis is a good reason and the time to talk about personnel." The reason cannot be said to be "good." Rather, even bad. And in general, calling the crisis “reason” is somehow strange. If the crisis is just a “occasion”, then what should the cause of the “conversation about personnel” should become? Full collapse of the economy?

In fact, the crisis really plays a cleansing role, which has already been said many times in the world press. In each country, it cleans what is necessary for the healing of the whole organism. Let's say in the USA the crisis “cleaned” the largest banks, insurance, mortgage companies, etc. In other words, in America, the crisis is in the finas and economic nature. He eliminates financial “bubbles”, healing the economy and creating a base for future growth.

In Russia, the crisis affected not only the economic, but also the political system. Power and business in the system of hospitalism are connected by so close ties that the instability of the economic system is immediately transmitted to political. In other words, the crisis showed that not only the economic, but also the political institutions of Russia need “cleaning”. Awareness of this fact part of the Russian ruling elite is articulated in the article by D. Medvedev on the website Gazeta.ru and his performance at the Yaroslavl forum.

If you briefly express the essence of Medvedev’s speeches, then we are talking about a gradual, time extended in the time of controlled restructuring of the Russian economy, coupled with the cosmetic liberalization of the political system. At the same time, by default it is assumed that the current elites will remain in their positions and will steer the country for another kind of ... Now the dispute is about the so -called The 2012 problem: who will become president in 2012-Putin or Medvedev? This “dispute”-the next PR camp of the Kremlin, the purpose of which is to inspire the broad masses-there is no other choice. But until 2012 there is still a lot of time ...

The project of the Medvedev "Perestroika", which is called "modernization", has no chance of success. The crisis as a “spotlight” highlights not only certain deficiencies in the system, but also its fundamental unsuitability for the further development of the country.

The political and economic aspects of the systemic crisis was mentioned in the previous two parts. The most important element of the system in question is personnel. More precisely, the mechanism of government, which has developed under Putin: the principles of the selection of personnel, their arrangement, control, etc.

Government on the principle of Peter-Chernomyrdin

Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin made an invaluable contribution to science with just one phrase: "They wanted the best, it turned out as always." This statement contains more than it seems at first glance. Two main ideas are important here. First: any reform projects in Russia inevitably endure collapse. Second: everything returns to the "stove", from which they danced. That is, history moves in a circle. There is a third important message: reforms begin with good intentions, but, according to some fatal pattern, turn around their opposite. Putting several semantic layers into one short phrase and closing the question is in Chernomyrdinsky.

But why is this happening? It is appropriate to turn to the work of another paradoxalist - Lawrence Peter, the author of the famous book "The principle of Peter", which is dedicated to the solidification of the secrets of the inefficiency of hierarchical systems. In a humorous form, Peter proves: any hierarchical system is arranged in such a way that a person rising along the career ladder due to his abilities, having reached the level of incompetence, does not fall out of the system, but continues to move up. Thus, the hierarchical system accumulates in its apical part a critical mass of incompetent leaders and degrades.

Obviously, in the West this vice of hierarchical systems is “treated” with the help of competition. In the economy, effective systems (firms, companies) displace ineffective ones from the market. In politics, competition between parties is accompanied by an elite periodic rotation. So, in the USA, the politics of the Republicans went bankrupt, and they were replaced by the Democrats. When they go bankrupt and they will be republicans again at the power of the authorities. In general, the story also goes in a circle, but without shocks, as in Russia, since the replacement of the elites are laid down in the political system. In Russia, the ruling elite is trying to create a political system “for itself” and forever. The change of elites is possible only through all kinds of brutal scenarios: revolutions, coups, etc. The same thing in business: the crisis showed that many Russian oligarchs have reached their incompetence and, in theory, should sell property for debts. But this does not happen. In Russia, a tough hierarchical system that excludes the idea of ​​competition. So far, the economy is not covered with a copper basin, there can be no talk of any voluntary rotation of the elites. A distinctive feature of the Russian ruling elite is its closeness, clanity.

They do not solve all personnel on their own, but a system of selection, preparation, arrangement, control. Kumovism, circular bail, loyalty instead of professionalism - these are filters for the selection of elite personnel in Russia. Question of the problem: what kind of human material can go through such filters? The answer is obvious. Therefore, do not be surprised at the quality of the Russian elite. One of the founders of the Soviet sociological school V. Shlyapentoch believes that a model of feudal society is being implemented in Russia today. Elite relationships are built according to the same principles as in medieval Europe.

This approach contains “keys” to understand the functioning of the Russian bureaucracy. The main link in the feudal system is the weak central government, which delegates the regional barons the fullness of the local power in exchange for the loyalty to the “king”. The principle of vassal dependence is in the exchange of loyalty for the opportunity to create arbitrariness in “your” latifundia. The difference between the reign of Yeltsin and Putin is that under Yeltsin some of the regional “barons” themselves wished to become “kings”. This process reached the rush on the eve of the 1999 elections, when the “feudal lords” united in the OVR in order to take the Kremlin. The Frontaa was defeated, but the “frontiers” were not punished, but incorporated into the system based on a new contract - the refusal of claims to the “throne” in exchange for permission to pump out of their possessions everything that can, not forgetting, naturally, to unfasten the tribute of the “royal” power. About the same at one time, Cardinal Mazarini bought off from the nobility who headed the front. Lovers of Dumas' work are familiar with the exciting ups and downs of the Front era by his novels about musketeers.

Loyalty is a key concept in the feudal system of elite relations. The professionalism of personnel is desirable, but this is not the main condition for their promotion on the career ladder. The main thing is personal relationships. Putin, not at all embarrassed, draws personnel from his colleagues in the KGB, the St. Petersburg City Hall and fellow students at LSU. According to the estimates of the sociologist Olga Krystanovskaya, more than a quarter of the bureaucratic apparatus of modern Russia immigrants from special services. Moreover, we are talking about those who indicated in the questionnaire that they served in the KGB. And how much did you not indicate? The question is open.

The system of selection of personnel according to the principle of personal (vassal) devotion is replicated from above to the bottom-up to the manager of some kind of housing coat.

A similar principle of selection of personnel leads to the following systemic consequences:

• Closure of the system, since the resource of acquaintances and relatives is final. There are no “strangers” in this part of the batch;

• The swelling of the bureaucratic apparatus, which is a direct consequence of the desire of officials to attach “their own”, often simply inventing new vacancies, grandiose projects, administrative units, etc. There is a phenomenon of overproduction of the elite;

• transformation of corruption from deviation from the norm into the norm itself, in the principle of operation of the entire system;

• an increase in the number of incompetent officials and leaching from the system of professionals who have not entered the “feudal” standards;

• system degradation, which is expressed in a decrease in the quality of decisions and the ability of the apparatus to comply with the decisions already made;

• isolation of the bureaucratic system from the society that it is designed to serve. The situation is turned over on the opposite - society is forced to serve the bureaucracy.

The degradation of the system inevitably leads to the fact that the interests of the bone that have closed in the tower are conflicting with the interests of society. The system serves itself. The bureaucracy is trying to replace the real problems of society with constructed threats in order to distract the attention of the population, to transfer the arrows to some “enemies”. The current elite can manipulate, but does not know how to manage. PR allows you to push back the solution of urgent problems, but it itself does not solve problems. Now it is becoming more difficult and difficult to PR to the authorities. The crisis mercilessly exposes the essence of the system, exacerbates all the contradictions laid down in it, catalyzes muffled conflicts inside the elite.

"Bolivar will not stand two",

or "stabilizers" against "reformists"

One of the consequences of the system for the system is the fact that the backbone of the new system is born inside it. This backbone begins to form around Dmitry Medvedev. In the corruption “vertical” built by Putin, Medvedev, despite the presidential post, occupies a very modest place. His personal “possessions” are small and the prospects for their expansion do not have them. Putin and his "vassals" do everything possible to push Medvedev to the periphery. The feudal system of informal control over the state apparatus and large business (through loyal personnel), supplemented by the legitimization of Putin’s authority due to its relatively high popularity in society, does not leave Medvedev another way out to increase political weight, except through restoring the authority of formal power and procedures.

Kremlin propaganda persistently introduced the myth that Putin strengthened the state into the mass consciousness. As always, there was no cunning. The state in the modern sense, as a bureaucratic apparatus hired by taxpayers, Putin practically destroyed, replacing it with the feudal type of state, which was built on a vassal dependence, erasing the line between the personal pocket of the official and the Gosquiting, the fraging of business and the authorities into a single whole, the almost unlimited arbitrariness of the local “barons”, the destruction of the legal field and so on. and so on. The list can be continued for a long time.

Now the situation appears in the true light. Medvedev personifies the “official” power, which in the feudal system is of the nature of the decoration. Putin embodies and leads a system of feudal relations.

Medvedev’s authority is low, since the “official” state is extremely weak. Therefore, Medvedev is interested in the destruction of the feudal system, because this is how he can become president without quotes.

However, not only the “feudal” bureaucracy resists the fight against corruption. Resists, etc. The paternalist majority, i.e., according to pre -revolutionary terminology, "serfs". They do not imagine life “in the wild” without a “master” and therefore cling to the guardian of this system - Putin. The fear of changes in this environment is almost animal. The ghost of the 90s looks frightening. This is a fear of the need for physical survival. Under the kings, the Barin provided his serf in the content necessary for physical survival. The same is the case with the so -called. Paternalists. Councils show that the majority of the population costs a primitive set of meager benefits to satisfy physical needs and nothing more. But the modern economy is based on the constant provocation of needs in people, on the overestimation of the consumer bar. People bypassing potatoes and a pair of felt boots cannot be a motor of modern consumer economies. The majority, locked in the “serf ghetto”, who has come to terms with their fate, fixes the power of the “feudal lords” and, at the same time, limits their possibilities to extract profits from the economy. The archaic economy and the social structure of society are prone to stagnation. The system cheered the external factor - an increase in oil prices. As soon as the external factor from the favorable turned into unfavorable, all the shortcomings of the feudal model became obvious. The paradox of the situation is that the “feudal lords” rested on an unpleasant fact - you can’t pump special special profits from the poor, unpretentious population. In the West, the oligarchs make money on the population. They extract profits from new knowledge created by scientists, which in turn allowing new technologies in all areas of human activity. In Russia, the source of wealth is natural resources, and the population is rather a burden. It has to be fed at the level of physical survival, so that it does not interfere with “serious people” to saw the loot.

The current "feudal" elite is absolutely consumer. All this undertaking with the “vertical of power” was needed in order to share money without problems with a narrow circle. No “big leap” was interested in anyone. It is very significant that the criteria for the growth of Russian economic power for Putin were the growth indicators of GDP, which really pleased in recent years. But this is just a quantitative indicator that does not at all reflect the qualitative state of the Russian economy. Putin's elite was little worried. It was focused on making maximum profit in the shortest possible time, and until a certain point it succeeded. Now this system does not work. The country has new tasks and challenges. The old system is sharpened for other tasks and will not cope with the new situation. It only draws in the moment of the beginning of the indigenous structural reforms in the economy, in politics, in society, and ideology so painful for the “feudal lords” and “serfs”. Russia has the next revolutionary, large -scale breaking. Many are afraid of this. But the story is inexorable.

Now the Russian ruling elite can be divided into two parts: “Party of Stabilizers” and “Party of Reformers”. (I. Jurgens, in the sensational interview with Reuters, speaks of a clash in the power of the interests of “conservative-state-owners” (in the person of Putin) and “liberals” (represented by Medvedev)). “Stabilizers” is a Chekist-oligarchic symbiosis, which was the greatest gain from “Putinomics”, and now it is in the greatest loss ...

The model of their political and economic dominance collapsed along with their assets. They are trying, using a political resource, to save their capital and property and maintain the previous balance of forces. None of this will work out, because the world economy has entered the stage of deep transformations and will no longer be the previous freebie. In addition, the aggressive foreign policy of Moscow and the growing internal instability do not add the desire to invest in Russia. Too many risks.

As for the “reformists”, these are the second and third echelons of the current elite, which did not particularly shir with the previous “master” and, which is especially important, have no prospects to strengthen their positions until they “move” “stabilizers”. This camp is grouped around Medvedev. It is less resource, but much more numerous than it seems at first glance. Representatives of this camp believe that the Russian economy should not be reformed after the crisis, but to get out of the crisis , because for Russia the latter turned into the collapse of the entire system, all of the political and economic way. Reforms in your hardware measurement are the right way to redistribute power and property.

Leave everything as it is or change the system, Putin or Medvedev. Around these issues, the main political plots will be twisted in the foreseeable future. But it is already obvious that in a system of systemic crisis, the design of the “tandemocracy” will not reach until 2012. “Bolivar will not bear two,” as one of the heroes of O. Henry cynically noted. However, with all this, the elites are so sure that the population will dutifully monitor their games and wait for their fate, that in the heat of the struggle they do not think about such a subject of history as the people. They are only worried about the ratings, for the raising of which the campaign car is working, and everything else is secondary.

The myth of the long -suffering of Russians and that everything can be fed up with the completely inadequate ambitions of the Kremlin in the foreign policy arena. So far, no one has yet to refuse to compete with the idea with “world imperialism”. In this regard, we give one historical bike:

At the special examination of the film “Chapaev”, the head of Goskino Bolshakov praised the picture of Stalin in every possible way. When the image appeared on the screen in a close -up of Chapaev’s horse, Bolshakov decided to impress the leader’s imagination with the achievements of Soviet cinema.

- Joseph Vissarionovich, you see, Chapaev seems to jump on a horse, but in fact there is no horse under it. This is called rirprojection.

- What does "rirprojection" mean? - the leader muttered, puffing with a tube.

— Это значит, что актер сидит на табуретке и подскакивает на ней, а на экране кажется, что он скачет на лошади.

— И на этой табуретке вы хотите обогнать Голливуд?

(To be continued)

Photo by RIA Novosti