Off the record

The issue of Protocol 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights was not as fateful as Russia portrayed it

In May 2004, all ministers of the Council of Europe member countries, including Sergey Lavrov, opened it for ratification with 46 signatures under the protocol. At the same time, the experts acknowledged that the proposed simplification of procedures at the ECtHR is primarily ...

In May 2004, all ministers of the Council of Europe member countries, including Sergey Lavrov, opened it for ratification with 46 signatures under the protocol. At the same time, the experts acknowledged that the proposed simplification of procedures at the ECtHR — first of all, the determination of the admissibility of complaints by one judge instead of three, as before — could theoretically reduce the quality of the resolution of the issue, but would help clear up the rubble of primary complaints that had accumulated in Strasbourg. At that moment, this balance of unopened complaints was about 80,000.

Within a year and a half, the legislatures of the 45 countries participating in the convention ratified the 14th protocol, opening the way for the reform of the ECtHR. On May 13, 2006, Putin signed the necessary order, and the ratification procedure in Russia also began: it would not have caused a stir if something had not happened. In December 2006, the Duma rejected the president's initiative, citing concern for the protection of human rights, which could be violated by the reform of the ECtHR. On January 11, 2007, at a meeting with members of his Human Rights Council, Putin supported this decision of the Duma, lamenting the "politicization of the European Court", and the Russian Foreign Ministry translated this for a dumbfounded Europe as a reproach of "double standards."

By that time, the balance of outstanding initial complaints in Strasbourg had already exceeded 90,000, and now, by the time the State Duma finally ratified the ill-fated protocol, it had reached 112,000: about a quarter of them are consistently complaints from citizens of the Russian Federation.

The judges, now representatives of 47 countries, are rolling up their sleeves and getting ready to clear the rubble. But what did Russia achieve anyway? Deputies of the Duma, commenting on their, as always, victories, say that during the discussion of the reforms that are finally starting, the ECHR prevented this and that. But these are not the questions that they clung to at the beginning, and they are all technical - nothing particularly life-changing.

We have to look for logic in some parallel processes. And in parallel, the ECHR considers dozens of complaints against Russia from various citizens, but there are especially unpleasant ones among them. Complaints related to Yukos are difficult to get through in court, generally speaking, there are two types: 1) from shareholders about violation of their property interests in Russian courts; 2) from those convicted in criminal cases on violation of their procedural rights in a Russian court. The winter of 2006 is just the moment when the first shareholders' complaints are taken into consideration.

Discussing the version about the desire of the Russian government to somehow agree on the fate of these cases, one must understand the following. It is possible to agree on something diplomatically with the PACE session, where parliamentarians and ministers sit. But with the ECtHR, where panels of judges (one each from 47 countries) discuss decisions on a confusing, sometimes rather random scheme for distributing cases between them, it is impossible to agree on anything. This is not a Russian court, the chairman of which, and even then not one hundred percent, can promise something in a case that is being handled by a judge. But it is not certain that in December 2006 all Russian politicians understood this.

Meanwhile, the first swallows have already flown from Strasbourg. On October 25, 2007, the ECHR recognized Platon Lebedev's complaint about the unlawfulness of his detention in 2003-2004 as justified. On December 23, 2009, that is, 14 months later, this decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. This event does not yet affect the fate of the “defendant”, but the symbolic meaning in this context is rather big. On January 12, due to the absence of the Russian side, the ECHR postponed the consideration of the claims of Yukos shareholders to March 4 for the second time. It may be possible to postpone the case once again, but it cannot be blocked, it will be considered, and it is also difficult to doubt the nature of the decision.

It remains to compare the changes in Russian rhetoric in fundamental questions of law over the same period with the actual series. At the end of 2006, in the trial of terrorists in Beslan, prosecutor Shepel demanded the death penalty. At the end of 2009, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation came to the conclusion that the death penalty in Russia cannot be applied. Since both were undoubtedly discussed in the Kremlin (however, people there have changed a little during this time), we will conclude that in 2006 the temptation of the Russian authorities to send the Council of Europe away, refuse membership in it and rush headlong into Asia was real, but in three years the authorities came to the conclusion that either we were not strong enough, or it would be better for us to stay in Europe. The question of the double standards of the ECtHR was not raised at the December meeting between Medvedev and the new Secretary General of the Council of Europe T. Jagland. Nor did they discuss the concept of “sovereign”, that is, different from European (and the other is not yet known in history), democracy.

That is, after three years of arguing and bringing the rest of the complaints that have not yet been opened in Strasbourg from 80,000 to the milestone of 112,000, Russia, just on the eve of considering the claims of Yukos shareholders, mumbling unintelligible explanations along the way, goes to stand in a corner. For the state, of course, it's a shame, what to say. But for ourselves and for the citizens there is more pride: no, we are not Asians with slanting and greedy eyes.