Lights on the Dnieper

Leading expert of the French Institute of International and Strategic Relations (IRIS) on the European view of Ukraine

Disappointment mixed with anxiety — such a feeling is experienced today, 5 years after the victory of the Orange Revolution, in European capitals when looking at Ukraine. Yes, towards the end of 2009, the 13th Ukraine-EU summit was already held in Kyiv, at which, as usual in such cases, there were mutual hugs and optimistic statements. But one should not be deceived by these overtures: a united Europe is by no means concerned with a deep study of the “Ukrainian issue”, nor is it striving to make it a priority of its policy. Moreover, Europe has been talking about Ukraine less and less lately. However, the Ukrainians themselves, who found themselves alone with the catastrophic situation in the economy, and now plunged headlong into an exciting presidential campaign, seem to no longer believe in their “Euro-Atlantic vocation”. The frustration of Europe echoes the irritation of Ukraine.

Who is to blame? Both parties are responsible. Chronic instability in Ukraine, incurable corruption, periodically renewed gas wars with Russia, and finally, the permanent confrontation between Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko - all this did nothing to strengthen Ukraine's reputation in the eyes of Europeans. Even Kyiv's most fervent and dedicated "support group" - Poland, Britain and the Baltic States - began to show signs of fatigue. But Europe is not without sin. She never managed to properly manage the success of the pro-European forces in Ukraine in December 2004. Rather, Europe did not understand what to do with Ukraine, which then defended its right to fair elections. On the one hand, the European Union has assumed increased commitments in the East. On the other hand, noticeably tired of the expansion process and split in relation to Ukraine (as well as to Russia), the European Union has not been able to develop a conceptually adjusted policy in the direction of the Dnieper. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009 did not change anything in this regard.

But does all of the above mean that Ukraine is lost to Europe? No. The lights of hope still burn brightly on the banks of the Dnieper. And not only because “Ukraine has not died yet,” as the Ukrainian national anthem says. Despite corruption, the weakness of democratic institutions, and the strength of oligarchic circles, Ukraine has a civil society. And not just eat! From year to year it becomes more and more mature, relying more and more confidently on the main achievement of the "orange revolution" - freedom of speech. Namely, this freedom makes Ukraine one of the few happy exceptions in the post-Soviet space.

How to advance economic reforms and democratization in the absence of the prospect of an early accession to the EU and NATO - this is the main challenge for Ukraine in the coming years. It will be difficult for Kyiv to look for a role model on the side: it cannot be inspired by someone else's experience of European integration, whether it be the Polish-Baltic (successful) or Turkish (not very good). Ukraine has its own “special path” to Europe. After the presidential elections, Ukrainian foreign policy is likely to change. This will primarily affect relations with Moscow. They will get warmer, regardless of whether Yulia Tymoshenko or Viktor Yanukovych wins. Moreover, Europe will make a mistake if it sees this as a cause for concern: Europe itself needs stability in relations between Kiev and Moscow - as a guarantee of stability in the east of the continent - and will only add to Ukraine's attractiveness in the eyes of Europeans. Russia, in turn, will make a mistake if it sees this as an excuse for revenge for the events of December 2004. Moscow must understand that Ukraine, like all other republics of the former USSR, has reached a mature age and will no longer attach its future, its fate to the former metropolis.