General battle

New Military Doctrine as a reflection of the conflict in the leadership of the Ministry of Defense

The doctrine writes, the reform goes. The new military doctrine of Russia was waiting for almost five years. But the document signed by President Medvedev most clearly reflects not the principles of military construction, but the conflict between the Minister of Defense and the general. The doctrine was written for those armed forces that are no longer in Russia and, most likely, will not be
In the country, military reform is unprecedented in scale and radicality. The leadership of the defense department is split: some of the generals support the Minister-reformer Anatoly Serdyukov, their opponents are represented by the former head of the General Staff, deputy secretary of the Security Council Yuri Baluevsky. But resistance cannot interfere with reform. If you believe the current head of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov, in 2009 the officer corps was reduced by almost two -thirds (from 355 to 150 thousand), instead of 1180 parts and formations of the ground forces, only 85 constant readiness brigades were formed. All compounds of reduced composition were liquidated, which means that Russia abandoned the one and a half century tradition of the mass mobilization army (there are no longer units that could accept millions of reservists, nor officers who would lead them). And the opponents of the reformers all this time developed a new military doctrine, which seemed to not notice the changes that had happened.

The choice of the enemy

The Russian and foreign expert community immediately drew attention to the main difference between the 2010 doctrine and the previous option adopted in 2000. In the text of the document, the main hypothetical enemy of the Russian state is named. True, this was done in a slightly veiled form, but she did not mislead anyone. The military danger for Russia, according to the doctrine, lies in “the desire to endow the power potential of the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) by global functions implemented in violation of international law, to bring the military infrastructure of NATO members to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc”. In addition, in the list of military dangers, there is the deployment of pro systems, the militarization of space and the creation of strategic non -nuclear systems of high -precision weapons. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogg Rasmussen immediately stated that these provisions are a sad mistake and NATO is not an enemy of Russia.
According to experts, the choice of potential enemy will not lead to real changes in the construction of the Armed Forces. If the Kremlin was seriously admitted that NATO was representing a “military danger”, they would never have a chance to leave only 85 brigades in the ground forces and reduce the organized reserve to only 60 brigades.

Secret containment

A lot of anxiety in Russia and even more abroad caused statements by the Secretary of the Security Council of Nikolai Patrushev, who in October 2009 promised that the military doctrine would describe "the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons in the reflection of aggression using the usual means of defeat not only in large -scale, but also in the regional, and even in the local war." Moreover, from the words of Patrushev it followed that in a certain situation, having analyzed the intentions of the probable enemy, Russia can cause a preventive nuclear blow. If you call a spade a spade, it can untie a nuclear war. The appearance of such provisions in a military doctrine would mean that Russia radically reviewed the views on the role of nuclear weapons, no longer considers it an exclusively political weapon, which should never be applied, that Moscow is returning to the 60s, to Marshal Sokolovsky, who suggested that nuclear weapons can be used not for retribution, but to achieve victory.
There was no sensation, last year's leaks of information from the Security Council about the possibility of preventive nuclear blows were an exaggeration. The provisions of the 2000 doctrine practically did not change: “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of ordinary weapons, when the existence of the state is threatened.”
True, it was reported that in addition to the doctrine, Medvedev approved some secret “foundations of state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence until 2020”. But, most likely, this was done so that Patrushev could keep his face.

Doctrine against reform

In the beginning of February, the doctrine’s text signed by President Medvedev does not contain any specific information about how the armed forces will develop, for the participation in which wars they are prepared. And this is a reflection of the conflict that goes both within the military department and in the highest echelons of power in connection with the reform of the armed forces. Obviously, a set of rather vague science definitions is the only thing that the opposing clans came together: Serdyukov with their few supporters and Baluevsky, whom most generals supported. That is why in the text of the military doctrine there is not a single word about military reform that is in full swing. However, meticulous analysts will be able, if desired, in the text some hints in existing differences. The doctrine, in particular, requires "ensuring the rational ratio of formations and military units of constant readiness and formations and military units intended for the mobilization deployment of the armed forces and other troops." Translated into Russian, this means the following: you, Serdyukov, took and eliminated parts of the part -time, that is, those that are designed for mobilization deployment, and we believe that on the spare track our armored train should be equipped as the one on the front line, in constant readiness. In other words, the authors of the doctrine showed Mr. Serdyukov a figure in his pocket. They were satisfied with this. The Minister of Defense can calmly continue the reduction and modernization of the army.