The thread was torn off

In four cases out of five, “color” revolutions in the post-Soviet space in the 21st century were triggered by election fraud ( see table ). And this is in countries where the manipulation of the electoral process was quite common, and not democrats were in power: from the “doubting” Shevardnadze (Georgia) and Voronin (Moldova) to Akaev (Kyrgyzstan) evolving towards Asian despotism and Kuchma capable of political assassinations (Ukraine). At the same time, none of them dared to shoot at their own people. Three out of four live quite comfortably in their own countries - only Akaev moved to Moscow. Bakiyev, still the de jure president of Kyrgyzstan, has crossed the line by allowing them to open fire on the crowd. And this is a precedent. As well as the fact that for the first time the protest was of a spontaneous nature - the oppositionists only joined the tail of the crowd, and then pretended to saddle it. Hence the pogrom character of the protest.

The Kyrgyz authorities severely squeezed in terms of tightening the nuts - as a result, the thread was torn off. This is generally the misfortune of authoritarian regimes: having no feedback and therefore being in constant fear, they are not capable of fine-tuning. Bakiyev, on the other hand, decided that he did not need a wrench - he chose a sledgehammer. By declaring "deliberative democracy", he frightened the elites: for some, the absence of even a controlled rotation blocked access to the desired pie of property and budget money, for others - with political ambitions - this turned into a risk of ending up in prison.

Everything would be fine if the Kyrgyz regime had a gas pipeline, like the Turkmenbashi, or some oil, or some other resource that would allow throwing money at the discontent of the masses, as they do in the same Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where elections are also do not get bored. But Kyrgyzstan is a poor country, Bakiyev raised prices for electricity, heating, hot water at times - the crowd went to take away what they considered their own: to rob houses, shops, buildings ... Of course, there was no political idea behind this, yes and it couldn’t be - in order for it to exist (and it is needed so that the protest does not turn into a foul-smelling shapeless slurry and is limited by at least some flags), political parties or umbrella movements like the Georgian “Kmara” of the period of the “Rose Revolution” are needed or Ukrainian Pora. By destroying parties and/or sending oppositionists to prison, as Bakiyev did, autocrats, including in Russia, deprive themselves of at least some protection from the desperate crowd.

„

The Trouble of Authoritarian Regimes: Not Having Feedback

and therefore, being in constant fear, they are not able to

to fine tuning

”

Kyrgyz history has once again demonstrated that the rigidity of the power of the rulers does not save, all this power armature crumbles like a house of cards at the first more or less serious crisis - precisely because it is rigid, deprived of degrees of freedom that would allow it to adequately respond to environmental changes .
In Georgia during the Rose Revolution, the state was in a state of half-life. In Moldova, on the contrary, when there was a "revolution of bricks", the construction was quite stable. And in the "orange" Ukraine, state institutions, at the very least, functioned, and in Akaev's Kyrgyzstan, too. This means that relying on a strong state does not protect against revolutions. Authoritarian regimes tend to be short-lived. You can't be half pregnant - it's a miscarriage. You can’t endlessly show the carrot tail, calling it a sovereign or some other democracy, but not giving real freedoms and rights. Such structures collapse from the inside. And it's better not to bring it up. The face of the current Kyrgyz revolution is a visible example of this.