Around Russia

A chance for a Quele. Lossed?

June 15, 2010 Alexander Golts

One and a half hundred killed, tens of thousands of refugees, flaming quarters, plundered houses. A wave of violence, which for several years gained strength in Central Asia, covered Kyrgyzstan. And the Provisional Government of this country turned for help, asked to send peacekeepers. Neither America, nor NATO (I can imagine what hysteria our patriots would have arranged in this case, they say, hands away, the Pindos damned, from our conflicts). Assistance was requested from Russia. And the president of the Great Power in response knitted something unintelligible: it should, they say, should immediately put an end to bloodshed. So they, the Kyrgyz bosses, would be happy to put this very end, only there is no strength. And instead of peacekeepers, Moscow sent the Ministry of Emergencies to Kyrgyzstan, which took out six inhabitants of the republic, who received severe injuries during the conflict. True, there was a strengthened battalion of paratroopers, but not to fulfill the peacekeeping mission, but to protect Russian military personnel and members of their families. Which are located 500 kilometers from the conflict area ...

Meanwhile, right now, the organization of a collective security agreement (CSTO), which includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, as well as Armenia and Belarusia, is the real verification. Since the creation of this organization, which, according to all formal signs, resembles a military alliance, skeptics have expressed suspicion that all this idea with the CSTO has no practical sense, but is intended solely so that the Kremlin chiefs could prove to themselves and the world that they also have something - well, like Washington NATO. Moreover, for the time being, cooperation within the framework of the OBKB was reduced to joint exercises of the air defense (which, to put it mildly, is not a response to existing threats) and the supply of Russian weapons at preferential prices. True, the worse things are going on with the United Group of the North Atlantic Alliance in Afghanistan, the clearer that the CSTO begins to play a crucial role in ensuring the country's security. Obviously, the defeat of NATO in Afghanistan will result in the fact that the weak authoritarian regimes of Central Asia will not be able to withstand radical Islam, civil wars and national conflicts will begin. Therefore, for several months tens of thousands of refugees will storm the Russian border, as they now storm the border between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. And Moscow began to prepare quite rationally to fearing this threat to Russia's security (perhaps today the only real threat). She began to very actively form the collective forces of the operational response (Qus). All CSTO states agreed to participate in them, except for Uzbekistan. The composition of the Qusor by Russia allocated an airborne division and an airborne brigade. From other states, Moscow needed not so much military units as the legal basis for interference at the early stage of the conflict. The exercises that included emergency transfer of troops have already been conducted.

But it came to business. And Moscow chose to lower the question of a peacekeeping operation on the brakes. Consultations on a peacekeeping operation are held at the level of Secretary of Security Councils of the CSTO countries. The representative of Kazakhstan has already stated that the operation is premature and that Kyrgyzstan should solve its problems itself. The Secretary General of the CSTO Nikolay Bordyuzha proposed limiting himself to immediate deliveries of vehicles and fuels and lubricants. That is, all Russian claims to play a dominant role in ensuring security in the post -Soviet space ended in nothing. If, at the next conflict, his victims turn their requests for peacekeeping to other countries, Moscow should only be offended by itself.

What are the reasons for such indecision? In my opinion, the whole thing is in the absence of military formations that can perform peacekeeping functions. This is the result of refusal of compounds formed from contractors. As a result, even in the elite airborne troops, half of the troops are recruits who have served less than six months. If we follow Russian laws (which, however, were violated without hesitation during the Russian-Georgian War), then they should not participate in a peacekeeping operation, even from a legal point of view. The fact that these soldiers are not ready to act in difficult conditions of interethnic conflict is obvious. It is no coincidence, as soon as it was decided to refuse to partially transfer the armed forces to a contract, the Ministry of Defense immediately forgot about the 15th brigade, which was just prepared to perform peacekeeping tasks. Everything that is at the disposal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is five from contractors of battalions of the airborne troops. But one battalion - on vacation, the other two - are already in Kyrgyzstan, guard our air base in Kant. I am afraid that Medvedev simply does not have combat combat formations to perform peacekeeping operations. And the CSTO loses the chance to prove that it is at least needed for something.

Photo by RIA Novosti