Translated material
Freeze Karabakh
Russian intrigue in the South Caucasus
Today in Sochi, at the invitation of President Dmitry Medvedev, his Azerbaijani and Armenian counterparts Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan will meet. No sensations are planned, which, however, is consistent with the plans of all parties involved in the settlement process.The only source from which ideas for a Karabakh settlement are drawn are still the so-called Madrid principles adopted at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conference held in November 2007 at the level of foreign ministers. For two years, these principles were considered secret, although many knew that they boiled down to the return to Azerbaijan of seven regions occupied by the Karabakh people along the perimeter of the unrecognized republic, and the subsequent determination of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh through, as the document says, “a legally binding expression of will.” In the summer of 2009, these principles were updated and made public. According to a number of Armenian observers, these updates do not bode well for Armenia. Thus, one of the opposition leaders David Shakhnazaryan, in a conversation with Vremya Novostey, notes: “If in the previous version the occupied territories were transferred under the control of international observers, now we are talking about the direct return of these territories to Baku.” And he is not at all optimistic about the formula of “legally binding expression of will”, under which anything can be hidden, up to the corresponding decision of the Azerbaijani parliament. “And by this time we will have already given up seven districts...”
This formula evokes little more enthusiasm in Baku. Well-known Azerbaijani journalist and political scientist Rauf Mirkadirov agrees that Yerevan, by agreeing to the return of occupied areas, is taking a serious risk. “But here’s at least this detail: if we are talking about a referendum, then according to our constitution it can only be held throughout the entire territory of the country, which in this case is impossible. And if the Armenians are risking their regions, then in order to give Karabakh back to us, we also need to change the constitution.” In Karabakh itself, when asked whether there is a topic that could seriously complicate its relations with Yerevan, they answer: “In Yerevan they can calculate anything. But we will never give up the occupied areas.”
In short, there is nothing to seriously discuss. Without legal registration of the status of Karabakh, Yerevan cannot make concessions in the Madrid genre. For Baku, such a formulation of the issue is completely unacceptable.
But after the events in South Ossetia in 2008, the process of Armenian-Turkish reconciliation began. At the same time, from the very beginning, there was an impression that Karabakh was left out of the equation in this process, and things that could have been discussed without this were discussed. This part of the journey was completed in just six months, when Baku’s statements that it was not satisfied with such Armenian-Turkish progress had to be taken seriously. Turkey, for which the slogan “one people, two states” never lost its relevance, was forced to declare: its border with Armenia will open only if Yerevan is ready to make concessions in Karabakh. “Even if not all districts, maybe two or three,” the famous Turkish political scientist Mustafa Akgul explained to a VN correspondent. “Let there be at least a sign that the Turkish government could present to its voters.”
But even “two or three” districts for Yerevan, and especially Stepanakert, remain an unaffordable price. Let us recall that in October 2009, the return match of the national teams of Turkey and Armenia took place in the Turkish city of Bursa. Serzh Sargsyan was present on a return visit. Refusal of this trip would put the reconciliation process in jeopardy. That is why titanic efforts were made to ensure that protocols on the restoration of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey were signed in Zurich the day before. The main thing was done: the reconciliation process was not allowed to die. Then it was possible to take a break, and the sticky ratification of the protocols in the parliaments of the two countries was just right for this.
But Azerbaijan remained. The sluggish progress of the negotiations is working for Yerevan, and Baku has only one thing left to do: to spur intrigue, including reminders of its right to resolve the issue by force. Every statement in this spirit is a tactical point won: Yerevan becomes the object of pressure. After August 2008, no one dares to regard the Baku demarches as anything but a bluff - neither Armenia, nor Russia, nor Europe, nor the USA. The OSCE Minsk Group is turning from a mediator into an outside observer. In this situation, Moscow is trying to seize the initiative by organizing meetings between Aliyev and Sargsyan one after another.
Russia is playing a large-scale game with Turkey, which could result in changes in the balance of power in the South Caucasus. That's what's important, not the Karabakh issue. On the one hand, Moscow’s activity should show Armenians that there is no reason to worry about Russian-Turkish rapprochement. On the other hand, Russia is also important for Azerbaijanis: to show the West that Baku always has an alternative foreign policy vector. So Russia’s activation does not cause opposition from either side. The intrigue in the South Caucasus is becoming too multifaceted to ignore the risks. And if in Sochi the parties once again show a willingness to be restrained in not taking a step back, then the impossibility of taking a step forward will not alarm anyone. It is better to negotiate than not to negotiate. And there is no other way to avoid escalation in a frozen conflict other than an even deeper freeze.