Pyrrhus for the whole world

The impotence of power, or Farewell to the zeros

The 2000s ended almost exactly as they began. Great powers that thought they were in control were faced with unforeseen players who could mix up the cards. At the dawn of the decade, a transnational terrorist network loudly announced itself, which in the fall of 2001 struck at the heart of the modern West. And in 2010, a world-wide exposure session was staged by a computer genius who came from nowhere.

In both cases, the damage from individual actions of mysterious forces is less than from the reaction of states to them. The “crusade against terrorism” declared by the United States after September 11th disorganized international politics, shook the world system and cast doubt on the legitimacy of the claims of the only superpower to planetary leadership. And the campaign that followed the Wikileaks publications has deepened interstate anger, turned diplomacy into a tabloid story, and threatens to undermine America's credibility more than the leaks themselves.

The 2000s are a time of loss of illusions. The euphoria that gripped the developed part of humanity in the nineties, after the end of the Cold War, quickly dissipated. The world in the 21st century is no safer or more stable than the last century, with its wars, acts of genocide and nuclear confrontation. But now everything is even less predictable. Rules are being erased, institutions are being eroded, meaningful policies are being replaced by political technologies. The global environment is a giant magnifying glass through which all processes look larger, and the usual laws of interaction are distorted under the influence of unforeseen circumstances.

Interstate relations are getting rid of the ideological shell, returning to more traditional principles - the struggle for influence and prestige. The ideological vacuum is filled by the growth of national and religious feelings, primarily in the third world, but also in the “first” as a reaction. Xenophobia, paradoxically, is acquiring liberal contours - anti-Muslim sentiments in Europe are growing under the slogan of protecting tolerance from Islamic “obscurantism.” Freedom of the market and trade, which seemed an axiom in the late nineties, is receding by the end of the 2000s under the pressure of the widespread growth of state intervention in the economy and the revival of protectionist instincts. And the ideals of democracy are not only discredited by its forceful “promotion” in the middle of the decade, but also called into question by the impressive rise of a far from democratic China, which seems to have emerged victorious from the global financial crisis.

The North Atlantic Alliance has carried out large-scale expansion, but has lost its purpose and purpose. The European Union has reached its apogee, making a leap towards expansion and deepening integration at the same time. The result is an increase in development imbalances and a loss of global role as we plunge into internal problems. Russia has been diligently improving controllability to make sure that the centralized vertical, consisting of an ineffective apparatus, does not transmit the necessary signals.

The 2000s were a time of victories that quickly turned out to be Pyrrhic. The easy occupation of Iraq was followed by years of chaos, the outcome of which was uncertain. And Tehran, which got rid of its worst enemy with American hands, has already won. The rapid overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has left America and NATO bogged down in a years-long, hopeless campaign. It is difficult to prove more convincingly the impotence of force. The most powerful military power in history is unable to defeat one of the most backward countries.

The military victory in Chechnya, where Russia defended its integrity, led to the emergence of a territory practically beyond the control of Moscow and exerting increasing influence on the rest of the country. And the success in protecting compatriots in South Ossetia gave rise to a long-term foreign policy problem and a channel for the leakage of money for the permanent “restoration” of the newly recognized state. And while the Russian state is ready to fight to keep the Caucasus under its influence, many of its citizens go to great lengths to ensure that “foreigners” are not their compatriots.

In the late nineties, no one foresaw what is happening today. There is no point in trying to predict what will happen in another ten years. The world continues to move from an irrevocable past into an uncertain future. The tenth years are shrouded in fog. They are fraught with new conflicts and will become a time for making decisions that will determine the global and national development of the first half of the 21st century. And the cost of an error increases exponentially.

Fedor LUKYANOV