
The loss of liberals in discussions Sergei Kurginyan is, as they say, a fact that has taken place. It is enough to see the most significant programs with his participation of the parties - the “court of time”, where his main opponent was Leonid Mlechin, and the judge was Nikolai Svanidze, and the recent “fight with Vladimir Solovyov”, in which Kurginyan was opposed by Alexei Venediktov.
It is no secret that Kurginyan is a convinced supporter of not only the empire, but also the so -called red project. He believes in the potential of the Soviet Union, which could develop for many years, if, according to him, he was not devoted and destroyed by representatives of the Soviet elite, primarily Gorbachev, Yakovlev and Yeltsin. Speaking about the consequences of the collapse of the USSR - de -industrialization, the glaring social stratification and degradation of the people - Kurginyan is solidarized with the most rigid critics of the modern regime.
He sees a way out of the situation in the new edition of the Red Project with a new post -industrial ideology instead of a communist one. His confidence in the future victory has quite objective grounds. I mean, firstly, the revival in modern conditions of the Stalinist mechanism of rule. Secondly, for more than 15 years, a targeted campaign for the introduction of the image of Stalin as a great statesman in the public consciousness of the image of the image of Stalin. Compared to this campaign, the publicity policy, which, according to Kurginyan, broke public consciousness, was much more superficial and lasted from the force of five years (the second half of the 1980s-the beginning of the 1990s).
In addition to the objective prerequisites for Kurginyan’s victory, his demagogic talent contributes to, which he mobilized to defend his point of view, without disdaining neither overecks nor frank falsifications. He considers his role as a mission to return to the people of Russia its history, and history its meaning. In the "duel", carried away, he compared his speeches with a naked sermon. Of course, Kurginyan expresses the point of view of a certain part of the Russian elite, which is so represented by the future of the country.
However, I want to dwell in more detail at the positions of the opponents of Kurginyan - liberals, who to a large extent provided him with victory. It is important primarily flaws in their vision of the Russian past and present. The reason for these flaws is a common Russian disease: few are capable of here, in the words of Yuri Trifonov, "to reject the last, to reach the bottom." If you summarize, the following picture turns out:
All these years, while the introduction of a positive image of Stalin-state in public consciousness has been introduced, the liberals avoided focusing on the necessary explanation of how the Stalinist system of power was arranged. Why? Yes, because then analogies with the current Russian power became obvious. The political system, as a rule, was reduced to the regime of the personal power of Stalin, and the causes of repressions - to the features of his character and political style. All fair pathos of revelations was directed to repression, gulag and other cruelty of that time.
Speaking about the Stalinist "socialism", even the most advanced liberal experts agreed with opponents in a positive assessment of Stalinist modernization. The discrepancy was only in the question of "price". At the same time, the statistics of the arrested and executed, born in the bowels of the NKVD/KGB, was not questioned. It turns out that the “price” of Stalin’s modernization itself is not so great, but quite comparable to the “costs” of modernization in Western countries. The recognition of the success of Stalin's modernization was combined with the apology of foreign policy - few people resisted the "charm" of the Stalinist Great Power.
There was a true goal of Stalinist modernization in the shadow - the creation of military industry, as a result of which the production structure was extremely deformed. The fundamental fact was not explained that Stalin's modernization turned into deep social regression, a rollback in historical development compared to the end of the XIX - the beginning of the XX century, when Russia moved along the path of creating democratic institutions, private property and legal culture. The long -term destructive social consequences of the Stalinist transformations were not revealed. And this is not only the death of millions of people. These are millions of people who passed the camps and absorbed camp culture. This is the destruction of society as an independent substance, its transformation into space for the manipulation of power.
Focusing attention on the repressions and atrocities of the Gulag, the liberals accused all the Communists of them, including those who had nothing to do with them. On the contrary, many Communists of the Brezhnev time were consistent anti -Stalinists, unlike today's communists of the Zyuganov party. Such attractive sides of the Soviet "developed" socialism, such as universal secondary education, free higher education, free medical care, etc. remained in the shadow. Unlike liberals, Kurginyan did not tire of emphasizing the social conquests of the Soviet system. These reasoning his reasoning fell on fertile ground. Without it, people remember that some 30 years ago there were no homeless people, nor poor, nor sieves on the windows, no metal doors with several locks. The explanations of what actually took place in the country in the Brezhnev period of "stagnation" did not give one or the other side.
Then, in the bowels of the Soviet system, literally according to Marx, the foundations of new social relations arose. The "stagnation" was actually a period of intense, albeit underlying socio-economic development. It was not Soviet collectivism that has developed, the potential of which Kurginyan still hopes, but secret criminal individualism in the form of a shadow economy. If on the surface in the 1970-80s there was a decrease in production growth, social atrophy and the alienation of the employee from the results of his own work, then the entities of the shadow economy were secretly assigned from state enterprises. When a significant part of this profit passed into the private pockets of the shades, then the sentence of Soviet socialism was signed. Perestroika, starting with calls to make socialism more effective, eventually led to its formal death. The August coup of 1991, which cut off perestroika, did not mean a “democratic revolution”, as many liberals still consider, but just a change in the current government. The destruction of the "vertical" of the authorities of party committees, holding the Soviet Union as a unitary state education, entailed its inevitable collapse.
By exalting Boris Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar, the liberals are still not ready to recognize the genuine character of the so -called August Revolution of 1991 and learn the necessary lessons from it. They do not say that Gaidar reform has released shadow criminal public relations, and privatization contributed to their legalization. None of the liberals in power imagined what to do with the inheritance of the Soviet industry, almost 80% of which one way or another worked for war. As a result, many plants were abandoned, and the bet is naturally made on the use of the country's natural wealth. Their owners were a small group of private individuals. As a result, the Soviet state property was replaced by not capitalist private property with the regulator accompanying it - the right, but hypertrophied personal property, in which relations are regulated by the system of concepts and the elimination of objectionable ones. With the coming to the power of Vladimir Putin, the new owners were directly included in the technological chain of state power.
The last ten years have passed under the motto of the fortifications of traditional Russian statehood. It became finally clear that there were no real social forces and independent civil structures that can propose and defend a different, not state -owned, but a civilian path of development of the country. With such a historical inheritance and the luggage of the disappointments of the last decades, Kurginyan may well be right, predicting the victory of the new Red Project by 2019. Of course, this will be a project in a modern edition. However, the essence of the state structure, in which only the supreme power and its subjects exist, will not change from this.