And I want it, and it injects me

The Armenian opposition postponed the "revolution"

On March 17, another large opposition rally took place in Yerevan. At the rally, there were calls for a change of government; those gathered (tens of thousands of people reportedly took part in the action) chanted “Now! Now!” However, opposition leaders preferred to calm the crowd, saying that the time had not yet come to eliminate the current “regime”. At the same time, they assured their supporters that they were not going to abandon their plans to carry out a “revolution.”

The rally of many thousands that took place in Yerevan is impressive (especially when you compare it with opposition protests in other neighboring countries - for example, in Azerbaijan , where opponents of the government, who recently organized a “day of rage” using the now fashionable method of Facebook mobilization, managed to gather only a few hundreds of people).

On the other hand, in the case of the Armenian opposition, which was inspired by the “revolutions” in Africa and the Middle East (at one of the recent rallies in Yerevan, a speaker even addressed “greetings to the peoples of Egypt and Tunisia”), its readiness to organize mass rallies is not yet ensures that she is ready to move on and will move on to something more serious.

The opposition alliance ANC (the Armenian National Congress is an association of a number of parties, headed by the former President of the Republic Levon Ter-Petrosyan ) has organized numerous protests over the past few years. At the rallies, the usual threats were made against the “regime,” but the opposition was in no hurry to move on to active confrontation.

One of the factors that holds back potential “revolutionaries” in Armenia is the Karabakh conflict. The destabilization that threatens Armenia with an attempt to overthrow the government (especially if this destabilization drags on, as was the case, for example, in Kyrgyzstan ) will certainly affect the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijan can first of all take advantage of the weakening of Armenia: for example, increase military pressure on the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which depends on the support of Yerevan. Or (if the Armenian “revolutionaries” manage to come to power), with the support of the international community, put pressure on the new leadership of Armenia (which will need global recognition of its legitimacy) in order to extract some concessions on Karabakh. For example, to obtain Yerevan’s consent to transfer under Azerbaijani control the territories adjacent to the NKR (the so-called “security belt”, which was taken under control by Karabakh troops after the military conflict in the early 1990s)

Under these conditions, the “revolutionaries” in Yerevan may find themselves in a situation where, instead of more pleasant activities - such as the redistribution of the property of the previous “regime” - they will have to deal with a large-scale crisis in Karabakh (up to a new war). The risks for those who are going to govern Armenia are quite high. Even a president who has failed in the Karabakh conflict or has earned accusations of trying to “surrender Karabakh” may lose his seat for this (something similar happened in 1998 with Levon Ter-Petrosyan, after he proposed transferring territories from the “security belt” to Azerbaijan). .

Opponents of the government understand this. Speaking at a rally on March 17, the leader of the People's Party Stepan Demirchyan said that the opposition would try to achieve a change of power “without shocks.” Shocks, he noted, could weaken Armenia’s position on the Karabakh front. As for Ter-Petrosyan, at one of his recent rallies he admitted that “the Armenian National Congress has always been restrained... by the danger of a resumption of the Karabakh war on the part of Azerbaijan in the event of internal unrest in Armenia.”

At the same time, however, the ANC leader made a reservation. He stated that, they say, “a people who have nothing to lose may one day, roughly speaking, spit on the opinion of the Congress and even on Karabakh.” That is, the former president admitted the possibility of a “revolution” (even at the cost of Karabakh), but refused to take responsibility for himself in advance, preferring to resort to the hackneyed demagogic technique of “revolutionaries” and shift it to the “people.”

In the current situation, both the opposition and the authorities prefer to refrain from harsh confrontation. At the previous rally, the leader of the ANC put forward a 15-point ultimatum to the authorities: he demanded, in particular, to release some comrades whom he considered political prisoners, to increase salaries and pensions in the country, and in addition to dismiss the heads of a number of government agencies (including the head of government and the head of the National Service security). The former president also demanded early parliamentary and presidential elections.

The authorities essentially refused to fulfill this ultimatum. However, at the next rally, the former president did not aggravate the situation, but, on the contrary, tried to soften the language. He stated that he did not issue an ultimatum, but only announced a “program for implementing democratic reforms.” To his comrades who were chanting “Now! Now!”, the ANC leader said that there was no need to rush. “We must understand that today or tomorrow, or right now nothing will happen,” he reassured the crowd. “Everything must happen in due time, we are all participants in this political process.”

The leader of the Armenian National Movement (the party that was ruling during Ter-Petrosyan’s presidency) Aram Manukyan also called on those gathered to wait. “Be patient, people,” he persuaded, “we will be in the right place at the right time. Believe me, we have everything figured out.” At the same time, the oppositionist instructed the protesters to be loyal to the leader. “We have only one request,” Manukyan said . “Trust Levon Ter-Petrosyan, listen to the calls, requests and even orders of the Armenian National Congress.”

Levon Ter-Petrosyan. Photo (c)AFP

As for the government officials, after the previous rally they stated that they were not going to fulfill the opposition’s ultimatums. At the same time, the authorities did make some concessions to potential “revolutionaries.” On the day of the next protest, it became known that two oppositionists had been released early from prison : Harutyun Urutyan, a former representative of Ter-Petrosyan’s election headquarters, convicted of “obstructing elections,” and Roman Mnatsakanyan, convicted of participating in the March 2008 riots.

A more serious concession was that oppositionists were allowed to gather in Freedom Square in the city center for the first time in several years. There, we recall, Ter-Petrosyan and his supporters staged a “Maidan” in early 2008 (when the former president lost the next election and refused to admit defeat). The rallies then turned into riots, and clashes occurred between oppositionists and police officers, in which there were casualties on both sides. After this, it was not allowed to hold rallies in this square.

This time, however, opposition supporters who had gathered at another traditional rally site (near the Matenadaran repository of ancient manuscripts) were unexpectedly allowed to move to Freedom Square. Opposition leaders called it a victory. When the rally moved to the square, its participants were in no hurry to disperse. There was even speculation that the protest could continue into the night. However, in the end, the organizers dismissed their supporters, scheduling the next rally for April 8.

The press, which assessed the actions of the authorities and the opposition on March 17, is now discussing a version according to which the parties were guided by certain agreements. Both of them got what they wanted. The authorities were protected (at least for a while) from radical actions, the opposition demonstrated its strength. The “revolutionaries” had the opportunity to return to their favorite square, but they did not turn it into a “Maidan”, but stood there and dispersed. “The actions of the opposition and the authorities,” notes the Yerkir (“Country”) newspaper, “were very synchronous and complemented each other.”

The day after the rally, by the way, from the ranks of the ruling Republican Party (which usually exchanges only accusations and derogatory characteristics with the ANC) something vaguely resembling a compliment addressed to Ter-Petrosyan was heard. Secretary of the RPA parliamentary faction Eduard Sharmazanov said that “the statements of the ANC leader have basically become more correct.” “Of course, there was criticism of the authorities, but this is normal. The opposition criticizes - we work,” the deputy added.

Commenting on the version of behind-the-scenes agreements between the government and the opposition, ANC activist Alexander Arzumanyan drew attention to the fact that the police who kept order during the rally communicated very politely with its participants. “The behavior of the police created the impression that such an agreement was possible,” he said .

So far, the authorities have received only a reprieve in any case. If the Armenian leadership really wants to come to an agreement with potential “revolutionaries” and not disperse them, then this will require giving them something more than just permission to rally in Freedom Square. In the near future it will become clear what else the authorities are willing to pay.

Mikhail Tishchenko

And I want it, and it injects me

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