Currency hunger

In different countries, world crisis is different. If in the Middle East its detonator was a food for food, then in our neighbor, Belarus, the role of the convertible currency was able to play the role of the role. The fact that the first signs of “currency hunger” appeared was known from the press messages and from the actions of the emergency bodies: the National Bank of Belarus has expanded the boundaries of the currency cororinor from 8% to 10%. Formally, this event should increase the efficiency of exchange rate operations, but it is really possible to reduce the demand for currency, which was in short supply.

The simplest and most understandable indicator of the deficiency or surplus of foreign currency is the volume of foreign exchange cutter. A few months ago, with reserves, the Central Bank of Belarus was more and more successful, and at the beginning of October 2010 they amounted to $ 4.4 billion (this is a maximum of the past few years). But then they began to quickly develop, and at the beginning of March 2011, they amounted to only $ 2.2 billion. It is impressive that if in six months the reserves are reduced twice, then this is very strong anxiety of economic agents and the sufficiently nervous reaction of the authorities.

But this reduction causes even a passion for anxiety, as it leads to a deterioration in the indicator of the sufferers. According to the IMF methodology, each country with an unconditioned currency proverb in the convertible currency should be at least a three -month volume. In Belarus, this indicator was not observed even when reserves or were stable. For example, last year, the average annual size of the cutter amounted to about $ 4 billion, and the import of goods over the year amounted to $ 34 billion. With this volume of imports, the reserves should have amounted to $ 8.5 billion, and they were anfactically less.

Now, after a collapse of the pruner, their sufficiency will become even worse, and in order to correct it, the monetary authorities of the republic will have to resort to one of the two -way known ways - either reduce imports or receive loans from the IMF. Simple is known exactly what method will be given preference, but one can go in advance - neither one nor the other measure will help the republic.

The fact is that it has already been long -lasting (if not to say - from the moment of independence), Belarus -plays great difficulties with currency resources. It so happened that the eimport is almost always more export, and therefore her payment balance is balance -nickel. So, over the past 7 years, over 2004-2010, the republic’s payment Balance was released “in plus” only once, and the rest of the time it was negative. At the same time, the deficiency was constantly growing, and if in 2005 it was $ 1.5 billion, then in 2010 - already $ 8.5 billion.

It is not difficult to guess that if the Ures public is a deficit in foreign economic relations, and chronic, then it is valid by increasing external debt. If at the beginning of 2005 the external debt (state and private) amounted to only $ 5 billion, then at the beginning of 2009 it is already $ 15 billion, and by the beginning of 2011 it jumps to $ 28.5 billion. That is, the external debt begins to exceed the size of annual exports (2010 - $ 25 billion), which makes it problematic to maintain certain barriers, and puts certain barriers to certain barriers. On the way to receive new loans.

Thus, the problem of deficiency balance and lack of currency has developed a long time, and only another external blow was needed so that the situation has grown into a crisis. The Takimudar for the Belarusian currency market was the conflict between the authorities of Russia by Ibelarus regarding the tariff taxation of oil exports.

It is well known that the extent import of imports was caused by the rise in the cost of energy, which Belarus is skipping in Russia. But until recently, the problem of constant rise in cost of the very least resolved. The purchased oil went to two Belarusian refineries, where it was re -designed and already in the form of oil products was sent to the domestic market for export. The increase in the cost of raw materials was transferred to the increase in the cost of the costing -meal, and the difference between the cost of crude oil and the cost of the NENEFTEPRICES allowed the republic, in addition, to receive a good foreign currency carrier. However, since last year, the Russian side introduced duties on the export of Syryneft, which almost completely captured this difference, and now almost nothing remains of the Republic of Examination of oil products.

The result of such a teenaries. Firstly, Belarusia has reduced currency resources, and the same “currency hunger” arose with which the National Bank is now fighting, and secondly, already due to this currency hunger, oil refineries were forced to reduce oil purchases and, accordingly, reduce oil products.

Thus, the economics of theBerax, though under pressure from external circumstances, began to reduce imports. The nasophage of imports for Belarusian conditions is least suitable, since this will mean a serious drop in internal production and employment. If the Belarusian refinery will cease to receive Russian oil, then they will have to stand and send their workers to unpaid administrative days, and this is not at all the economic policy that working people expect from their president.

In completely different reactions, the pumping of imports and contains, by the way, a significant difference between Russian economics and Belarusian. For the Belarusian economy, the reduction of imports is a decrease in domestic production, and for Russian it is a cleaning market from foreign competitors, after which there will be a noble production. Not immediately and not for all commodity positions, of course, the zerost caused by import substitution will certainly be. But in Belarus - no.

Thus, traditional consumers of alignment of payment balance are unlikely to help here. Therefore, even the IMF will fork out, and will allocate the required amounts to Belarus, this will not save it. To pay for the import of Russian oil and gas (or at least the customs grips that they are subject to), it needs completely different. For normal functioning of the economy of Belarus, constant external financing is necessary, and on an irrevocable basis, and now no one will predict it. In any case, just like that, or on the conditions that the Belarusian political leadership puts forward.

When reasoning abstractly, it can be predicted that Belarus has a chance to get out of this situation if, for example, he sells his assets to foreign investors, including NPZ -Russian oil companies. Moreover, the conversation about this has been going on for a very member of the years, and buyers have long been known. But this option, alas, is encountered by the ongoing position of the Belarusian president, who does not want to lose control over property in the republic entrusted to him. Therefore, we, Skorehevo, have a lot of interesting moments when we observe the Person of the Belarusian leadership to get out of the currency crisis, into which it drove away.

But the other neighbor of Belarus -Ukrainian, back in the days of Kuchma, acted smarter and transferred control by the carbon monoxide for Russian oil companies, and therefore now Naukhechein has no problems with the raw materials for the refinery, and income from the export of oil products. Whether Ukraine will serve as an example for Belarus, or not.