The origins and meaning of the Arab revolution

We publish a transcript of the program “Science 2.0”-a joint project of the information and analytical portal “Polit.ru” and the Vesti FM radio station. The guest of the program is a doctor of historical sciences, the head of the department of the Modern East of the Russian State Humanitarian University, the leading researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies and the Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences Andrei Korotaev . You can hear us every Saturday after 23:00 on the wave of 97.6 FM. Polit.ru published the thoughts of Andrei Korotaev and Julia Zinkina about the mechanisms of the Egyptian revolution and Andrei Korotaev’s comment on the prospects of the situation in Yemen.

Anatoly Kuzichev: I welcome Vesti FM studio Andrei Vitalievich Korotaev, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Head of the Department of the Modern East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as the leading researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies and the Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Andrey Vitalievich, hello!

Andrey Korotaev: Hello!

A.K.: Boris Dolgin and Dmitry Itskovich are conducting the program, as usual, these are our colleagues with Polit.ru.

Dmitry Itskovich and Boris Dolgin: Hello!

AK: And I, Anatoly Kuzichev, from the Vesti FM radio station.

B.D.: We would like to talk about the social structure of Arab societies. This is very interesting if you take into account all their diversity. About how somewhere archaic forms coexist in them today, and somewhere newer.

D.I.: We understand what we want to talk about: we are usually talking about science, about its connection with relevant social circumstances. Here it all came together. Because the most important thing that is happening in the world is now about what is happening in Yemen.

And what is Yemen, what does it consist of, what is it eaten with? We had a completely brilliant tourist article about Yemen on Polit.ru. She was written by a girl who travels a lot around the Arab countries, a little knows the Arabic language. The beauty of pictures, descriptions, people, lifestyle, some kind of relationship is incredible. At the same time, we look at this with absolutely American-European-centric optics, and what we see, it excites us. And today it really worries, because it can steal the whole world.

A.K.: That's how briefly we formulated the first question, Andrei Vitalievich.

Andrey Korotaev: The idea is clear. Indeed, the situation is insanely interesting, although, of course, for many in these countries it is not easy. And it is interesting in that, of course, on the one hand, the Arab countries are surprisingly diverse, but on the other hand, we see such a wave of revolutions, shocks that occurred amazingly synchronously. Therefore, of course, I want to find some denominator-in fact, he is, but there is a risk of adjusting everything to one comb, to underestimate the variety of Arab countries.

B.D.: Events take place everywhere a little or not a little differently.

Andrey Korotaev: Well, yes. Apparently, it makes sense to talk about diversity and about the common denominator. Why do we start?

A.K.: Let's first about the general denominator.

Andrey Korotaev: A common denominator-why did this happen to such an extent synchronously? One impulse of synchronization is not so close to us - 1973, a jump in oil prices ... ...

BD: which was very reflected in the Soviet Union - gave the country good oil money.

Andrei Korotaev: He affected the Soviet Union and in the Arab world in a similar way - a wave of Nefteedollars poured, which, in general, went to everyone, but oil -producing countries - first of all. Yemen also got very decent: through the channels of help, through the migration of the Yemenis to work in the Persian Gulf and through the wave of oil -eater, who brought labor migrants to Yemen. So, in general, all the Arab countries got it, and this contributed to the acceleration of the modernization of countries.

B.D.: And inhibition of modernization in the Soviet Union ...

Andrey Korotaev: Well, we have to deal with this ...

A.K.: Let's still return to the common Arab denominator.

Andrey Korotaev: So, one of the clear manifestations of the modernization of the Arab countries was the development of a modern healthcare system. In a number of countries, these petrodollars were able to organize networks of hospitals, maternity hospitals, clinics and so on. Therefore, in most Arab countries in the 70-80s we observe a sharp drop in mortality, including infant and children's. The general trend is such - the total mortality fell three times, which is a lot, infant - four times, children's - about five times. This

A landslide drop in mortality occurred against the background of high birth rate.

Furiable also began to decline in Arab countries, but with noticeable delay.

And also, among other things, In the 70s, most Arab countries leave the Maltese trap. What is it? The Maltese trap is what Thomas Maltus described in the late XVIII - beginning of the XIX century. This is a situation typical of pre -industrial societies when the economy seems to grow. Maltus said that the production of means of existence is growing in arithmetic progression, and the population for obvious reasons is growing exponentially. The economy is growing, but the growth rate of the population overtake the rate of economic growth, and at the exit, despite the growth of the economy, most of the population lives worse and worse. Suppose there is some kind of innovation there, there is some growth in the life of the population, but then everything is repeated - and the population again collapses to the level close to the level of survival. Humanity was in the Maltusian trap until the 19th century, and this was one of the main sources of socio-political upheavals in pre-industrial societies. Western Europe bursts out of the Maltese trap in the 19th century, and Arab countries come out of it just in the 1970-80s. The growth of the population is increasing, but the rate of economic growth is even higher than the growth rate of the population.

Recommended for the rate of food consumption is 2300-2400 kcal per person per day. In most Arab countries, in the early 1960s, this consumption rate was noticeably lower than the recommended near the norm-in the area of ​​2000-2100, it was a level of real malnutrition. Say, in Egypt in the 1970s there is a jump from 2300 to 3000 kcal per person a day, and below 3000 kcal it never fell. That is, Egypt over 10 years passes from the level of malnutrition to the level of overeating. Now 30% of the population is really overeating there, and this is very funny, since at the same time 85% of the population receives subsidies for food. So 15-20% of overeating Egyptians still continue to receive subsidies for food.

Here is what happened in the Arab world in the 1970-80s - almost all countries leave the Maltese trap, and this is an important factor in mortality. When the problem of malnutrition is solved, it greatly affects infant and child mortality ...

A.K.: Andrey Vitalievich, sorry, you promised to tell us about the common denominator.

Andrey Korotaev: This is a common denominator.

A.K.: Maltusian trap, from which everyone crawled out.

Andrey Korotaev: We continue. The situation is as follows: there is a sharp decrease in mortality, while the birth rate remains at a high level. What is this leading to? The fact that the growth rate of the population is accelerated, and the notorious demographic explosion occurs. Infant and children's mortality falls especially strongly. What does it mean? A woman gives birth to 7-8 children, these are very recent numbers for the Arab world. But in a traditional society, 2-3 children live from them until reproductive age, so there is no demographic explosion there. And then infant and children's mortality collapses, and the woman continues to give birth to 7-8 children. Only now, 6-7 live from them until reproductive age.

At the same time, there is a sharp rejuvenation of the population - a significant increase in the share of youth in the total population. This is such a notorious “youth hillock”-a phenomenon that was opened in the 1960s. It must be borne in mind that this is a natural consequence of the release from the Maltese trap. In Russia, this was just before the October Revolution, on the eve of 1917. The difference is that in the industrial world, antibiotics, modern medical technologies, etc., make the main contribution to a decrease in infant and children's mortality. And in Russia, the main thing, by the way, was still a certain growth in living standards, including peasantry, the transition to Khaty-Pyatenki huts. The traditional dwelling is just a single -chamber ...

D.I.: They stopped freezing.

Andrei Korotaev: This means that in winter the door opens - and cold air goes directly, including on lactating mothers, for babies - this is a powerful factor in infant mortality. And in the five -tier, the main idea is that the inner wall appears there, the wall indoor. Then the warm room appears guaranteed to in the winter. And this is a guaranteed warm place in the house where the baby was not scared, had a completely tremendous influence, turned out to be a cosmic factor in mortality.

A.K.: Surprisingly.

Andrey Korotaev: And in the Arab world it is clear: Nefteedollars, a way out of the Maltese trap, the development of medical science, a strong rejuvenation - “Youth Bugor”.

AK: I remind you that today in Science 2.0 Andrey Vitalievich Korotaev. We tried to isolate a certain common denominator in the Arab East.

B.D.: In order to further deal with the specifics of different countries.

AK: By the way, for some reason we focused on Yemen.

B.D.: Andrey Vitalievich was a lot in Yemen at one time.

D.I.: And because in Yemen the main events are taking place now.

B.D.: Well, one of the most important.

Andrey Korotaev: In Yemen, the most dangerous situation is now the greatest potential of the bloody civil war.

A.K.: Sorry, I must remind you that the main element of the common denominator is a strong rejuvenation of societies.

D.I.: Not just rejuvenation, but a youth hillock.

Andrey Korotaev: It is clear that

Young people are part of the population, most prone to radicalism, which has not yet have families.

BD: and requiring maximum mobility from society.

Andrei Korotaev: Yes, therefore, more easily mobilized to participate in mass movements, rather ready to sacrifice his life for a seemingly right -hand business. A well -known thing - a noticeable increase in the share of youth in the total population leads to the radicalization of society. The same Social Democrats, for example, in the pre-revolutionary era everywhere with age migrated from left to right. Accordingly, the older the person, the sooner he will have more moderate beliefs, the more young people. On the contrary, young will more often have radical beliefs. It seems to be

There are publications where it is proved that almost all major revolutions were accompanied by youth hillocks.

D.I.: I have a question about the youth hillock. It seems to me that traditional education does not cease to cope with a large number of people.

Andrey Korotaev: Of course. This is correct in any case, but in the Arab countries there is another factor - this is a massive distribution of modern education. Here, just in recent years, serious successes have been achieved. Incidentally, Yemen is a country that is in the first place in the world in the share of GDP, the state budget spent on education. It is Yemen! In principle, the Yemenic leadership has a rather wise policy, this is perfectly correct, because the growth of education is a way to reduce birth rate. It is believed that

Women's literacy is the most powerful factor in decrease in the birth rate.

In general, education is a way to achieve economic growth. That is, the policy was quite reasonable, but when there is such a massive distribution of education, this has some consequences. They cannot be called unambiguously negative, but it cannot be called unambiguously positive either.

I will give a characteristic example. I had a familiar dean of the Humanitarian Faculty of Cairo University. Do you know how many students have at the faculty? 30 thousand! And this is at one faculty of the University of Cairo. This gives an idea of ​​the scale.

D.I.: And how many thousands of audiences?

A.K.: There are parties mainly there?

Andrey Korotaev: No, the territory of the University of Cairo is completely huge, but still the audience is crowded. In general, there are a lot of problems. And one more characteristic example.

At the time of the beginning of the Egyptian revolution, 43% of the unemployed in the country had a higher education.

AK: 43%?

Andrey Korotaev: 43%. Accordingly, about half of the unemployed were at the age of 20-24 years. A huge number of unemployed highly educated ....

D.I.: ... and fantastically unsatisfied people.

BD: qualified and young enough to have high requests.

Andrey Korotaev: I don’t know, frankly, I never said this factor, but one of my friends said. It must be borne in mind that society is still traditionalist, with fairly rigid sexual restrictions ...

AK: Is this an important factor? Sublimation.

Andrei Korotaev: In a number of Arab countries, Kalym has recently had a tendency to growth, therefore it is quite difficult to marry.

B.D.: Kalyma size or degree of its prevalence?

Andrey Korotaev: Still, this is a huge amount of young highly educated, but sexually unsatisfied population. These, of course, are additional points, but still strong.

AK: Listen, you have to come up with a term. Remember what the Moldavian revolution was called? Twitter-revolution. And here what? I'm even afraid to suggest. Sexual sublimation? Sublimation of sexual desires, fantasies realized in such societies.

Andrey Korotaev: Yes.

D.I.: No, this is one of the factors. Of course, the factor of the youth hillock, the factor of this unexpected semi-formation, partially replaced by the traditional education, which nevertheless restrains people and holds within some cultural framework. How did the Tunisian revolution begin? The peddler of something, the seller of something with higher education. This is just a mass phenomenon everywhere.

Andrey Korotaev: This is a little to the side, but still I want to tell about it on the example of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi leadership showed itself, as it turns out, the most wise. And Gaddafi, apparently, failed that he did not follow the example of the Saudi leadership. The Saudi leadership realized the seriousness of this problem and, in my opinion, was acted in an extremely wise way. They began to provide Saudi unemployed with the higher education of the place of school teachers. After all, people with a humanitarian education, and the humanitarian can always find some work of the teacher at school. And in the Arab world, the position of school teachers is quite honorable, and even pay very good money. In general, this is a completely satisfactory proposal, there is something to agree to. Question: Why are there so many teachers? And it is solved in a rather simple way: classes are reduced. There, 15 years ago, the classes were 30-40 people, and now 10-15 people in the classroom. And this is also great, because it leads to an improvement in the quality of education. The only thing that such a solution needs a lot of resources.

B.D.: Not every country can afford it.

Andrey Korotaev: In Saudi Arabia, these resources were, and Libya had this kind of resources. A rich country can afford this, but Bahrain did not follow the wise path of the Saudis. Still, it was a rather bold solution: to send a very significant part of the budget for these purposes. But it worked.

D.I.: But in Saudi Arabia, it seems, and there is no such strong demographic explosion.

Andrey Korotaev: No, in Saudi Arabia it was the same. In the first place in terms of a demographic transition is the united Arab Emirates - there are already less than two children in a woman. Apparently, soon it will be necessary to begin to think about stimulating the birth rate, and not about how to reduce it. In Egypt, this is still high - well, 2.8 children per woman, but this is not seven or eight, which were recently.

D.I.: For several years - and everything would be in order.

Andrey Korotaev: This is what is about that now the youth hillock in most Arab countries began to decline. Almost by 2015, he was already supposed to resolve in countries like Tunisia and Egypt. These two explosions occurred at the very sample output from the trap.

But Yemen, unfortunately, does not apply to this category, he is still far enough before leaving the trap - the birth rate is above five children to a woman, but more recently there were eight, so this is already a noticeable success. But still, Yemen is very far behind other Arab countries in terms of a demographic and urbanization crossing-there still 70% of the population lives in villages. In most Arab countries, more than half of the population has been living in cities for a long time, in Libya - already at 90%. In many Arab countries, the urbanization transition has already ended, the population from the village to the city occurred, but in Yemen this process has not yet ended. A very dangerous combination of a youth hill with a massive peremrel from the village to the city, this creates a special explosive mass.

D.I.: It seems to Russia, it seems.

Andrey Korotaev: Yes. In this regard, in Egypt and Tunisia, say, the problem of superintendent migration from the village to the city has already been more or less resolved. Plus, there is still a high education of unemployed youth. These factors were an important factor that the revolutions were so bloodless, in some ways resembled the student revolutions of 1968 in Western Europe, or to velvety revolutions. Still, highly educated youth is not as prone to bloodshed as poorly educated, we can talk about this quite confidently.

In Algeria, the previous explosion was terribly bloody - in the region of 100 thousand people were injured. And now - baby babble. In Egypt, the previous strong explosion - these were 1977 bread riots. They continued all day - 800 dead. But there, the main shock force was poorly educated youth. Now all this lasted three weeks, many millions of people participated, just huge crowds, and such a small number of dead. At the same time, people were killed mainly not at the hands of protesting, but from the forces of security and the criminals they hired, who gave most of the deaths. And the protesters themselves showed the top of the gentlemanly behavior ...

AK: Sorry, I will try to formalize. So, we have a common denominator - a youth hillock of highly educated, sexually unsatisfied people.

B.D.: Often also unemployed.

A.K.: This is a general situation for many countries mentioned today in our program.

Andrey Korotaev: Yes, plus another factor in the common denominator, who contributed to why this was synchronously. This, of course, is the AGFTATI, the second wave of agflation, that is, rising prices for food.

Д.И.: Ухудшение качества жизни, которое происходит очень быстро.

Андрей Коротаев: При этом надо сказать, что большая часть арабских стран зависит от импорта продовольствия. The previous wave of protests was in 2008, on the eve of the global financial and economic crisis. В Египте первая волна протестов началась шестого апреля 2008 года, с забастовки рабочих фабрики в Эль-Махалла-эль-Кубре. They protested, first of all, against the fall of the standard of living. Тогда в Facebook'е была создана группа «Шестое апреля» для поддержки этих бастующих рабочих. Тогда была впервые опробована самоорганизация через Facebook. What is characteristic, after food prices collapsed as a result of the beginning of the global economic crisis, a wave of protests went on a decline. Но уже была создана инфраструктура, именно во время первой волны была создана инфраструктура взаимодействия молодежи через среду, которая показала свою крайнюю эффективность и во время новой волны.

Д.И.: Действительно, эти новые технологии: фэйсбуки, твиттеры, смски и так далее, так сильно повлияли на ситуацию?

Андрей Коротаев: Такое впечатление, что да. Ладно, не буду говорить…

А.К.: Нет, раз уж начали говорить, Андрей Витальевич, будьте любезны...

Андрей Коротаев: Посол Египта в России недавно выступал, и он приводил эту информацию, и она действительно выглядит исключительно правдоподобной. Что организаторы выступления 25 января в Каире, группа в Facebook, рассчитывали, что там будет где-то 1,5 – 2 тысячи человек, и они ошиблись в оценке числа потенциальных участников - на два порядка. Они флэшмоб пытались организовать, но пришло примерно в сто раз больше людей, чем предполагали организаторы этого мероприятия. Здесь мы имеем дело с чем-то типа самоорганизации.

А.К.: Страшная сила этот Facebook: пытаешься флэшмоб организовать, а нечаянно революция получается.

Андрей Коротаев: Могу сказать, что я и сам получил предложение идти через Facebook. Видимо, была абсолютно спамовая рассылка. Какие-то египетские знакомые у меня есть, видимо, поэтому я как-то попал в эту сеть рассылки. Видимо, рассылались эти приглашения многим миллионам людей, но они сами не ждали, что эффект будет именно таким.

Б.Д.: А роль общеарабских медиа: Аль-Джазира, Аль-Арабия?

Андрей Коротаев: Абсолютно колоссальная.

Надо проговорить тот момент, что это вторая волна агфляции, - это очень важно. По крайней мере, для Египта это однозначно так, но я думаю, что для Йемена и Туниса это тоже было очень важно. Потому что если бы в протесте участвовала только высокообразованная безработная молодёжь, масштаб был бы не совсем таким, какой получился. К этой безработной высокообразованной молодёжи присоединились многие миллионы бедных, скажем, египтян. В Египте их положение действительно очень заметно ухудшилось, причем очень быстро - за считанное число месяцев. Нужно иметь в виду, что волна 2008 года и волна 2010-2011 гг. связаны с тем, что рост продовольствия происходил стремительно за несколько месяцев. There was a study of Egyptian economy metrists, who showed that during the first wave of agflation, the number of Egyptians living below the poverty level increased by three to four million people in a few months. А когда появляется три-четыре миллиона новых бедных людей буквально за считанное число месяцев, людей, которые прямо на глазах опустились ниже уровня бедности, – это создаёт дополнительную армию массового протеста.

Я ещё раз повторю, что сложно того же Мубарака в этом винить. Правительство Мубарака делало всё возможное, чтобы цены на продовольствие как-то смягчить через систему субсидий и тому подобное. Но всё-таки полностью им справиться не удалось. Так что, с одной стороны, был авангард застрельщиков - высокообразованная безработная молодёжь, а с другой стороны - была армия недовольных бедных людей. В результате все вместе приняло массовый характер. Опять-таки, одного фактора агфляции явно мало. Скажем, в Латинской Америке рост цен на продовольствие по бедным слоям ударил с не меньшей силой, чем по арабскому миру. But in Latin America there were no such wave of protests. Латинская Америка, надо сказать, основательно опережает арабский восток по демографическому переходу, то есть там молодёжный бугор уже более или менее рассосался. И нет такого сочетания всплеска цен на продовольствие и молодежного бугра.

Д.И.: Поэтому не было такого сильного давления.

Андрей Коротаев: С другой стороны, конечно, исключительно велика роль медиаканалов. Ведь в некоторых других азиатских странах ситуация близкая, в том же Пакистане. Там тоже потенциально взрывоопасная ситуация, но нужно иметь в виду, что

за последние 10-15 лет в арабском мире произошла ещё и медиареволюция. Super professional television channels appeared.

Лучше всего известна Аль-Джазира, но Аль-Арабия – кувейтский аналогичный спутниковый канал, абсолютно сопоставимый по качеству. Это же абсолютно мировой уровень…

А.К.: Высочайший класс. Sorry. Ты знаешь слоган Аль-Джазира, очень смешной? Я его видел в каком-то офисе: там висит такой огромный глаз, сделанный из тысячи маленьких телевизионных экранчиков. И слоган написан: все смотрят CNN, а что смотрит CNN? Аль-Джазиру, естественно.

Андрей Коротаев: Я могу сказать, что если спрашивать арабов, зачем они покупают спутниковые тарелки, они отвечают: прежде всего, чтобы смотреть Аль-Джазиру. Это характерно именно для стран типа Туниса и Египта, где государственные средства массовой информации находились всё-таки под жёстким государственным контролем. Появление такого свободного источника информации имеет огромное значение.

Д.И.: Здесь двойная вещь. С одной стороны, медиареволюция как появление массмедийных региональных лидеров, высококлассных и профессиональных - типа Аль-Джазира или Аль-Арабия. А другая сторона – это когда трансляторами в этих медиа оказываются любые люди. Потому что Аль-Джазира может принимать любой человек, просто с сотового телефона, - поэтому любая информация становится доступной, и ею легко обмениваются через эти большие медиа, а не только через фэйсбуки.

Андрей Коротаев: Я видел абсолютно блестящие, классные трансляции. Действительно, когда на твоём родном языке, ты всё это видишь, ты всё это слышишь... Кстати, довольно забавно, что такой главный лозунг этих арабских революций: АШАБ ЮРИД ИСКАТ АН НИЗАМ!!! АШАБ ЮРИД ИСКАТ АН НИЗАМ!!! У меня до сих пор так в голове сидит. Он, кстати, на литературном языке.

Б.Д.: То есть понятен всем арабам - вне зависимости от страны.

А.К.: Андрей Витальевич, переведите нам.

Андрей Коротаев: Народ хочет падения режима.

А.К.: Всегда, в любом месте. [laugh]

Андрей Коротаев: Вот толпе и хочется идти и свергать. Потому что классно очень.

А.К.: Сдерживайтесь, Андрей Витальевич, очень надо сдержаться.

Андрей Коротаев: Нет, понимаете, Тахрир - это, конечно, класс. Действительно высокообразованная молодёжь, такие одухотворённые лица, и так вот с душой это скандируют, что заводит. И мне кажется, что всё-таки это рвануло именно по арабскому миру, за пределами арабского мира такого эффекта не имело. Если ещё и на твоём родном языке вот это вот скандировалось…

Д.И.: Народ хочет падения режима.

А.К.: Давайте на неделю прервёмся, а потом снова встретимся в этой студии с Андреем Витальевичем Коротаевым, доктором исторических наук, заведующим кафедрой современного Востока РГГУ, ведущим научным сотрудником Института востоковедения и Института Африки РАН. Вели программу Борис Долгин, Дмитрий Ицкович и Анатолий Кузичев.

Thank you!