
The end of the next dictator, which has gone beyond the permissible, poses many interesting questions.
These are not questions about who will be as follows: the answers are more or less obvious. If the President of Yemen, instead of trading about the compensation, returning control over the country, it may end or not end with a full -fledged civil war, but no treatment in Saudi Arabia will help him anymore. The line of Assad is also not far off.
The question is in some basic principles of world order and modern politics.
Vadim Gasanov put forward his version of questions about the same occasion in his bewildered text. If you briefly summarize, the author eats to understand why we have been handing over our loyal friends - Gaddafi and Assad, because friendship with their regimes has been stretching since Soviet times, and they have not done anything fundamentally new now.
It seems to me that the latest events in Libya help, answering his questions, to reformulate them in a more productive way.
In the article of April 2003, I wrote : “The only opportunity ... not to lose the war in Iraq - carefully look at the real, and not the fictional interests of the country - both in the region and in the world. And after this, without waiting for the end of the campaign, to join the work on the creation of a new Iraq: to think through the system of representative office of various groups of the population (taking into account the successes and failures of the experience of Lebanon and Dagestan); connect to the search for relatively healthy forces in the Iraqi establishment; prepare participation in tenders for the restoration of Iraq; To develop the principles of "inheritance" of economic obligations with a change in the regime, etc. "
To the extent in which the actions of Russia corresponded to this logic, the state and our companies won.
The lack of contacts with the Libyan rebels or the continuation of the support of Gaddafi would have little changed the fate of the latter, but would significantly complicate relations with tomorrow Libyan leadership and most of the population. National support for such modes usually ends as special services employees destroy their once omnipotent certificates.
Of course, Russia could block the famous UN Security Council resolution - this could adjust the international legal status of what is happening and would make you resort to much more complex explanation constructions. But:
And here we go to values. Since the end of 2010, the period showed that the process of drift of ideas about the boundaries of the permissible in domestic policy of different countries continued: something that was previously moderately tolerant or even perceived as the norm is now unacceptable. And on this subject there is a relative consensus.
When Assad Sr. cleared the boor, this was perceived much more calmly than the current actions of his son. When Gaddafi suppressed folk performances at the beginning of his reign - this was still the norm. Today it has gone beyond the permissible.
The situation is not quite mastered, but known - human ethics is mobile. Once there were people normally, in a significantly later period, the “eye beyond” became the formula of an unusually progressive principle. And now it seems somewhat archaic.
Where exactly is the border today? It is still possible to get ahead of the reforms and slightly suppress as in Morocco or Jordan. Bahrain is already on the verge. True, there is also an amendment to the Iranian problem. Belarus, it seems, is behind the line. Only the transition scenario is still unclear.
To write off on a double standard for countries, friendly US or the European Union, will not work. Otherwise, Egypt and Tunisia would not have happened.
So,
- This is the first substantial issue based on the results of what is happening. Then the legitimacy of violence and the legitimacy of power in the eyes of the international community is lost?
It is clear that each case is special, but it is necessary to understand the rulers when they enter a completely minefield.
The second, related, a question that sounds in the notes of Hasanov-why does all this excite someone? “... In the area of Hama, from time immemorial, citizens of Syrian nationality have been living, professing radical Islam, who, according to various sources, supplied compatriots for Yemen, Jordan, and even (seemingly) for Chechnya. And that once in 10 years, like termites, they experience an exacerbation of radical Islamism and begin a massacre, after which the Alavites from Damascus (the meaning of the word “alavit” should not be explained?) Islamists cut. As a result, everyone is satisfied "
We will not find fault with the strange opposition between the name of one of the branches of Islam (Alavites) and the Islamist class passing over branches (supporters of political Islam of varying degrees of radicality can be of Muslims of various kinds - with the ensuing from here, however, differences). And also to the myth that everyone who opposes Assad or Gaddafi are Islamists. The most successful of him refuted the safe al-Islam Gaddafi, when he began to publicly promise to join the Islamists against the liberal opposition.
In the post -Soviet countries - with all their differences - they are madly loved by the category of "sovereignty". Although in Moscow, at least in Tbilisi, at least in Kyiv, even in Astana. And this is partly explainable - according to the results (or rather, in the process) of the collapse of the USSR, massive construction of national states began. But somehow it began very much at the wrong time.
Sergei Markedonov is absolutely right, calling not to forget that our countries are passing this stage - and this leaves a strong imprint on our summons. But it is difficult to agree with him in the conclusion - we and others will not be able to wait until this problem is solved, and therefore solve a democratic agenda, etc. The task of multiple transition is very important to be aware, but it will have to be decided more or less at the same time.
Why am I? To the fact that only having received new Russia, new Ukraine, etc., we will have to get used to the limited sovereignty of the state on its territory. As, by the way, the sovereignty of Georgia over Southern Ossetia was limited by the time of the beginning of the August war.
- This is the second big question. This is a matter of both the legitimacy of various international structures and the principles of their formation - where small dictatorship and large liberal democracy can own the same voice (I intentionally take extreme options).
We also have a local problem - where to get away from lawmaking and the court to children from time to time from the trenches of the Cold War of advocates of legal sovereignty of Russia.
Another question raised by Vadim Gasanov is about preserving identity-our own and those to whom we somehow belong. Whether the day before yesterday we kissed Eric Honecker in the person of Leonid Brezhnev yesterday - or it was a country that, fortunately, was no longer. We bear certain civil liability for everything that the USSR did, but to identify ourselves with it to the citizens of the new Russia is not the most intelligent choice. But this is the easiest case.
But how to be not losing the historical sequence of the United States: did we help Ben Laden the day before yesterday, yesterday we declared him an enemy, and today we destroyed? The same story with the international techniques of Gaddafi after he “disarmed in front of the party” in 2003.
Here I must say right away: politicians have to betray a lot of dirty hands. Even if human rights activists can’t do without it, for the sake of saving a person you can then wipe your hands with a napkin. Even if a scientist or cultural figure, in order not to be left without financing, will be forced to say hello not only with pleasant people. If the most honest businessman will redeem the actual hostage from the security forces. That policy of all the grave has to go constantly.
That is, this is again the question of the boundaries of the permissible. Was it necessary to encourage Gaddafi's refusal to weapons of mass destruction when he was afraid that he would follow Saddam? Undoubtedly. Was it necessary to begun European politicians from Gaddafi victims of a new bloody slander - Bulgarian nurses and Palestinian doctor? Yes, sure. And to encourage a light opening of the regime? And to hug with as if as a more civilized son - an alleged successor. Thus, which is now waiting for the International Criminal Court.
All these are difficult questions. And they constantly have to solve them. An important condition that helps to do this is an understanding with whom you are still dealing with-
The difference is as if not great, and it is easy to make a mistake.
And hence the question of their own and other people's bitch sons - its own can easily become a stranger, and vice versa, and the essential characteristic will remain. And it’s better not to forget about her, having agreed over the heads of these creatures.
It is clear the sincere desire to see the dictator humiliated or destroyed. It is clear the pragmatic desire of his former associates is to demand reprisals most loudly. It is clear that you need anti -stimulars for those rulers who are too cruel or deaf among the needs of subjects. But there is another need - an incentive for rulers who are ready to leave, but fearing to do it. Caring about this stimulus is an unpopular business, but very necessary.
In this sense, the statements of unusualness of the unusualness of Gaddafi so surprised Vadim Hasanov so surprised, do not seem to me unconditionally thought out. Another question is that the decision on this kind of refuge should not be a stupid improvisation (which sometimes happens in our politics), but part of the scheme agreed with the external and internal opponents of the Libyan leader. Then this would not be a complication of further interaction, but, on the contrary, its positive beginning.
As the overthrow of Mubarak does not mean the end of problems for Egypt, so the overthrow of Gaddafi will not mean the transition to an immediate new, good life for the inhabitants of Libya. I am by no means inclined to idealize the forces that come to power as a result of revolutions or civil wars. In the end, we already see how the change of regime in Egypt reduced international stability in the region in the medium term.
There is no question of how to make a revolution or revolutionaries exemplary - this simply does not happen. A partial exception is the so -called velvet revolutions. But they turned out to be only the beginning of a difficult path.
More practical questions are different: for rulers - how not to bring to revolutions; For external forces - how to minimize the negative effect of the countries in which revolutions occur, and to themselves - as forced partners of both the old and new regimes.