Front-line sanitary battalion near forest roads
He was smoky and killed with longing.
But the soldier said that he was lying without legs:
"You and I, sister, will dance again."
(Pop song,
words by V. Kharitonov)
The creation of the All-Russian Popular Front remains the central event of the election campaign that started this spring. The goal of the campaign is quite clear - to keep all power in the hands of Vladimir Putin. Until now, an important detail has not been clarified: who exactly will take the presidency? Signs are multiplying that Putin, without further ado, will return to the distribution of formal powers that is normal for a personalist dictatorship. But it cannot be ruled out that, under the pressure of some circumstances, the game of “tandem” will continue.
Putin's choice The price of the issue should not be exaggerated. If Putin agrees to a second Medvedev term, then only on the same terms: with the concentration of all real power in his own hands. The risks are associated solely with the fact that it is quite difficult to guarantee the preservation of such conditions for all 6 years. During his presidency, Medvedev diligently demonstrated political lack of independence and unwillingness to accumulate political resources. But he already has some amount of resources, which means that there will be a temptation to use them against a partner. Therefore, the option of Putin's return is more prudent. Most likely, they will stop there.
In the perspective of the Duma campaign, the difference between the two options is not very great. If Putin becomes president in 2012, then it is clear that in December the list of United Russia headed by him should not receive significantly less than Putin himself in March. The admissible distance is known from past experience: in 2007-2008, the Duma result of the United Russia was 64.3% of the vote, Medvedev had 6% more (71.25%). It is possible that Putin's candidacy will be supported not only by United Russia, but also by some other party (say, Right Cause). But at the same time, United Russia must achieve unconditional leadership, because the Kremlin, of course, will not want to bear any coalition obligations. If Medvedev (or some third candidate) runs for president again, then it is all the more important to achieve a colossal Duma majority, which would serve as Putin's political tool and an additional guarantee of his power.
Methods Desirable election result for United Russia is at least 60% of the vote, from two-thirds to 80% of the seats. The arsenal of techniques needed to achieve results was in working order already in 2007-2008, and subsequently it was tested and improved many times in the elections in the regions. The average result of the United Russia in the elections of regional legislative assemblies, held from December 2007 to October 2010, was 60.1% of the vote and 73.3% of the seats. Features of Russian-style elections include artificial non-alternativeness; an information monopoly that does not affect only a small number of politicized Internet users and quality media; administrative mobilization of socially dependent segments of the population who come to the polls exclusively to vote for United Russia; direct falsifications in the counting of votes. The list can be continued, but the example of the "elections" of Valentina Matvienko in St. Petersburg
* * According to the CEC, V. Matvienko won 94.5% of the votes in the Krasnenkaya Rechka constituency, and 93.7% in the Petrovsky constituency. enough to admit that EP will receive in December exactly as much as its leader wants.
„
By and large, the All-Russian Popular Front is not a reality, but a rhetorical device
”
The only question is how many votes United Russia can appropriate without fear that this will cause total distrust in Russian and international public opinion. Let me emphasize that this is a matter of political expediency, not technical feasibility. From a technical point of view, there are no restrictions. For example, in the elections of regional legislative assemblies in March 2011 - with absolutely similar attitudes of the population - United Russia received 36.7% of the vote in the Kirov region and 65.1% in the Tambov region. The difference - almost 20% - is a product of administrative pressure and manipulation. But the March regional elections, when the average result of UR in the votes was 50.1%, showed that it is increasingly difficult for United Russia to achieve victories. The social atmosphere is completely different than during the 2007 parliamentary campaign. The enthusiasm generated by the rise in living standards in the middle of the 2000s is fading away - the well-being of citizens is no longer growing. The contrast with the "dashing nineties" no longer looks unambiguously favorable. There is a growing sense of irritation and weariness in society at the political model created by Putin. Changes in public sentiment are recorded even by such an unreliable tool, unsuitable for authoritarian conditions, as public opinion polls. According to the Public Opinion Foundation, since the beginning of last year, the level of support for the United Russia has been gradually, but almost steadily, declining. If in the first quarter of 2010 it was 52%, then in early August 2011 it was 42%. At the same time, in the fall, Russia may face economic difficulties that will affect mass sentiment.
Thus, the main task is not the victory of United Russia in the Duma elections, but the explanation of why it won with such a colossal advantage. The strategy associated with the creation of the People's
front. The idea that voting for United Russia is a vote of confidence in Putin, successfully played out
in 2007, in the current context no longer looks attractive. The scale of the penetration of the “party of crooks and thieves” meme launched by Alexei Navalny into the masses is such that the close association between the party and Putin could, having migrated to a more important presidential campaign, seriously complicate its course.
Under these conditions, the Popular Front turns out to be the very counter-meme that can be used to explain why voters, even if their attitude towards United Russia is quite skeptical, should still vote for it. Simply put, they will vote not for her, but for Putin and for public organizations that are part of the Popular Front. It does not matter that most of these organizations are fictions, created under the development of government grants, and that almost all of them, before the Popular Front, were firmly connected with the United Russia. By and large, the All-Russian Popular Front is not a reality, but a rhetorical device. Therefore, its organizational structure is irrelevant.
Problems The idea of a Popular Front could have practical implications. It can be used for personnel purge in the deputy corps of the United Russia, which is long overdue. A dozen or two "social activists" in the Duma would not hurt, and it's time for businessmen to find other ways to protect themselves from prosecution. But by giving the formation of the United Russia list to the primaries, the political leadership demonstrated quite clearly that the interests of key regional players who still want to sit in the Duma will not be sacrificed to propaganda considerations. It is not excluded, however, that at the September congress of United Russia, Putin will somewhat correct the situation.
Some other questions related to the propaganda positioning of the Popular Front remain open. It is already clear that Putin has abandoned the image of ER as a “center-right party” and is initiating a turn towards left-wing populist rhetoric, in connection with which the main sparring partner will not be the “left” Mironovites, but the “right” Prokhorovtsy. It is not entirely clear what place the nationalist component will take in the United Russia campaign. Hints - like the urgent registration of the Congress of Russian Communities and the appearance on television of Dmitry Rogozin - have already been received, but these are only the first chords of the front-line waltz. The main work on the promotion of the Popular Front will begin in September.