Daily Journal:

The current situation could have been predicted. Prokhorov, as the leader of the party, did not control it entirely. Initially, he joined a power-oriented party that was alien to him, a pro-Kremlin political force. Moreover, both before Prokhorov’s arrival and after that, this party, from the Kremlin’s point of view, had the task of working with a specific moderate-liberal voter, that is, a voter who does not want to vote for the radical opposition, does not vote for Yabloko, with This is not even part of the peripheral electorate of United Russia. Prokhorov went beyond these requirements. For obvious reasons, the voter I described above is not enough to receive not only seven, but even five percent of the votes in the elections. Any result less than seven percent is a defeat for Prokhorov. Therefore, Prokhorov, following the electoral logic, rather cautiously, but at the same time clearly moved towards the peripheral electorate of the party in power. He began to attract figures like Alexander Lyubimov and Yevgeny Roizman, acceptable to some United Russia voters. This is where a conflict situation arose. I think that the story of Roizman’s conviction thirty years ago is only a pretext. Roizman’s persona is interesting here only because exactly the same story happened with the A Just Russia party in 2007. Only this party should have taken away votes from Zyuganov. She also went towards the peripheral electorate of United Russia, also tried to attract Roizman to the list, and she also ran into big problems. The difference is that if Mironov had the opportunity to abandon Roizman and other figures that did not suit the Kremlin, he had the status of chairman of the Federation Council, his party was the successor of several parties at once, including Rodina and the Party of Pensioners, which was originally gave her a nuclear electorate, which could be the basis for an election campaign, then Prokhorov’s situation is different. Firstly, the party has virtually no nuclear electorate, so the option of a “conformist” election campaign is not at all acceptable to it. Secondly, Prokhorov has already made a public promise to Roizman. If he changes his position, it will be a huge blow to his reputation. We see that Prokhorov refused to dissociate himself from Roizman. Accordingly, the factor that he does not control the party enough is now fully manifested. And those people in the party who are connected with the authorities today made this clear to him quite clearly. Now he faces a very difficult choice. He may try to enter into conflict, taking into account the fact that some regional organizations support him. But success is not guaranteed to him. Even if he wins, a strong intra-party split is inevitable, which for him, in fact, is not the worst thing in this situation. What is more dangerous for him is a conflict with the Kremlin. Another option is that he leaves in one format or another: either he is displaced, or he slams the doors himself. The third option, in my opinion, is the most unfavorable for him - he accepts the conditions, abandons the figure of Roizman, who has become iconic here, and comes to an agreement with his opponents in the party. There is a feeling of pre-election idyll, but, of course, there is a reputational blow. Therefore, I don’t think that any of these options is optimal for Prokhorov. All options come with significant costs.

The Kremlin was not interested in “Right Cause” getting into the Duma at the expense of reducing the results of “United Russia”. How else can “Right Cause” get into the Duma, given the existence of “Yabloko”, in conditions when some liberal voters will boycott the elections, I don’t understand. A contradiction arose. On the one hand, the Kremlin made it clear that they are interested in the presence of liberals in the Duma, but, on the other hand, this issue is not a priority for the Kremlin. If we build a hierarchy of priorities, then, of course, the most important thing is to maximize the results of the party in power. Then, by a large margin, it is not Prokhorov, but the holding of more or less decent elections. To do this, it is necessary to create more or less normal conditions for the communists and the LDPR, because they are now laying claim to expanding their electorates and improving their performance. If they are limited, there will probably be an even bigger scandal. And somewhere at the very end, probably in last place, is the idea: why don’t liberals appear in the Duma? In addition, the question arises: did the Kremlin want to create a full-fledged faction led by Prokhorov or just a representation of liberals? According to the new law, if a party receives five percent, it will nominate one candidate to the Duma. Maybe this option was actually considered, which does not suit Prokhorov. But in any case, in the hierarchy of priorities he is in last place. If for this it is necessary to reduce the result of the party in power, to allow Prokhorov to receive part of the votes that the party in power already considers its own, the Kremlin is not ready to do this. The scenario in which Prokhorov will work exclusively in the liberal clearing, attracting exclusively liberal voters who will be ready to vote for him in this situation, in my opinion, is unrealistic. Prokhorov understands this, which is what caused this conflict.