In the Kremlin

Three -party parliament: new assembly

September 15, 2011 Sergey Shludov

A new political season starts. After three months, December 4, elections to the State Duma will take place. However, today it is possible to predict the composition of the future parliament. Representatives of only three political parties can be in the coming State Duma. Without the LDPR and "Fair Russia."

Children of Berezovsky

In the entire short history of Russian parliamentarism, there were several attempts to instill in him a biceps. Or, at worst, at least some system, that is, the stable structure of ideological retrains and counterweights that would form the country's party structure and, as the President of Medvedev, “reflect the real preferences of the widest circle of citizens as much as possible.” In fact, the introduction of a party system with a limited number of real players frankly contradicts this thesis. Or “citizens' preferences” should become smaller and they should become easier. The reduction in a political supply should, as conceived by the architects of the system, give rise to a reduction in political demand.

For eight years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency in a political discussion, there was an opinion that the Kremlin was seeking to build a two -party system according to the American model in the country. The author of such an idea was considered Boris Berezovsky, who, according to journalistic legend, went back to the newly elected president in April 2000 and proposed creating a system consisting of a left -shententric and legal centers. It was Vladimir Putin who was proposed to lead the levocentric project as a priori more successful, thanks to populist and social rhetoric. Berezovsky himself intended to establish the party of the right center, with a pro -Western ideology and aimed at reforms. But the country's leadership, having survived the experience of the 1999 parliamentary elections, removed the idea of ​​bicamera in a long box. Recall that then the regional front in the person of the Bloc “Fatherland - All of Russia” grappled in equal struggle with the Kremlin “unity” and the country, having received two “parties of power”, only sabotage, black PR and uncontrollability. The idea of ​​bicepartia was again remembered in 2006, when the Just Russia party was created. Teached by the experience of the democratic elections of the 90s, Kremlin political technologists are now engaged only in design party-industry. The project “Fair Russia” suggested it as the second large “party in power”, as well as “United Russia” based on the support of Vladimir Putin and also using the administrative resource. Therefore, it is not surprising that, firstly, smaller parties, for example, “green”, sought to become part of the new levocentric party; Secondly, that the migration of members of parliamentary parties began, for example, from the Communist Party and LDPR to Mironov; Thirdly, that “Fair Russia” began to stably occupy the second places in the regional elections, and in some rare cases even to win.

However, despite this, the party project “Fair Russia” failed. And he was not a success for many reasons: there is the mediocrity of Sergei Mironov as a party leader, and the slurred ideology, and open love and sympathy for the leader of a competing party, and the reluctance of the ruling “United Russia” to act at least a hem of the Earth.

As a result, the negative experience of the Mironov project buried the idea of ​​bicamerality for Russia for many years. Now most likely the Kremlin administration has been adopted by the Mexican experience of party construction.

Mexican scheme

When they talk about the Putin system of parliamentarism, they often recall the experience of three countries: Mexico, Japan and the GDR. In the “second homeland” of the Prime Minister, in Eastern Germany, for more than forty years, the dominant role of the socialist single party of Germany has been preserved. At the same time, other four parties that had one more conservative or a more liberal bias existed normally next to her for many years. The system at first glance had a completely democratic appearance, and all the “preferences of citizens” were presented in it. Today, Russia, of course, is still far from the Constitution an article about the “leading role of the All -Russian Popular Front” in the country's political life, but the experience of the GDR as a “memory of the future” must still be kept in mind.

The second example is the experience of the liberal-democratic party of Japan. For half a century, from 1955 to 2009, the party has been ruling and dominant in Japan. Its situation in the last twenty years is interesting, when in order to form a government and stay in power, liberal democrats were forced, for example, to go to a coalition with socialists, to the unprecedented joy of the latter. Also, to conquer the majority, the mass involvement of smaller parties to cooperation was practiced, which were conventionally “for one ministerial portfolio” were ready for anything. In the dominance of one political party, smaller parties always have a temptation to abandon the opposition and go into power as a “appendage” of the ruling party. That is, between the crane in the sky (fullness of power, victory in the elections) and the blue in their hand (serving the ruling party), they choose the latter. At the same time, their stay in power is purely symbolic in nature, they do not decide anything.

But today Russia is closest to the Mexican experience. Russia is often compared with Mexico in terms of parliamentary flora and fauna. The Mexican model, which can be introduced in Russia, is simple to disgrace. One ideology is one party. Moreover, the experience of the once -ruling institutional revolutionary party, which controlled both the chambers of the parliament for 71 years, as well as the institution of the successor to the presidents, is very impressed by United Russia. The remaining two Mexican parties, the party of national action ”and the revolutionary democratic party are spokesmen, respectively, the right and left idea. The ruling centrist party by nature Anti -ideological , that is, does not have solid principles and, depending on the current political moment, uses a variety of rhetoric. This ensures the maximum effect on the elections, while the rest of the batches receive votes “on quotas” from the festive table of the ruling. By the way, the experience of maneuvering between ideologies was widely applied into practice and the liberal-democratic party of Japan, securing this maximum votes in the elections. “On the slave part of the island, we praise slavery, on the free part of the island we praise freedom.”

But history tells us that for the most part the presidential republics (especially in Latin America) are only partially or not free at all; The parliament in them is just an application to the presidential power, and the ruling party is always more than just a party. This is both the management mechanism and the parallel “vertical of power”. Such parties do not know how to be in opposition. Having ceased to be a “party in power”, they are scattered very quickly: either because of the overthrow of the leader, or because of the banal outflow of party members.

So, after a defeat in the elections, the institutional revolutionary party, which ruled Mexico, instantly scattered after the election. When the opposition united under the slogan “There is no falsification of elections”, the “institutionalists” immediately lost both the chambers of the parliament, and a few years later, in 2000, and the presidential post.

At the moment, judging by the election preparation, in Russia a course has been taken precisely to build a three -party system according to the Mexican model. In confirmation, several facts can be brought.

Forecast for the 2011 parliamentary elections

In the 6th State Duma, the elections to which will be held on December 4, 2011, only three of the now registered political parties will be presented. Surveys of public opinion and assessment of political scientists are currently saying that the future State Duma will retain its composition minus “Fair Russia”, which will not overcome the 7-percent barrier. Judging by the rating of parties published at the end of August the Levada Center, United Russia is gaining 54% of votes, the Communist Party of the Communist Party of 18%, the LDPR 13% and “Fair Russia” 6%.

Since the beginning of the year, everyone has been sagged except the LDPR. This can serve as an indicator of an increase in the protest voting, because we are used to considering the Zhirinovsky party as a sampler for those who vote from hopelessness or “joke”.

However, most likely, in the future parliament, which is designed to work (according to amendments to the Constitution) for five years, completely different parties and people will be represented.

This prognosis attempt is based on many factors: these are parties and the “Mexican” scheme of part -time, which can be applied in Russia, and the percentage of falsifications and the use of the administrative resource, and the behavior of the “place” bureaucracy, and the “purpose” of the results from above, and the agreements existing between systemic opposition and the Kremlin, etc. Bearing in mind all of the above, it is safe to say that the preparation of political forecasts in Russia, in a country with a political system that has not yet been formed and political culture, is an ungrateful matter. The forecast is based on the fact that everything will go further as today, that is, it involves some political stability, which can be blown up at any moment by the decision from above; And the whole forecast, no matter how logical and rational it is, can be thrown into the garbage basket.

The first place, taking advantage of the legal registration of “United Russia”, will take the All -Russian Popular Front. The front should be considered not only as a temporary electoral tool or as a mechanism for the accumulation of property with the aim of its further “nationalization” (we recall the annoying desire of the oligarch Alexander Lebedev to transfer his Airline Red Wings to the property of the front), but the main thing is as a foundation for the future centrist party in power. This says a lot.

Firstly, the United Russia was obliged to accept on the federal party list of all to whom the Popular Front will give a recommendation. Throughout the country, the primaries of United Russia began, and Vladimir Putin openly stated that parties that do not hold intra -party primaries simply sell places on the federal list. Open doors worked: feeling that you could still jump into the last car, representatives of other parties reached for the front -line soldiers. A massive outflow of frames from “Fair Russia” began. As in anticipation of the 2007 elections, everyone fled to Mironov, now everyone ran from him. There were rumors that they were “surrendered” by whole regional branches. One of the three founders of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, who once brought the Plan of the Rodina to its composition, Alexander Babakov, broke with fair Russians and declared the desire to run to the Duma through the Popular Front. As a result, about 2-3% of the "Just Russia" electorate will flow back to United Russia. A similar Anschlus is beneficial for the Party of Power itself: given the risks of the coming decade, the economic crisis and stagnation in the current management system, “bears” would be nice to adopt more left rhetoric.

Secondly, about 1,600 organizations have already entered the Popular Front. “Scraping along the susks” and even accepting those whom they did not take to “United Russia” at one time, the Popular Front can count on even greater administrative zeal in the field and a couple of interest of votes of votes.

Thirdly, constantly increasing the results in the federal and regional elections, United Russia made itself dependent on the bad infinity of the growth of its own results. You can’t dial a percentage less than last time: you need to show a small one, but growth. The refusal of the patronage of “Fair Russia” and the mechanisms of the Popular Front will increase the result of “United Russia” from 64% of the 2007 sample to 69-70% in the current elections. At the same time, we keep in the mind another 2-3% of the agrarian party of Russia, which in 2009 became part of the party in power. As a result, today's 54% closer to the elections will grow to 70.

At the moment, some experts and sociologists note that during the formation of the federal list between the newly called “front -line soldiers” and members of the United Russia party, an acute confrontation begins. This is a normal reaction of any bureaucratic system, which is certainly the United Russia party. Being built as a classic party for a one -party system, that is, as a party duplicating the state apparatus and in many issues claiming to replace it, United Russia painfully reacts to the influx of new members. Moreover, Putin forces the “United Russia” to share places and power with the “new arrivals”, and the electoral list is not rubber.

As mentioned above, the Popular Front will most likely become the foundation for the future large batch of centrist. The front will have to cover a truly lion's share of the population, more than 80-85%. The past results of “United Russia” will seem like children's entertainment, and the fact of non -participation in the front will be considered as an occasion “for suspicion.” This will be our native CPC, a new edition of the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party. But this is the worst script.

The best is that, probably, the front was created purely for rebranding and rebooting United Russia. This will allow you to update the composition, and temporarily raise the rating, and get rid of the bored meme "Party of crooks and thieves."

The second place is most likely to take the transformed party “Just business”. At the moment, it sounds ridiculous, but in December the party of Mikhail Prokhorov can count by about 8%, a maximum of 10% of the vote. And there is an explanation for this.

A similar leap and success are not something new for Russian parliamentary history. In the 2003 State Duma elections, the Rodina block (also the Kremlin project) was able to take 9% of votes from the zero start at once. Of course, we can say that the left and mild nationalist rhetoric of the "Motherland" was much more in demand in society than the liberal ideas of Prokhorov, weighed down by the same desire to reform the Labor Code. But this can also be brought to several objections. Prokhorov, given his personality and character, would never take up a potentially failed project; It can also be assumed that, having decided to lead the “right business”, the oligarch received some guarantees in the Kremlin, as Rogozin and Mironov at one time. This, of course, is only the guesses and opinions that exist in political discussion, but if you listen to the rhetoric of the new leader of the “right -handed business”, we can assume that he is counting on an inflated ceiling. This includes the words that “we are not an opposition”, a forecast for second place and a desire to become a “party in power”. According to the former leader of the Civil Power party, Mikhail Barschevsky: "Prokhorov flies gets 10% at least in the elections if he pronounces a phrase such as" the current government leads Russia to a dead end. "

It is essentially difficult to criticize Prokhorov. The updated right -hand batch takes only the first steps. The power is sluggishly to the vegetarian rhetoric of its leader, the power is sluggishly in the removal of billboards and the organization “Mask-Show” at the Prokhorov Bank of the IFC with an “introductory goal”.

So in the fall from the “right-handed” it is worth waiting for an aggressive and expensive election campaign in the best traditions of 1996, precisely as excuses for the future 10 percent result. The first volleys of the campaign are already distributed. The other day, Alla Pugacheva announced her desire to "support Mikhail Prokhorov." True, immediately a rainbow impression was lubricated by the statement that "supporting Prokhorov, I support Putin." Of course, such a statement largely negates the “opposition” fuckers of the businessman. Well -wishers can recall 1999, when the Union of Right Forces, going to the Duma, supported Vladimir Putin and ended up some of his rating in his asset. The right ones can support Putin today, but we must remember that both the right are others and Putin is different.

So far, without the mention of Putin, Prokhorov can only rely on his “natural” electorate, that is, liberal -thinking voters, primarily representatives of small and medium -sized businesses who are ready to believe in the success of Prokhorov and who need guarantees for the passage of the party in the Duma and creating a “party of interests of business” there. And if you add to them part of the electorate of an unregistered batch of folk freedom, which in the summer had a rating of about 9%in Moscow, then the necessary ten can be obtained quite naturally.

If you distract from the numbers and just pay attention to information tapes, you will find that they are already full of “right -handed”. The passions around the party boil serious. Before the next party’s congress had time to open, the media began to actively replicate the news that during the congress of Prokhorov they would “be thrown away” from the post of leader of the party. Analysts adhere to the version that the “Kremlin is dissatisfied with the activity of the oligarch” and that “an attempt will be made to intercept Prokhorov’s leadership in the party”. В итоге в среду 14 сентября лидер «Правого дела» очень жестко присёк любые попытки «сепаратизма» и распустил исполком партии. Первый день съезда партии признан недействительным. «Первая в истории попытка рейдерского захвата партии Кремлем» провалилась. В политологической среде преобладает мнение, что именно Кремль стоит за попыткой раскола в «Правом деле». Да и сам Михаил Прохоров напрямую обвиняет «чиновников из администрации президента». Мы лишний раз убедились, что Кремль — понятие «многоподъездное», что единой воли в Кремле нет, а есть лишь столкновение интересов различных групп влияния. Казус Прохорова доказывает, что при желании можно проводить в жизнь собственную позицию, если и оглядываясь на Кремль, то не всегда подчиняясь ему.

Напомню, что камнем преткновения стал вопрос о включении в список партии главы фонда «Город без наркотиков» Евгения Ройзмана. Прохоров мертвой хваткой вцепился в Ройзмана и не позволил выкинуть его из списков партии; в чем (опять же если верить источникам) пошел на прямую конфронтацию с Кремлем. Ройзман — человек, которые реально смог создать в России организацию по борьбе с наркоманией и наркобизнесом. Причем эффективную организацию. Это подтверждает и количество уголовных дел, заведенных против Фонда, от которых, выражаясь научным языком, попахивает «конфликтом интересов», а ненаучным — сговором правоохранительных органов и наркоторговцев. (Вспомним нашумевшее дело Егора Бычкова, главы отделения Фонда «Россия без наркотиков» в Нижнем Тагиле.) И странно сейчас видеть, как Кремль выступает против Ройзмана.

Один из основателей «Правого дела» Евгений Чичваркин уже написал в своем Живом Журнале, что «"Правое дело" приобретает четкие черты реальной оппозиции. Мне хочется верить, что Прохоров просчитал все на 7 ходов вперед, потому что это все не шутка юмора. Мне уже во второй раз захотелось назад в партию. Как же там у нас в России интересно » .

Третье место займет КПРФ. Безобидный Геннадий Зюганов, чья риторика не меняется последние двадцать лет, устарел еще в прошлом десятилетии, однако может рассчитывать на скоромные 7-8%, балансируя на грани проходного бала. Естественный электорат КПРФ уменьшается с каждым годом, а ничего нового и привлекательного Зюганов придумать не может. Кого увлечет идея Народного ополчения, полностью скопированная с путинского Фронта? В Кремле, кажется, наконец-то успокоились и «разрешили» КПРФ формировать вокруг себя остаточный протестный электорат. Пусть лучше стекается к легальным коммунистам, чем к Лимонову. Ведь выборы 2011 года первые, когда не создана альтернативная левая партия для оттягивания голосов у КПРФ, какими были «Родина» в 2003-м и «Справедливая Россия» в 2007 году; впервые ряды КПРФ не пытались расколоть, как было в момент ухода Геннадия Селезнева. И наконец, совершенно в рамках мексиканской схемы, где доминирование центристов во многом осуществляется за счет постоянной конфронтации «правой» и «левой» партий, Геннадий Зюганов не способен возвыситься над партийными интересами и поэтому никогда, например, не поддержит «Стратегию-31» и не выйдет на площадь, «потому что там Немцов, который в лихие 90-е разворовал страну». На данный момент Зюганов — это вечная оппозиция, атавизм 90-х, и, отводя КПРФ впервые за последние годы «унизительное» третье место, власть даст понять, что это последний срок пребывания коммунистов в Думе. КПРФ из «вечно второй», то есть из «единственной» альтернативной силы в стране, из магнита протестного голосования, будет превращена в «одну из» партий. Этим будет снижен ее оппозиционный статус. Позже, уже после ухода Зюганова на покой, остатки коммунистической партии смогут служить базой для создания в России первой внятной социал-демократической партии европейского образца. Партии, которая очень нужна России и представители которой не будут повсюду таскать с собой «труп Сталина».

А что же остальные?

В рамках поправок к избирательному законодательству, внесенных по инициативе президента Медведева, партия, набравшая более 6% голосов, но не перескочившая 7-процентный барьер, может рассчитывать на два кресла в Госдуме; партия, набравшая от 5 до 6% голосов, — на одно кресло. Видимо, опробовать эти поправки на практике предстоит ЛДПР. Все зависит от того, решат ли пустить Жириновского в парламент одного или с сыном, депутатом Лебедевым. От этого решения зависит, сколько наберут либерал-демократы: 5 или 6% голосов.

Сейчас Жириновский дал понять, что снова будет пытаться привлечь в партию электорат, разделяющий националистические взгляды. Для этого в партийный список включен сын полковника Юрия Буданова и адвокат Евгении Хасис. Ясно, что имена «Буданов» и «Хасис» будут использованы как мем, как приманка, как символ. И более ничего. Известны они лишь в узкой среде убежденных ультраправых. И даже подобный шаг, как включение этих двух мемов в предвыборную агитацию ЛДПР, не сможет принести им ощутимых процентов голосов на выборах. Убежденные националисты с своем большинстве принадлежат к внесистемным организациями и даже боевым группам (или же разделяют их взгляды и программы) и вряд ли будут голосовать за «системного» Жириновского. Максимум, на что могут рассчитывать либерал-демократы, это взвинчивание бытового национализма, разделение на «нас» и «их». Но волны бытового национализма быстро сходят на нет, а имена «героев» быстро забываются.

В рамках 2-3% можно прогнозировать результат «Справедливой России», чье падение будет так же стремительно, как карьера Сергея Миронова, который буквально за месяц прошел путь от спикера Совета Федерации до Антиселигера.

На днях прошел съезд партии «Яблоко». В избирательный список вернулся Григорий Явлинский. Это безусловно успех. Вспомним, что когда несколько лет назад Явлинский покинул пост лидера партии и передал его Митрохину, то результаты «Яблока» на региональных выборах сразу резко упали. И отрастали назад потом очень медленно. На данный момент рейтинг «Партии ''Яблоко'' под руководством С. Митрохина», как пишет Левада-Центр, около 1%. Даже если Григорию Явлинскому силами одной своей личности удастся увеличить рейтинг партии вдвое-втрое, то все равно мы получаем около 2-3%. Но сам факт возвращения Явлинского в активную политику, что означает его участие в телевизионных дебатах, представляется крайне интересным.

В будущей же Государственной думе нам с вами стоит ожидать «мягкой коалиции» «Единой России» и «Правого дела», хотя на данный момент последние и отрицают вероятность такого поворота, что в сумме даст им вместе около 80% депутатского корпуса и полную свободу действий в любых вопросах.

Автор - политолог, аспирант Института философии РАН

Photos of RIA Novosti