Alexander Iosad: Vertical Democracy

The last congress of the United Russia party will be remembered for a long time. For obvious reasons, the media pay especially much attention to the upcoming “castling” in the ruling tandem and a public scandal that followed the congress with the participation of the head of state and the Minister of Finance. In the current political situation, the one-Russian hope for the majority in the State Duma and the re-election of Vladimir Putin for the third term have every chance to justify themselves, so it is not surprising that the attention of political analysts in Russia and abroad is riveted to the prospects for the next six to twelve years and the possible economic consequences of the dismissal of Alexei Kudrin.

However, among other, less sensational statements made at the congress, the little-meaningful phrase was passed when the Prime Minister represented the delegates of the future “first issue” of the party list. The phrase, however, has a lot about how the political space in the country functions. Vladimir Putin noted: “We have a tradition that the head of“ United Russia ”is headed by the head of state, and I believe that this tradition does not need to be violated.”

This wording is a curious interpretation of what a “party in power” is. In the West, as you know, the ruling party is the party that is elected to power. Applicants for this title are located in a conditional range from left to right, which theoretically includes the whole variety of political views. Giving their votes in the elections, voters support the point of view in this range that impresses them the most. In Russia, the situation is different, and many observers, especially in the West, explain this by manipulation of the electoral process by the authorities (whether through changes in the legislation or authorized violations during voting). But that difference in the position of political parties in the eyes of the society that we observe in everyday life cannot be explained exclusively to the election results. Here's the point.

The range from the left to the right formed relatively recently, during the restoration of the Bourbons in France at the beginning of the nineteenth century (the first division into left and right in politics occurred during the French Revolution, when the left opposed the right of the veto for the king, and the king was executed, and the question fell by itself). Since then, the Pravdov Lygovs became the norm for all democratic countries. However, as Stephen Lukes notes, “until [the beginning of the 1820s], other spatial images, especially the metaphor of verticality, embodied the ideas about the hierarchy ... for example,“ King of the Sun ”” (2003: 606), in the iconography of the political space. The same metaphor “vertical of power”, as you know, became widespread in the first two periods of the presidential rule of Vladimir Putin and, it seems, had a huge impact on the reorganization of political space in the country according to the principle of the hierarchy.

The Putin's vertical of power was not created in order to influence the position of political parties in the country. She acted as a model of centralization of power after the 90s, which some observers later characterized as “uncontrollable federalism”. The vertical of power itself became a consequence of the need (in the perception of the first persons of the country) in the taming of the obstinate regional leaders (and, probably, by a reflection of the style of leadership inherent in the new president). It is important to note that it was not a tool for monitoring public policy. The very expression “vertical of power” analysts and political scientists write off, as a rule, to the rhetoric of justification of ambiguous decisions in the field of minimizing the sovereignty of federal entities and do not attach much importance to it. So, for Western observers, Cameron Ross's remark is typical, according to which the “efforts of the President [Putin] in the subordination of the regional authorities and the establishment of what he calls the“ vertical of power ” is a genuine mockery of the principles of federalism” (I.I. italics).

However, do not write off rhetoric from accounts. In this case, the vertical-hierarchical model of the political space, embodied in the concept of “vertical power”, has a direct impact on the position of political parties in the country. Moreover, she directly contradicts with the model of the range of left-right. Having gained widespread, the metaphor of the “vertical of power” directly contributed to the reorganization of the political space on the principle of proximity to the top of the vertical, and not on the basis of political views. In the traditional system “left-right” voters have the opportunity to compare the opinions of parties on specific issues, which determine the position of each of them in the political space of the country. In the vertical system, political preferences do not play a similar role, because the main thing is that one party differs from another is the degree of participation in official politics and proximity to power.

“United Russia” is occupied by the dominant position not because its policy is most popular, but due to closeness to the ruling tandem. The Communist Party, LDPR, and until recently, “Fair Russia” occupy the next step. The next circle consists of registered, but not represented in the State Duma of the party, but the degree of their participation in political life is extremely limited. Any other structure, regardless of its political orientation, automatically turns out to be completely marginalized due to its own “extra -systemicity”. What are the consequences of this for public policy in the country?

First of all, such a reorganization of political space leads to the fact that in a public polemic the country's political course fades into the background. On the one hand, United Russia, as the Party of power “by default”, has no motivation to make their decisions in the social and economic sphere to a serious court of the public. Despite attempts to make the legislative process more transparent using the Internet (as in the case of the laws on the police and on education), usually bills are put forward and adopted almost without the participation of other political forces. At the same time, the legislative branch of the executive power is being replaced and public control over the process is weakened (theoretically, Western parliaments are an instrument of public rather than purely political control, as they represent the “will of the people”). On the other hand, the “non -systemic” opposition itself usually does not enter with “United Russia” into a polemic about the specific parameters of the political course (for example, the size of the state defense order, as Alexei Kudrin did). This happens for two reasons.

Firstly, in the hierarchical system, where the opposition forces like “apple” or “Parnas” are greatly marginalized, the main claim to the authorities and its party is not that it adopts laws with which the opposition does not agree, but that the opposition does not take any participation in this process. Due to the position on the side of the political space, the main goal of the “non-systemic” opposition is not to implement a certain program, but the exit from “extra-systemic” (or complete change of the system). It is on this that its key requirement is based - holding free elections. Secondly, this claim is the lack of access to power-in fact, the only thing that unites opposition parties; The result can be quite paradoxical as the union of the “left” Limonovites with some representatives of the former ATP in the framework of “strategy-31”. A number of observers, this union seems to be a sign of the consolidation of the opposition; In practice, he leads to the fact that the requirement of free elections is almost the only thing that unites partners. If this requirement is satisfied, they would hardly have been able to develop a single election program.

For the same reason, the opposition rarely opposes the specific proposals of United Russia-in order to oppose someone's political course, it is necessary to come to an agreement by your own. The sharp critic of Alexei Kudrin from the part of the liberal opposition after his dismissal from the post of Minister of Finance is another example of the same phenomenon. Although the views of Kudrin and some opposition to economic policies can be largely converged, the latter criticize the first for his proximity to power - instead of uniting on the basis of the economic course, as happened in countries with a horizontal range of political beliefs. Having focused on their own “non -systemic” status, refusing to enter the polemic with the authorities on specific issues of domestic policy, the opposition forces only emphasize their own marginality in the current political space.

As for the opposition of the "system", then a less unambiguous situation has developed here. As nominal participants in the political process, the opponents of the “EP” in the Duma have the opportunity to express their disagreement with the domestic political measures of the party in power. Moreover, this could become an important element of a political strategy for such parties, one of the main tasks of which is to prove the electorate of its independence from the ruling regime. From time to time, the LDPR and, in particular, the Communist Party of the Communist Party is really publicly opposed to the legislative program "United Russia." However, the position of these parties is quite unstable, and they avoid the Kremlin’s criticism too harsh, fearing the transition to the lower level of the political hierarchy, where, in the absence of the “left-right” range, they would be no different from other marginal forces (this is what threatens “fair Russia”). In addition, a long silence about its own political orientation affects the programs of these parties; If the Communist Party still retains the elements of the “left” position (though in combination with atypical for left -wing ethism and traditionalism), then the LDPR fits into the classical definitions of “left” and “right” with even greater difficulty.

The rhetoric “vertical of power” also prevents the emergence of new political forces in the country. The case of Mikhail Prokhorov and the “right business” clearly demonstrates this feature of the vertical organization of political space. The formation of the “right -hand business” occurred with the support of the Kremlin and was considered by experts as an attempt to attract a moderate liberal opposition to their side at the expense of the party, which would represent their interests in parliament. The collapse of the party was also connected in the eyes of many media and Mikhail Prokhorov himself with the efforts of the Kremlin. It is characteristic that the situation of the general absence of the “Left-right” range was manifested in the eclecticism of the party program, the work on which was conducted this summer-in early September: a combination of measures aimed at developing business, with “left” slogans about the need for social protection has a lot in common with the rhetoric of “United Russia”. If you leave aside the question of the role of the Kremlin in the collapse of the “right -hand business”, the fate of the two parties with a similar rhetoric indicates the difficulties associated with the analysis of the political space organized by vertical principle.

The proposed approach allows you to look at the position of "United Russia" in a new way. Following the logic of the statement of Prime Minister Putin at the September Congress, United Russia is a “party in power” at the expense of the tradition according to which the current head of state is simultaneously default the party list. Political views (and possible discrepancies in them) do not matter. It also follows from Putin’s statement that the results of the elections in 2012 should not affect the position of “United Russia”. If the president is chosen by Vladimir Vladimirovich, he will be at the head of the party list in the next elections to the State Duma. But if voters suddenly chose someone else, then he would also have to head the “EP” list-be it Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky, another “candidate of Bogdanov” or the author of the Mem “Party of Kholikov and Thieves” Alexei Navalny. Given how much the party is integrated into the institutions of the authorities, such a scenario is not impossible - after all, in the vertical hierarchy, the change in political orientation does not lead to a change of position in the political space.

Ultimately, the lack of a horizontal range of “left-right” in Russian politics and its substitution with a vertical hierarchy prevents the emergence of new political forces in the country no less effective than changes in electoral legislation. Separation on the left and right allows voters easier to determine the position of beginners in the political space relative to existing parties and decide whether they support their program. In the built vertical system, the party begins with the “non -systemic” status in which they merge into a single mass, and the discussion of political programs goes to the second, or even the third plan. This is the logic of vertical democracy in which political forces strive to be elected for the sake of a higher position in the system, and not to promote a particular program.

Literature

Lukes S. The Grand Dichotomy of the Twentietich Century // The Cambridge History of Twentietary Political Thunght / Ed. TERENCE BALL and RICHARD BELLAMY. Cambridge University Press, 2003. P. 602–626.

Ross C. Putin's Federal Reforms // Russian Politics Under Putin / Ed. Cameron Ross. Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 2004. P. 155–176.