This is not the first time that democratic electorates have been asked what to do if the candidate or party closest to them has, in their opinion, too little chance of success. Some go to the end and vote for their own, despite doubts. Others begin to look for workarounds, indulge in complex calculations and give their votes to someone else, which, in fact, is what the Kremlin political technologists expect from them.
In essence, wanting to outwit the authorities, this part of the voters, on the contrary, allows themselves to be deceived. But folk wisdom says: do not gamble with the state, in any case you will lose.
Russian sociologists first encountered this phenomenon in the 1996 presidential elections. All polls then showed that Grigory Yavlinsky enjoyed the greatest confidence, but a typical pre-election dispute looked something like this:
I like him, but I will vote for Yeltsin, because Yavlinsky has no chance.
No chance for what?
Go to the second round.
Listen, you yourself just said that there will be two rounds. Vote for him in the first round, and if Yeltsin and Zyuganov still make it to the second round, then support the president.
But the logic didn't work. But the supporters of General Lebed did not suffer from such doubts, which allowed him, as we remember, to finish third. And this was, perhaps, the first major success of the nationalists at a high level.
History repeated itself eleven years later, when all three right-wing parties received a meager number of votes in the Duma elections. It was said that the democratic electorate simply ignored those elections. Partly it was. But many supporters of Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces went to vote anyway, they only decided to support the Communist Party. They argued that since the right had no chance, it was best to vote for the strongest of the opposition parties. Allegedly, this is the best way to express your dissatisfaction with the authorities.
Experience has shown, of course, that the authorities did not give a damn about a couple of extra percent received by the Communist Party, but the Democrats were again thrown out of parliament, and indeed from big politics.
“Nothing can be done,” said our experts. - When a voter is guided not by interests, but by ideals, he does not always act rationally. Especially in Russia, which, as you know, cannot be understood with the mind.
Indeed, the theory of irrational behavior of the electorate, which has long been developed in the West, explains many oddities. But our case is described just in the section on the very, that, neither is, rational behavior. Ideals and other high motives here serve only as a cover. Having voted - even under the influence of a momentary impulse - for this or that party, a person begins to associate himself with it, like a fan. And if his “team” turns out to be an outsider when counting votes, this becomes stressful for him, a painful blow to his pride. If the feeling of protest against the authorities outweighs everything else, then it is much more comfortable for a person to support that opposition force, which, even if it is not at all close to him, will at least take second place.
In American sociology, this is called the theory of "least regrets" - the desire to protect oneself from becoming too upset. As you can see, from the point of view of spirituality and adherence to principles, there is absolutely nothing to be proud of here.
But in this case, it turns out that the democratic parties really have no chance. Their last chance is being taken away by their own potential voters.
Can they be persuaded? The solution is suggested by the same theory of least regrets. It turns out that the worst thing is when, after learning the results of the elections, you see that your favorite candidate had a chance, and he lacked only a few votes - perhaps your own vote.
That is why, in 2000, those supporters of Albert Gore in Florida, who could not go to the polls, were tearing their hair out, because he lacked only two hundred and a little Florida votes to become president.
Usually the West learns from Russian mistakes. Now our Democrats have a chance to learn from the bitter experience of the American Democrats? And, most importantly, how long can we allow Mr. Surkov's office to manipulate us?
Grigory Melamedov, especially for Novaya